

JPRS 74876

7 January 1980

USSR Report

MILITARY AFFAIRS

No. 1487

FBIS

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REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE		1. REPORT NO. JPRS 74876	2.	3. Recipient's Accession No.
4. Title and Subtitle USSR REPORT: MILITARY AFFAIRS, No. 1487		5. Report Date 7 January 1980		6.
7. Author(s)		8. Performing Organization Rep't. No.		
9. Performing Organization Name and Address Joint Publications Research Service 1000 North Glebe Road Arlington, Virginia 22201		10. Project/Task/Work Unit No.		11. Contract(C) or Grant(G) No. (C) (G)
12. Sponsoring Organization Name and Address As above		13. Type of Report & Period Covered		14.
15. Supplementary Notes				
16. Abstract (Limit: 200 words) This serial report contains information on Soviet military and civil defense establishments, leadership, doctrine, policy, planning, political affairs, organization, and equipment.				
17. Document Analysis a. Descriptors USSR Military Organizations Military Facilities Military Personnel Civil Defense				
b. Identifiers/Open-Ended Terms				
c. COSATI Field/Group 15C				
18. Availability Statement Unlimited Availability Sold by NTIS Springfield, Virginia 22161		19. Security Class (This Report) UNCLASSIFIED	21. No. of Pages 105	
		20. Security Class (This Page) UNCLASSIFIED	22. Price	

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TASKS OF MILITARY HISTORICAL RESEARCH DISCUSSED

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 10, 1979 signed to press
21 Sept 79 pp 3-9

[Article by Professor and Doctor of Philosophical Sciences Maj Gen S. Tyushkevich: "Military History in the System of Social Sciences and Directions in the Research of Its Problems"]

[Text] The Communist Party of the Soviet Union has assigned large and responsible tasks to the social sciences. "At the present stage of this country's development," commented L. I. Brezhnev at the 25th CPSU Congress, "the need for further innovative elaboration of theory is not diminishing but on the contrary is becoming even greater."¹ This also applies in full measure to such an area of social sciences as military history.

The need for development of military history is dictated in particular by the character of international relations and by the fact that the clash between the forces of socialism and imperialism on the main question of the present day -- war and peace -- is becoming increasingly more intense. Military history, a wellspring of experience of the past, helps better to cognize the present, correctly to appraise it and more surely to predict the future.

In the decree entitled "On Further Improvement of Ideological and Political Indoctrination Work" the CPSU Central Committee calls for "arming the Soviet people, each new generation with the invincible weapon of historical truth and a profound understanding of the laws and prospects of societal development, supported on the firm foundation of Marxist-Leninist teaching."²

1.

Military history is that specific part of general history which studies the development of human society. Karl Marx "pointed out the way toward scientific study of history as a unified process which is logical in all its vast diversity and conflictiveness."³ It investigates an extraordinarily broad spectrum of problems -- from history of the military activity of classes, parties, nations, and the history of wars in various

historical periods of mankind, to the history of military technology. Its interest covers history of the armies of states of different eras, art of warfare, technology, military theory, and a number of other topics. In other words military history focuses on cognition of that aspect of societal affairs which is directly linked with the military activities of states, classes, political parties and special organizations established for resolving military problems.

Military history is a collective science. It consists of a number of relatively independent parts: history of wars, military organizational development, art of warfare, and military technology. It also encompasses military statistics, archives science, historiography, etc. Sometimes military history is divided into military history of the slaveholding, feudal, capitalist, and socialist society; there also exists military history of individual countries, such as Russia, the USSR, Germany, the United States, etc.

The principal subject of military history is the history of wars and armies. Its principal aim is investigation of the operation and manifestation of the laws of the military aspect of social development in historically concrete situations, elucidation of the specific historical patterns of and laws governing concrete wars, military historical processes, and study of the individual and particular in the history of wars. A deeper understanding of the present day, the current state of military affairs and their development prospects becomes possible on this basis. An example of this is study of the history of the Civil War and the Great Patriotic War, the historical laws and patterns characteristic of them, as well as drawing on the experience and lessons of the past for the present and future.

In order better to grasp the social function of military history, it is necessary to have a clear understanding of its place in the system of the social sciences and the nature of its links with other sciences. As a part of historical science, it is interlinked with all social sciences, for its subject -- war and the army -- is involved in the most diversified relationships and interaction with other aspects of societal affairs. Military history is linked with dialectical and historical materialism, Marxist-Leninist teaching on war and the army, political economy, scientific communism, history of the USSR, history of the CPSU, the legal and other sciences. It is particularly closely linked to military science. The character of relations between military history and other sciences is varied, since each science has its own subject, edifice of logic and, alongside general tasks, its own concrete tasks, which it performs in practical social activities. The link between military history, dialectical and historical materialism is expressed in the fact that the philosophy of Marxism-Leninism constitutes for military history a philosophical and methodological foundation. It enables one to explain military history as a process, to elucidate logical and patterned trends in it, and to present a true picture of reality. Historical materialism teaches us to discern laws and patterns in military historical events and to explain various unexpected turns in the course of these events.

Military history is exceptionally closely interrelated with Marxist-Leninist teaching on war and the army. The latter arms it with important initial theses for evaluating concrete wars, development of art of warfare, military technology, etc. Military history in turn provides important material for development of the categories and concepts of teaching on war and the army. The more fully the theses of Marxism-Leninism as a whole and of Marxist-Leninist philosophy in particular are utilized as a nucleus of ideology and methodology in military history, the greater the scientific character of military history.

Considerable influence on its development is exerted by various areas of general history -- history of the USSR, of other countries, history of economics, state and law, political relations, etc. Military history in turn plays an important role in development of these and a number of other sciences.

Military history is uniquely linked with military science. This link is organic and bilateral. They both investigate war and the army and rely on a common ideological and methodological foundation -- Marxism-Leninism; they serve a single cause -- building and armed defense of communism; they constitute a basis for the formation and development of military doctrine; they occupy a significant position in the military-patriotic indoctrination of the Soviet people; they constitute a means of further growth of the might of the Soviet Armed Forces and the entire alliance of armies of the Warsaw Pact nations.

Military history and military science perform common functions in accomplishing the principal task facing the Soviet Armed Forces -- to be in a continuous high state of fighting efficiency and combat readiness to repel aggression, from any quarter. It is essential to note here that history of the art of warfare and history of the Armed Forces, as component parts of military history, are also an inseparable element of military science, enriching it with concrete material and experience. At the same time military history and military science also solve their own specific problems. Military history investigates primarily relationships characterizing war and army in their chronological development, while military science investigates structural relationships. Therefore each of these relatively independent sciences constitutes a form of cognition with functions inherent in it alone.

The principal tasks of military history under present-day conditions are as follows: formation of knowledge on events of societal affairs pertaining to the area of military activity of persons, political parties, classes, and states (gnoseologic function); philosophical, ideological, indoctrinal function; study of and transmission to new generations the experience of the military past (applied).

Marxism-Leninism proceeds from the position that history and the present day are stages of a unified world-historical process. There exists a dialectical link between them. Features of the present were contained in

the past, and features of the future, trends of future development are contained in the present.

Military history studies wars at various moments in the development of the society of mankind, elucidates their causes and content, reveals the character of struggle of social forces, investigates the means and methods by which they were conducted, their results and consequences, and teaches us to draw lessons from them. That which has been experienced by peoples is social experience, the experience of peoples, classes, parties, and individuals. Since it is perceived, it is an objective factor, which determines people's actions and their attitude toward reality.

Studied and summed up on a Marxist-Leninist philosophical and methodological foundation, the experience of the struggle of peoples, revolutions, victories in wars in defense of the socialist homeland, and defeat of the aggressor is utilized for accomplishing the tasks of the present and predicting the future. The experience of history is a mighty weapon in social battles. V. I. Lenin stated that "we take the past as material, as a lesson, as a rung up, from which we are to advance further."⁴

The experience of history arms us with knowledge of the general principles, laws and patterns of victory by progressive forces in just wars, helps us avoid mistakes, and promotes improvement in the forms and methods of our work. As a consequence of this, study, synthesis and exchange of experience become an objective factor of the ideological and political unity of fighters for socialism, for peace and international security, against imperialism, aggression and war.

Imparting to Soviet citizens knowledge of military historical experience, military history with this is participating directly in forming in them a scientific philosophical outlook and is performing an important ideological function. By its content military history helps raise the consciousness, social activeness and productive initiative of the people, including the fighting men of the Soviet Armed Forces, and promotes their cultural growth and development of excellent moral and psychological qualities in them.

Revealing the revolutionary, fighting and labor traditions of the Soviet people, military history helps raise the morale of our population, the ethics of our people, teaches us to overcome difficulties and better to see obstacles in the process of building communism and organizing its armed defense.

It is therefore not surprising that during the Great Patriotic War the Communist Party continuously drew upon the country's glorious past and publicized the deeds of the Russian people, deeds which inspired officers and men in difficult defensive battles and in swift offensive action, and called upon them to perform selfless acts.

Under conditions of a sharp clash between socialism and imperialism, when the problem of war and peace has become vitally important, military

history cannot help but occupy the front lines of the ideological struggle. The more acute the struggle between the forces of peace and the forces of war, and the more savage the resistance of militarism, the greater the responsibility on military history for shaping in Soviet civilians and military men a Marxist-Leninist philosophical outlook and correct understanding of the events of history, as well as for exposing bourgeois, Zionist, Maoist and other reactionary teachings. Soviet military history possesses objective advantages in this struggle: it constitutes a form of cognition by the builders of a new society, promotes a just revolutionary policy, and rests on a scientific philosophical and methodological foundation.

Military history of the socialist state performs important functions, constituting a genuine factor in strengthening the defense might of the USSR and the entire socialist community and a determining prerequisite for increasing the fighting efficiency and combat readiness of the Armed Forces.

Since military history studies the history of wars and armies, and its main subject item is the process of armed struggle, its modes and forms, preparation and conduct, it constitutes one of the foundations in elaboration of current problems of military theory and military organizational development.

The influence of Soviet military historical science on strengthening the defense capability of our nation and the countries of the socialist community, as well as on increasing troop combat capability, is very diversified. But it is most visibly manifested in evaluation of the wars of the contemporary era. The experience of past wars, particularly World War II, is of inestimable significance for accomplishing the tasks of combat and political training of Soviet military personnel under present-day conditions, further development of modes of conduct of the engagement and operation, and improvement of methods of troop control taking into account the latest technological achievements.

We should particularly emphasize that military history is an effective means of improving the thinking processes and expanding the military horizons of officers; it helps one correctly explain the causes of victories and defeats in wars of the distant and recent past, reveals factors of victories in wars in defense of socialism, provides a correct interpretation of the lessons of military history, and promotes drawing from military history conclusions which are useful for the present day. The fact that officers and general officers who lack direct combat experience, who did not take part in the war or experience its harsh school of combat are now taking over top-echelon leadership positions in the military evokes the necessity of thorough study of military history within the officer cadre training system.

One should, however, approach the experience of the past innovatively, mandatorily taking into account the present situation, and on this basis determining the ways and means of its effective utilization for successful development of modern military theory and practice. A close link between military history and contemporary military theory is manifested in this.

2.

What are the principal directions and areas of investigation of military historical problems? There are several. They are determined by the achieved level of development of Soviet military history on the one hand and the demands which are imposed by our party on the social sciences on the other.

One of the areas of development of military history is further assimilation of the military theory and military historical legacy of the founders of Marxism-Leninism and elaboration of its scientific methodology. The legacy of Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels and V. I. Lenin is one of our priceless resources. Its study and investigation is a mandatory condition for successful resolution of all scientific problems. Military history, as a part of historical science, utilizes historical material which is vast in scale and highly complex in content. The abundant and varying significance of military historical facts demand thorough training in theory and military history. In order faithfully to reproduce and explain events of military history, a correct approach to the material is necessary. Marxist-Leninist methodology ensures such an approach. It provides fundamental, initial theses for resolving concrete problems of military history and makes it possible correctly to comprehend its links and relationships with theory and practice of military affairs, especially taking into account the demands of the present day and predictions of military danger. The most important methodological principles are the principles of party-mindedness, objectivity, historicism, comprehensiveness and concreteness of investigation, as well as unity of theory and practice.

Investigation of the laws and patterns of military history has become another vitally important area of investigation. This problem occupies the center of the struggle between bourgeois and Marxist military history. A considerable number of representatives of bourgeois military history reject the laws and patterns of societal development and give this process a subjective, idealistic interpretation, while Soviet military historical science on the contrary relies on them. As we know, Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, alongside the discovery of the general laws of development of society, also revealed a number of laws pertaining to the military area (sociohistorical relationships of wars, link between war and politics, dependence of the modes and forms of conduct of war on the level of development of productive resources and character of production relations, etc.).

Correctly cognized laws and other scientific categories make it possible comprehensively to understand military historical events and processes. They are an essential condition which ensures correct organization of military historical research, the end objective of which has been and remains thorough scientific explanation of concrete historical situations and processes.

The attention of Soviet military history has always been focused "primarily on the synthesized military experience of defense of the Soviet state

against repeated attempts by the forces of aggression to destroy the nation of socialism by force of arms, and the military experience of the victories of our people and army. The main thing in military experience is not only authentic facts but also syntheses, conclusions, and lessons. This part of the investigation is the most important, for it contains theoretical conclusions and practical recommendations which make it possible to improve military affairs, to predict the paths of its future development, and scientifically to resolve problems of strengthening the nation's defense capability. Military history here is closely connected with the present day.⁵ This link between history and the present day is most fully manifested in the process of investigation of the history of World War II and its main component -- history of the Great Patriotic War.

War, even on a small scale, is a multilevel phenomenon. It does not reduce merely to armed combat on the battlefield, but is also linked by numerous threads with economic factors, with the activities of various social forces, and most directly with politics, by taking guidance from which, classes and nations mobilize armed forces, assign them specific goals, conduct war and utilize the results of war in their own interests. Military history plays an important role in investigation of the entire aggregate of problems pertaining to war.

In view of the complexity of the international situation we must emphasize that problems of the present day are acquiring ever increasing significance for military history. These include first and foremost study of the experience of local wars initiated by imperialism since World War II: the wars in Korea, Vietnam, and the aggressive wars by Israel against the Arab nations. It is important to consider here both sociopolitical and military technical factors. From a military point of view the main role in local wars was played by ground forces with air and naval support. For the most part traditional weapons were employed, but frequently new weapons were also tested. Many discoveries were also made in utilization of military hardware and in the modes and forms of waging war. Considerable experience in combat in various theaters has been amassed. Also of great importance is the experience of various operations from the standpoint of employment of armed forces services and arms, modern troop control methods, etc.

An item of particular importance is study of the experience of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact nations in the area of increasing their defense might and strengthening the fighting alliance. We know that efforts by the CPSU, the brother parties of the socialist nations, the world Communist and worker movement as well as all champions of peace have been directed toward further international détente. This firm policy course has always been combined with preparedness to offer a rebuff to any aggressor. In recent years there has been improvement in furnishing our Armed Forces with modern weapons and combat equipment, and the quality of their combat training and ideological conditioning has improved. Everything which has been achieved by the Soviet people is being reliably defended.

In L. I. Brezhnev's book entitled "Na strazhe mira i sotsializma" [Guarding Peace and Socialism] it states that the Soviet Union cannot help but respond to the danger presented by the policies of the militarist circles of imperialism and the hegemonists. One must take into account that there is a genuine military threat on their part. Therefore we naturally are improving our defense. Nor could it be otherwise, for we have never neglected and will never neglect the security of our country and our allies. All divisions of military history -- history of wars, art of warfare, military organizational development, and others -- are called upon to work on these problems. This also applies in full measure to such an item as the problem of peace.

It has already been stressed that war and the army are the subject of military history. But investigation of the history of a war is inconceivable without studying those conditions and the circumstances which preceded it and engendered it, for in prewar policies are formed the causes, essence, and objectives of a war, which determined its historical place, its countenance, and the postwar world is in large measure the result of the war. The link between war and the peace which preceded and succeeded it is one of the important questions of military history. Only with comprehension of the dialectics of transition from peace to war can one thoroughly understand its causes and those trends which are manifested in it, those possibilities which are concealed in it. A typical example of this was the Peace Treaty of Versailles, which contained within itself the preconditions for another world war. In our time an example of peace which contains the sources of new military conflicts is the separate peace concluded between Egypt and Israel under the direct guidance of the United States.

Attention toward the problem of peace on the part of military history should also be considerable because the contemporary international situation is characterized by new conditions of statement and resolution of the problem of war and peace. In past eras wars, as a means of oppressing peoples and nations, were in fact inevitable and legitimized and were influenced by the total domination of private ownership and man's exploitation of man. The situation has changed substantially in the contemporary era. The development of a world socialist system, strengthening of the economy, political position, moral authority and great defense might of the socialist countries -- this is an enormous force which stands in the path of those forces which seek to halt progress with the aid of military force. All progressive forces on earth are interested in preventing another world war. Therefore military history cannot help but investigate the problem of the struggle to prevent war on the one hand and, on the other, concern for strengthening the defense might of the USSR and the other nations of the socialist community. The experience of history teaches us that socialism is compelled to place in opposition to the threat of war a policy which, with all the crystal purity of its peace-seeking ideals, should be based on the might of the Soviet Army and Navy.

Under conditions of an acute ideological conflict between socialism and capitalism on the main question of the present day -- the question of war

and peace -- military history is at the front lines of this struggle. Revealing the historical truth about wars of the past, it exposes the falsifiers of history, who seek to present in a distorted form the military events of the history of the USSR (especially World War II). An attack on reactionary bourgeois and Maoist military historiography is organically inherent in Soviet military history.

These are the most important points characterizing Soviet military history as a science, its place and role in the affairs of our society and the principal areas of investigation of its problems. In resolving these problems, Soviet military historical science consistently defends and confirms the principle of dialectical-materialistic analysis of the historical process, placing it in contrast to the antiscientific research performed by military historians who are in the service of the forces of aggression and hegemonism. Marxist-Leninist military historical science provides the objective truth and draws a correct picture of military history. It is a reliable weapon in the hands of the Communist Party, as a means of cognition and indoctrination of the masses, a means of strengthening the nation's defense capability and increasing the combat readiness of the Soviet Armed Forces.

FOOTNOTES

1. "Materialy XXV s"yezda KPSS" [Proceedings of the 25th CPSU Congress], Politizdat, 1976, page 72.
2. "O dal'neyshem uluchshenii ideologicheskoy, politiko-vospitatel'noy raboty. Postanovleniye TsK KPSS ot 26 aprelya 1979 goda" [On Further Improving Ideological and Political Indoctrination Work. CPSU Central Committee Decree of 26 April 1979], Moscow, Politizdat, 1979, page 3.
3. V. I. Lenin, "Poln. Sobr. Soch." [Complete Works], Vol 26, page 58.
4. Ibid., Vol 40, page 239.
5. P. A. Zhilin, "Problemy voyennoy istorii" [Problems of Military History], Voyenizdat, 1975, page 4.
[3144/0279-3024]

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3024
CSO: 8144/279

DEVELOPMENT OF VIEWS ON DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS DISCUSSED

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 10, 1979 signed to press
21 Sept 79 pp 10-16

[Article, published under the heading "The Great Patriotic War and the Post-war Period," by the Commander of the Red Banner Turkestan Military District Col Gen Yu. Maksimov: "The Development of Views on Defense"]

[Text] As was indicated by the experience of World Wars I and II, defense is one of the key problems of the art of warfare. This is dictated by the fact that defense was almost always prepared and conducted under adverse situation conditions, with a substantial enemy superiority in personnel and weapons. Therefore it is possible to repulse enemy attacks and inflict substantial losses on the enemy, and to force him to refrain from further attack only with thorough knowledge of theory of the modern operation, conditions of the concrete situation, and thorough preparation of troops to conduct combat actions.

In this article we shall briefly examine changes in views on organization of defense by the front and army during the Great Patriotic War and trends of its further development in the postwar period.

On the eve of the Great Patriotic War defense in Soviet military theory was defined as an aggregate of modes of combat actions employed in order to hold a certain area of ground, to inflict damage on the enemy and halt his advance.¹ It could be defense in place or mobile defense, and mandatorily antiartillery, antitank, antiaircraft, and dispositioned in depth, capable of building up resistance at depth.

At that time the tactical zone included the zone of artificial and chemical obstacles, battle outposts, the main and second defensive zones, to a depth of up to 20 km. This was a fairly deep but focal-point defense. A lack of trenches complicated maneuver and concealed deployment of troops and resulted in poor protection of personnel against hostile artillery, mortar fire and airstrikes.

The theoretical principles of defense essentially corresponded to the conditions of that period, but suffered major shortcomings. In the operational and tactical order of battle there prevailed the tendency of linear

distribution of men and weapons. Battalion defensive areas were not equipped with trenches; antitank defense was established by positions and not directions. Artillery occupied weapon positions on ground which was difficult terrain for tanks. Problems of strategic defense under conditions of an enemy surprise attack were not elaborated to an adequate degree. The claim that defense will find fullest expression only on the scale of the army proved to be not entirely correct.

These miscalculations in theory of defense had a negative influence on the course of combat operations immediately following the sneak attack by fascist Germany on the Soviet Union.

Defensive operations of fronts and armies in the first period of the Great Patriotic War were conducted under conditions of strategic defense of the Soviet Armed Forces. Their objectives consisted in preventing the enemy from reaching important strategic objectives and positions and in gaining time to prepare for and launch counterthrusts and shift to a counteroffensive.

A situation of being under strength in equipment and men, a lack of requisite experience in organizing for and conducting defense, as well as the element of surprise in the attack by Hitler's troops, which disrupted the orderly nature of deployment of Soviet formations, combined units and units along the nation's borders, made it difficult to put into practice the correct points of prewar theory. At the beginning of the war the fronts and armies were compelled to shift to the defense hastily, on a broad front, which led to uniform coverage of operational axes and a linear nature to the defense. As a rule the tactical order of battle of large strategic formations was single-echelon, with designation of weak reserves. Defense was of the focal type and lacked continuous trenches. Defense depth in the front amounted to 50-70 km, but most frequently troops would occupy one main defensive zone, while a second and third would be established in some small sectors covering important objectives or road junctions. Large gaps in the tactical order of battle and insufficient securing of boundaries between units permitted the adversary to execute deep envelopment and envelopment of exposed flanks.

In 1942 defense remained focal for the most part, but also assumed more sophisticated forms. Switch positions and intermediate positions began to be employed, and operational depth increased. In the Battle of Stalingrad, for example, it reached 70-90 km. Some fronts and armies had two echelons and various reserves.

On the whole defense in the first period of the war, in spite of certain development, remained linear, focal, weak in an antitank and antiaircraft respect, and was characterized by small operational densities.

In the second and third periods of the war, defensive operations of fronts and armies were prepared and conducted under conditions of strategic offensive by Soviet forces, chiefly to hold attained positions and liberated

areas and to repulse enemy counterthrusts and counteroffensive. Shift by large strategic formations to the defense would be effected in the course of or in the final stages of offensive operations, and sometimes in the preparatory period as well (the defensive operation of the Third Ukrainian Front at Lake Balaton in March 1945). Depending on the conditions of shift to the defense, character of the adversary's actions and concept, and state of operational position of the troops, following were the principal objectives of the front (army) operation: to punish the adversary and thwart his advance, and with a shift to a counteroffensive to complete his defeat; to frustrate enemy attempts to capture a large city, bridgehead on a river, or to reestablish disrupted land lines of communication. In 1943-1945 defense experienced new qualitative development. It became a trench defense and became dispositioned in depth. The front would prepare from four to six defensive zones, and the army -- up to three. The depth of the tactical order of battle would be 35-80 and 20-30 km respectively,² and width of the defensive zone — 250-350 and 30-70 km.³ Strong support echelons of fronts up to an army in strength would be established, and reserves of all arms would be designated. Troops would occupy not only the tactical zone and army zone but also partially the first and second front position lines.

The depth of the tactical defensive zone in the second period of the war increased from 3-4 to 15-20 km. A system of trenches became the foundation of its field fortification. It consisted of two zones, each of which contained from two to three positions of from two to three trenches each. The main defensive zone would be defended by a rifle division, its forward echelon occupying the first and second position, with the third position occupied by a support-echelon regiment. Position depth would range 1.5-2 km,⁴ which would ensure employment of all weapons in close coordination. The support echelon of the corps would occupy the second defensive zone.

Antitank defense was also improving. Its foundation would be comprised of company antitank strong points unified into battalion antitank strong points and tank-killing areas, which contained artillery, tanks and self-propelled guns, as well as artillery antitank reserves and mobile obstacle detachments (APTR and POZ). By war's end density of antitank artillery on the main axes reached 20-35 pieces per km of frontage with a disposition depth of up to 30-35 km.⁵

The fire plan in the defense experienced further development. At the beginning of the war it was based on small arms and mortar fire, while beginning with the second period, it was based on artillery, mortar and machinegun fire in combination with obstacles. In the main defensive zone fire system depth would be as much as 7 km, and in the second -- 3-4 km.

Antiaircraft defense (PVO) also was continuously improved during the war years. RVGK [Supreme High Command Reserve] antitankaircraft artillery divisions were established in the second period. Air defense of rifle divisions included aircraft-warning service (VNOS posts), an antiaircraft weapons fire system, small arms fire, as well as effective troop shelter and camouflage.

Defense of the Soviet forces at Kursk in July-August 1943 incorporated all the experience of previous battles and engagements and enriched the theory and practice of their preparation and conduct in repulsing large enemy forces. Trends toward increasing defense stability by increasing defense depth, skillful establishment of defensive forces, stepped-up activity by conducting artillery and air counterbombardment, mounting counterthrusts and counterattacks on penetrating enemy troops, skillful maneuver of men and weapons to threatened axes and decisive massing of troops on these axes, as well as by establishing a deep and impenetrable antitank and anti-aircraft defense, which evolved in the course of the war, experienced further development.

Subsequent defense was organized utilizing prior-acquired experience and the experience of the Battle of Kursk, in particular the defensive activities on 6-15 March 1945 at Lake Balaton by the Third Ukrainian Front (Mar SU F. I. Tolbukhin, commanding; Col Gen A. S. Zheltov, member of military council; Lt Gen S. P. Ivanov, chief of staff). It was also characterized by deep dispositioning of men and weapons and skillful concentration of principal efforts on important axes. While corps on secondary axes defended in 28-32 km zones, and divisions in 12-16 km zones, on the main axis of advance they occupied zones of 15-20 and 6-8 km respectively. The dispositions of corps and divisions were organized primarily in two echelons. The first two positions in the main zone were defended by battalions of forward-echelon regiments. The third was occupied by division support echelon and reserves. Corps support echelons and reserves were deployed in the second zone, and sometimes army reserves (21st Rifle Division of the 26th Army). Artillery groups, APTR and POZ would be established in corps, divisions, and regiments.

Operational density on the main axis of advance was as follows: one division per 3.3-4.4 km of front, up to 53 guns and mortars and 10 tanks and self-propelled guns per km of frontage.⁶ Maneuver of men and weapons from sectors not under attack was extensively employed in the course of battle, which made it possible to increase artillery densities to 50-80 guns and mortars, and antitank artillery to 25-30 guns per km of frontage.

Preparations for front (army) defensive operations during the war years would be conducted in advance or hastily in the course of combat operations. In conditions where large strategic formations were to prepare for defense on a limited timetable, while repelling enemy attacks, the front (army) commander and his staff would decide on a first-priority basis on measures connected with assigning the troops defensive missions in conformity with the decision reached, with establishment of a defensive grouping of men and weapons, organization of air defense and antitank defense. We were unsuccessful in organizing to a full extent coordination of troops participating in an operation, especially in 1941, which unquestionably resulted in failure to achieve maximum utilization of the combat capabilities of combined units and units and requisite stability of defense.

In the second and third periods of this war, as experience was amassed and with sufficient time available, an entire aggregate of measures would be conducted sequentially and thoroughly in the large strategic formations, pertaining to planning the defensive operation and organizing troop actions.

During the conduct of defensive operations the principal efforts of front and army command and staff were directed toward maintaining stability of defense and increasing its activeness in order to achieve decisive defeat of the adversary. This was achieved by skillful massing of artillery fire and airstrikes on the main axes of advance of the enemy troops, by stubbornly holding the positions and areas (sectors), and by the surprise mounting of counterattacks and counterthrusts.

Thus the basic principles of organization of defensive deployment and conduct of a defensive battle were confirmed in the course of the Great Patriotic War and earned the right to further development. A shift was made from focal to positional defense. Defense became antitank and anti-aircraft. Its density and depth were increased. Defense acquired stability, a high degree of activeness and was essentially impregnable, capable of inflicting such heavy losses on the adversary that he would be compelled to halt his advance.

Continuously increasing troop combat capabilities and innovative utilization of combat experience made it possible in the second and third periods of the war to assign defending troops more decisive missions and to achieve them in a short period of time. On the whole both according to the prewar views and in the course of the war the main objective of defense was viewed as creating all requisite conditions for a shift to the attack.

We must state that such an approach to defining the objectives of defensive operations of large strategic formations corresponded to the character of this type of combat operation, secured the possibility of gaining the time requisite for concentrating the personnel and weapons designated for the attack, and made it possible to economize on manpower and weapons on certain axes in order to establish superiority on others. And this is quite natural, since victory in war cannot be achieved by defensive actions alone.

At the same time it would not always be correct to examine the objectives of a defensive battle or engagement only from the standpoint of creating conditions for shifting to the attack. This is also confirmed by the experience of the Great Patriotic War. In 1941, for example, the armies of the Western Front shifted to the defense with the objective of preventing the enemy from penetrating eastward. In spite of the fact that all armies were assigned concrete missions to establish a solid defense, some of them were assigned attack missions in addition to defense. The 19th Army received the order "by stubborn defense to prevent the enemy from penetrating at the boundaries with the 30th and 16th armies" and at the same time "to capture the following areas: Popovo, woods south of Popovo, Kholm, to establish a stable defense and to prevent enemy penetration eastward."⁷ This objective of the defensive operation of the 19th Army

divided in two the decision of the commanding general, who was devoting greater attention to attack than to establishment of a firm defense.

The dual character of mission assignment without taking into consideration the actual situation and capabilities of the army led to a situation where neither of the assigned operation objectives were attained.

It seems to us that it is more advisable to examine on a strategic scale the objectives of a defensive operation aimed at creating conditions for a shift to a decisive attack. Its necessity has been and remains an objective phenomenon of warfare. At the same time one cannot by means of defense achieve the decisive objectives of war. Therefore Soviet military science views this type of combat operation as forced and temporary, by employment of which one can create the requisite conditions for totally defeating the enemy by mounting offensive operations and engagements.

The theory and practice of defense experienced continuous improvement in the postwar years in connection with the appearance and development of nuclear weapons, qualitative improvement of combat equipment, armament and conventional weapons.

Concentration of principal efforts in contemporary defense can be achieved by employment of nuclear weapons, by creating a denser fire and obstacle system, as well as by extensive maneuver of reserves of various designations and support echelons to threatened axes. Full motorization and the capability to deliver airborne assault troops will make it possible swiftly to reinforce a force on axes where enemy penetration has occurred, to take up defense in advantageous positions at depth with the aim of preventing further penetration, and to establish in a short time forces for mounting counterthrusts and counterattacks. The role of maneuver in the defense will increase substantially.

In connection with the enormous destructive power of nuclear weapons and new conventional weapons, troops will be compelled to disperse in order to achieve maximum reduction of losses, of course without diminishing stability of defense. This can be promoted by substantial increase in their combat capabilities.

Changes in defensive dispositions are quite probable although, as in the past, positions equipped with trenches will remain the foundation of any defensive line. It will be necessary to construct it with a system of battalion areas, company and platoon strong points, set up for all-round defense and containing intervals for the purpose of reducing losses from nuclear strikes.

The availability of nuclear weapons and an increase in the percentage share of tanks and other modern weapons in the defense will provide the capability to maintain a substantial portion of men and equipment in the support echelons and in reserve and to utilize them to mount powerful counterthrusts and counterattacks.

Consequently a modern defense can be based on skillful utilization of terrain, field fortification, the extensive employment of obstacles, and dispersed deployment of troops parallel with and perpendicular to the front. The following will be characteristic of defense: powerful delivery of fire by all types of weapons, extensive maneuver of firepower, and decisive counterthrusts and counterattacks. Nuclear strikes, counterthrusts and counterattacks, supported by massed conventional weapons fire, will become the principal means of achieving success in the defense.

Excellent troop morale and fighting skills, staunchness, continuous co-ordinated action and uninterrupted troop control will constitute major conditions for stability and impenetrability of the defense.

At the present time, with a high degree of mobility, the adversary is capable of initiating an attack without a halt in attack position and of building up efforts by moving up battle groups on a rapid timetable. Therefore troops shifting to the defense will have less time available for organizing it than in the Great Patriotic War, and the quantity of measures to establish a force, equip positions, construct artificial obstacles, organize a fire and control system is increasing substantially. In addition, execution of these measures will be carried out as a rule under enemy fire, including nuclear, to the entire depth of the defense and will require an additional number of measures to neutralize the consequences of this fire and to restore troop fighting efficiency.

Thus the problem of gaining time when shifting to the defense is assuming decisive significance. This will impose heightened demands on commanders and staffs. It will be important for them to predict the further development of events and to make decisions not when the enemy strikes but when he begins to move forward or during the period of completion of concentration at depth.

Under these conditions the high-echelon commanders will be required to reach decisions swiftly, in order to give subordinate commanders and staffs more time to organize for defense and troops to prepare for defense, especially for field fortifications. Therefore much will depend on speed of assignment of missions to the troops, but of course not at the cost of reducing the scope of execution of requisite measures and diminished quality of same.

Soviet art of warfare examines the various methods of preparing for operations. Application of a given method has always depended on the prevailing situation, on the degree of preparedness of command and staffs, plus other factors, chiefly time availability. It is not surprising that during the war years a sequential work scheme was practiced, whereby missions would be assigned to subordinates after the operation decision had been reached by the senior commander, and advance work, when immediate organization for defense would begin at each headquarters following completion of planning at the next higher level. The parallel work method experienced development primarily in tank formations, combined units and units, a method which enables commanders and staffs to proceed with decision-making and planning for combat in parallel with operation or engagement planning by the higher headquarters.

The first two methods of staff work on preparation for a defensive operation have retained their significance under present-day conditions. At the same time the experience of postwar exercises and theoretical studies indicate that with a forced shift to the defense under enemy pressure or the threat of an enemy surprise attack, employment of these methods is little probable due to the extremely limited time available for preparing for combat actions. The parallel work method will probably be the principal method. The work procedure in this instance should ensure that troop actions are in conformity with the concept by axes, beginning with the main axis of advance, as well as immediate communication of missions to combined units and units operating in the forward echelon. Then co-ordinated action and troop control will be organized. The decision, troop missions and other items can be refined and detailed later.

The character of troop preparation measures and the sequence of their execution can vary, depending on the conditions of shift to the defense. In all cases, however, they should ensure continuous readiness of troops and weapons to repulse enemy attacks both with and without employment of nuclear weapons, as well as prompt occupation of defensive positions and preparation for defense. As regards decision content and planning of combat operations, organization of coordinated action and comprehensive support, under all conditions they should be thoroughly thought through and be in conformity with the developing situation. It will prove useful to elaborate planning documents with avoidance of excessive detailing, without burdening them down with reference materials.

In conclusion we should stress that theory of defense, which received further qualitative development in the years of the Great Patriotic War and the postwar period, at the same time was put to a comprehensive practical test. Many questions pertaining to defense have retained their importance under present-day conditions. Therefore in the course of training staffs and troops the invaluable experience in this area should be utilized innovatively and thoughtfully.

FOOTNOTES

1. "Polevoy Ustav RKKA (PU-39). Proyekt" [Draft Field Service Regulations of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army (PU-39)], Voyenizdat, 1939, page 209.
2. "Voyennoye iskusstvo vo vtoroy mirovoy voynе" [Art of Warfare in World War II], Moscow, Izd. Voyennoy akademii General'nogo shtaba, 1973, pp 352-353.
3. "Istoriya voyn i voyennogo iskusstva" [History of Wars and the Art of Warfare], Voyenizdat, 1970, page 435.
4. "Sovetskaya Voyennaya Entsiklopediya" [Soviet Military Encyclopedia], Vol 5, Voyenizdat, 1978, page 651.

5. "Istoriya voyn...," op. cit., page 437.
6. "Operatsii Sovetskikh Vooruzhennykh Sil v Velikoy Otechestvennoy voynye 1941-1945" [Operations of the Soviet Armed Forces in the Great Patriotic War, 1941-1945], Vol 4, Voyenizdat, 1959, page 255.
7. Central Archives of the USSR Ministry of Defense, Fund 208, List 10196, File 30, Sheet 115.
[8144/279-3024]

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IMPROVING THE EMPLOYMENT OF AIR DEFENSE TROOPS DISCUSSED

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 10, 1979 signed to press
21 Sep 79 pp 17-25

[Article, published under the heading "The Great Patriotic War and the Postwar Period," by Col Gen V. Sozinov: "Improving the Operational Forms for the Employment of National Air Defense Forces"]

[Text] The principles of National Air Defense Forces operational art were born and developed during the Great Patriotic War. During the war years they were enriched with various modes and techniques of organization and conduct of air defense of industrial-economic regions and vitally important installations, as well as cover of main forces during preparation for and in the course of operations.

In this article we shall discuss the reasons which dictated the necessity of organization of combat actions of Air Defense Forces on an operational scale, their characteristic traits and features, which maintain their significance up to the present day.

The need for organization and conduct of combat actions by air defense forces on an operational scale arose in World War II as a consequence of mass employment of German-fascist, Japanese, and subsequently Anglo-American air forces, by mounting air operations with strategic and operational objectives.

Operational forms of employment of National Air Defense Forces were born in the first period of the Great Patriotic War. Following were the objective preconditions for this: concentration by the Soviet command of large air defense forces to defend areas and installations comprising the foundation of this country's economic and military-economic potential, the most probable target of hostile air actions in the form of air operations; establishment shortly before the war of large operational-tactical air defense combined units and establishment in the course of the war of operational and operational-strategic air defense formations -- air defense armies and fronts, the command of which could provide centralized control of all air defense personnel and facilities which had the mission of defending areas and installations of strategic importance; the existence

of large fighter forces (fighter divisions, corps and fighter air armies) in air defense combined units and formations, equipped with fighter aircraft which were fast and highly maneuverable for that time and possessing a considerable radius of action (approximately 300 km); equipping of National Air Defense Forces with radio and radar equipment, plus other means of guidance and control. The latter circumstance was of considerable significance under conditions of a rapidly changing situation and a large spatial scope of combat operations. Radar was also employed for conduct of reconnaissance, and a well-developed communications system made it possible promptly to transmit information on the air situation throughout the defended zone and on avenues of approach to it. Supported by this information, the air defense command was capable of predicting the development of events and securing coordinated actions by subordinated combined units and formations and cooperating forces, unified by a common concept and plan of action. It became possible more fully to utilize the excellent maneuver capabilities of fighter aircraft to establish superiority on the main axes of hostile air activities in the interest of defense of rear installations and protection of troop forces over a vast area.

The principal elements of the operational form of employment of National Air Defense Forces in the first period of the war were manifested during organization of defense in the area of Moscow, Leningrad, Voronezh, Stalingrad, and other large cities. Air defense formations and combined units, operating on a unified concept and plan, with centralized control, in the overwhelming majority of cases frustrated German-fascist air operations, which were conducted with decisive objectives and involved the main forces of one or two air forces (760-2000 aircraft). National Air Defense Forces combat operations in these instances were conducted on a broad front (500 km and more) and to considerable depth (400-600 km and more). They pursued opposite objectives to those of the enemy's air operations. Their duration ranged from 2-3 days to several weeks. It depended on the duration of enemy air operations and the results of air defense forces actions.

The experience of the air defense of Moscow and Leningrad is especially valuable.

The command of Hitler's air forces established a special force of bomber squadrons of the 1st, 2d and 4th Air Forces to conduct air operations against Moscow. Direction of the air operations was assigned to the command of the 2d Air Force, which was operating on the Moscow strategic axis.

The State Defense Committee, Headquarters, Supreme High Command (Hq SHC), and the General Staff took decisive measures to ensure reliable protection of our nation's capital from enemy air attack. Moscow and the Moscow economic region were defended against enemy air attack by the forces of the Moscow Air Defense Zone. It contained the following: the I Air Defense Corps, VI Fighter Corps, and the Tula and Kalinin Air Defense Brigade regions. Moscow's immediate defense was handled by the I Air Defense Corps

and VI Fighter Corps. In November 1941 the Moscow Air Defense Zone was redesignated the Moscow Corps Air Defense Region, and the Moscow Air Defense Front was established in April 1942.

In the latter half of July 1941 the Moscow Air Defense Zone contained 602 fighter aircraft, 1,044 medium and small caliber antiaircraft guns, and 336 antiaircraft machineguns.¹ This composition of air defense forces made it possible not only to secure the air defense of Moscow but also to provide coverage of a number of important installations outside the city, and to increase the survivability of ground troops. Up to 30% of the light anti-aircraft artillery (MZA) and antiaircraft machineguns (ZP) were detailed to protect locks on the Moscow-Volga Canal and other installations, as well as to cover air defense fighter airfields, medium antiaircraft artillery (SZA) deployments, and antiaircraft searchlights.

The decision for air defense of Moscow was based on the idea of establishing a perimeter defense dispositioned in depth, beefed up on the most important axes and with close coordinated action by all arms: fighter aviation, antiaircraft artillery, antiaircraft machineguns, antiaircraft searchlights and barrage balloons. A shift was made from installation to zone-installation defensive arrangement, where a unified force would cover a number of installations located over a large area. The layout of defense of installations would be determined by the place and role of each in the country's military-economic potential and by the probable character of hostile air actions.

For example, the zone of operations of the fighter aircraft of the VI Air Defense Fighter Corps in the defense of Moscow was expanded westward from 120 to 200 km and more. This made it possible to increase the air defense operational depth of the Moscow zone, to engage hostile aircraft at the far approaches to defended installations, and to have the time to maneuver personnel and weapons in order to step up countermeasures. With this objective in mind, at the end of September 1941 five fighter regiments from Moscow's air defense aviation (100 aircraft) were redeployed to Rzhev, Vyaz'ma, and Kirov.² These regiments remained at the disposal of the Moscow air defense commander. An additional 74 85 mm antiaircraft guns were handed over to reinforce Moscow's antiaircraft artillery defense.

Control of combat operations of the air defense forces defending Moscow was centralized for the most part and exercised from the command post of the I Air Defense Corps, where the commander and tactical headquarters of the VI Fighter Corps were also located. Decentralized combat control of air defense units and subunits occurred only during defense of separate installations beyond the city limits (airfields, water pumping stations, etc) and when hostile aircraft would appear without warning.

The plan of coordinated action by the air defense forces and facilities of the Moscow zone was drawn up jointly by fighter aviation and antiaircraft artillery headquarters in advance, and subsequently communicated to all coordinating units.

Line telephone communications were the principal mode of communication in the Moscow air defense forces control system. Radio communication was fairly extensively employed in fighter aviation, in the aircraft-warning service, and to a lesser degree in antiaircraft artillery units.

During the night of 22 July 1941 Hitler's air force initiated combat operations against Moscow with a massed air attack. These operations lasted four and a half months -- up to 5 December. In the course of operations the 2d Air Force was additionally reinforced by bomber squadrons redeployed from Western Europe. As the battle line drew closer to the capital, fighters of the 2d Air Force also took part in air operations.

Enemy air operations aimed at demolishing Moscow included massed (for the most part night) raids involving as many as 250 bombers. A total of 220 aircraft took part in the first raid on the night of 22 July 1941, flying at altitudes of 2,000-3,000 meters. They entered the zone of antiaircraft artillery fire in small groups and singly across a broad front (up to 25-30 km), mostly from the west. The raid lasted 5 hours. Subsequently, as a result of strong countermeasures by air defense forces, the enemy's offensive air tactics changed. Large raids would alternate with small ones. The altitude maintained by the attacking aircraft was raised to 5,500-6,000 meters, and runs on the target would be made at intervals of 1-2 minutes between aircraft, approaching from different directions. Single bombers would seek to penetrate through to Moscow, repeatedly entering the zone of antiaircraft artillery fire for the purpose of determining its weakest points. These raids would run 4-5 hours or more.

Under conditions where the enemy possessed air superiority, initiative and was highly active, it became particularly important to predict his actions and to counter them with organized air defense countermeasures. Considerable attention was devoted to advance planning of combat operations.

With a change in the situation and character of hostile air activities, forces and combat operations plans of air defense personnel and weapons would be promptly refined. These refinements were always subordinated to the idea of establishing for National Air Defense Forces personnel and facilities advantageous conditions for thwarting the plans of the German Air Force.

The German-fascist command, having failed to achieve its stated objective of demolishing Moscow, and having lost approximately 1,000 aircraft, refrained from further attacks of the capital.

The experience of air defense of Moscow demonstrated the essential correctness of the principles of organization of air defense of this country's major centers. The practice of massing air defense weapons and establishing a perimeter defense dispositioned in depth proved fully effective. Views were confirmed on employment of the various arms in an air defense system, the forms of their organization, joint and coordinated actions by all air defense forces and facilities, and centralized control of these forces.

Also of considerable value is the experience in organization and execution of the air defense of Leningrad during the blockade. An operational grouping of National Air Defense Forces was established to combat the large enemy air forces which were seeking to destroy the city. The operational grouping included the following: II Air Defense Corps and the VII Fighter Corps which was operationally subordinate to it. In November 1941 they were redesignated the Leningrad Corps Air Defense Region, and in April 1942 the Leningrad Air Defense Army was established. This measure completed unification of Leningrad's air defense forces and facilities into a single unified system on an operational scale, which made it possible to exercise centralized control of these forces on a unified plan and with close coordination with the air defense forces of the Leningrad Front and the air defense weapons and aviation of the Red-Banner Baltic Fleet.

The water route across Lake Ladoga was provided cover against air attack by the Ladoga Brigade Air Defense Region, and the rail lines which ran from the heartland to Lake Ladoga -- by units of the Svir' Brigade Air Defense Region. In August 1942 the Svir' and Ladoga Brigade Air Defense Regions were unified into the Ladoga Division Air Defense Region.

Control of the combat activities of Leningrad's air defense forces was centralized for the most part. Overall direction was exercised from the command post of the Commander of the II Air Defense Corps (subsequently air defense army commander). The main command post was located in downtown Leningrad. The command posts of the commander of the VII Fighter Corps and commander of the corps (army) antiaircraft artillery were also located here.

The prevailing conditions required clear-cut coordination among all Leningrad air defense forces and facilities. Headquarters of the Leningrad Air Defense Army, air forces of the Leningrad Front and Red-Banner Baltic Fleet, and the Kronstadt Air Defense Division, utilized in their combat efforts to repulse air attacks jointly-elaborated unified mutual coordination documents, taking the situation into account. They clearly defined action variants by air defense forces and facilities during raids on Leningrad, the Kronstadt Naval Base, and the port of Osinovets. A uniform code¹ map was prepared for vectoring fighters to hostile aircraft and a uniform layout of fighter combat zones; a system of vectoring posts was set up. In addition a special decree by the Military Council of the Leningrad Front authorized the commander of Leningrad air defense fighter aviation to utilize fighters of the Red-Banner Baltic Fleet to repulse mass attacks on the city. Coordination with field air defense was organized by Leningrad Front Headquarters.

Combat actions by German-fascist air power to destroy Leningrad were conducted by the forces of the 1st Air Force and continued approximately 5 months (July-November 1941). They involved mounting mass attacks by waves of aircraft against Leningrad, the ships of the Red-Banner Baltic Fleet in Kronstadt, the lines of communication of the blockaded city, fighter airfields, and antiaircraft artillery positions. The enormous

aircraft losses sustained by the enemy forced the German command sharply to cut back raids on Leningrad.

The German command attempted time and again to destroy the ships of the Baltic Fleet. In particular, a special air operation code-named "Eisstoss" — "Ice Strike" — was undertaken on 4-30 April 1942. In view of the nature of enemy air reconnaissance, the command of the Leningrad Air Defense Army took a number of measures. The deployment of antiaircraft batteries was made denser. Light and medium antiaircraft artillery batteries and a portion of the available antiaircraft machineguns were concentrated directly around the warship mooring locations to engage dive-bombing and strafing aircraft.

The enemy operation included five air attacks on the fleet's ships, involving as many as 300 bombers with fighter escort, reconnaissance for the purpose of obtaining precise information on the air defense system and location of ships, and strikes on fighter bases and antiaircraft artillery positions to neutralize the air defense system in the attack zone.

The enemy, however, succeeded neither in destroying the warships of the Baltic Fleet nor in inflicting substantial damage on them. The forces of the Leningrad Air Defense Army, operating in close coordination with the air defense forces and facilities of the Red-Banner Baltic Fleet and the air forces of the Leningrad Front, thwarted this German-fascist air operation, successfully accomplished the assigned mission, and inflicted heavy aircraft losses on the enemy.

Thus enemy air operations directed against Moscow and Leningrad, characterized by the participation of large air forces and considerable spatial scope, were countered by actions which were coordinated in objective, time and space, actions by large operational groupings of the National Air Defense Forces. Their successful combat actions were influenced by implementation of the principle of decisive massing of air defense forces and facilities to defend major centers and installations, by centralization of force control, and by improvement in organizational structure of forces.

The battles and engagements of air defense combined units and formations to thwart enemy air operations against Moscow and Leningrad were distinguished by a high degree of organization, coordination, and were aimed at accomplishing concrete operational-strategic missions — to thwart attacks by enemy air operational forces on Moscow and Leningrad, and thus to ensure continuation of their vital activities.

All this attested to the origination and development of a number of characteristic features of new operational forms of combat employment of the National Air Defense Forces. They include the following: establishment and combat employment of large operational air defense forces (combined units and formations) on a common plan and concept; a gradual transition from installation to zone-installation arrangement of air defense;

arrangement of operational and tactical coordination between National Air Defense Forces combined units and formations on the one hand and front and fleet air defense forces on the other in organizing and conducting air defense in a front (coastal) zone; centralized control of all personnel and weapons of a given air defense force.

Operational forms of employment of the National Air Defense Forces experienced further development at Stalingrad. The Stalingrad Corps Air Defense Region, to which the 102d Fighter Division (105 aircraft) was operationally subordinate, deployed in two echelons, were designated to combat hostile air activities on this strategic axis. The mission of the three forward-echelon regiments was to destroy the enemy on the far approaches to Stalingrad on the west and southwest; the two support-echelon regiments were to engage in combat on the near approaches to and above the city.³

Control of all air defense combined units and units prior to the initiation of combat operations on the near approaches to Stalingrad was concentrated in the hands of the air defense region commander. The commanders of anti-aircraft artillery regiments and independent battalions would receive instructions by direct communications with the region commander. When combat operations developed on the approaches to and within the city, centralized control became inexpedient (and sometimes simply impossible) under conditions of a rapidly changing situation, and therefore it was decentralized. Unit liaison officers extensively followed the practice of visiting air defense region headquarters for the purpose of maintaining close contact with the units and to organize coordinated action among them. When necessary the region command would send representatives to the units authorized to assign missions and resolve on the spot basic problems connected with organizing air defense.

Air defense forces coordination was planned by air defense corps region headquarters with the participation of the headquarters staff of the 102d Fighter Division. Considerable attention was devoted to coordinated action among the corps air defense region units and the fighters and anti-aircraft artillery of the fronts. It was coordinated particularly fully when organizing an air blockade of the encircled enemy force, which was carried out by air combined units and front antiaircraft artillery in close coordination with National Air Defense Forces and long-range bomber aviation. Combat against German air activities was conducted here in four zones, in conformity with the plan elaborated by the Soviet command.⁴

Employment of reconnaissance and guidance radars had enormous effect on securing unity of direction, centralized control, and improving effectiveness of combat employment of air defense troops against hostile air activities in 1941-1942. Because of this radar it became possible to shift to fighter actions to full combat radius and to zone-installation defense.

Development of operational forms of employment of National Air Defense Forces possessed specific features in the Battle of Kursk in the summer of 1943. They proceeded from the character of enemy air activities. Prior to initiation of its offensive, the German command sought to impede redeployment of Soviet troops, equipment, and supply of all types in the area of the Kursk Salient. Toward this objective enemy aircraft subjected to intensive airstrikes the rail lines of communication of the Bryansk, Central, Voronezh and Southern fronts. As many as 1,100 aircraft, including 900 bombers, were concentrated just in the Smolensk, Orel and Khar'kov airfield complexes.⁵ The Kursk rail center was particularly heavily attacked in May and June 1943. In terms of forces involved, the bombing raids on Kursk were the largest of all those mounted by the enemy on this country's major targets. A total of 843 aircraft, for example, took part in the air operation on 2-3 June.⁶ The massive airstrikes were opposed by powerful deployments of antiaircraft artillery and coordinated massive maneuvering actions by the fighters of the air armies of the fronts and air defense fighter divisions.

Of great importance was organization and execution of operational and tactical coordination between the National Air Defense Forces and the air armies and air defense forces of the Central and Voronezh fronts. Front-controlled fighters, deployed at forward airfields and comprising the forward echelon in the air defense of combat-zone targets, attacked hostile aircraft at the battle line. National Air Defense Forces fighters attacked enemy bombers on the far and near approaches to targets, forward of the antiaircraft artillery fire zone. Antiaircraft artillery was employed to cover the most important rail targets.

An important role in exercising close coordination and improving flexibility of control was played by command groups of air defense combined unit headquarters. For example, the Kursk Air Defense Command Group directed the operations of units of the Voronezh-Borisoglebsk Air Defense Region, which was defending one of the most important rail sections on the Kursk bridgehead -- the Kursk-Kastornaya section. The command group commander exercised control through his own headquarters staff. Command group headquarters maintained fire and radio communications with subordinate units; command communications by radio were the principal mode and operated without interruption.

The plans of the German-fascist command were thwarted thanks to rather precise organization of coordinated action by all air defense manpower and weapons during the Battle of Kursk. The enemy failed in attempts to put out of operation rail lines of communication, to disrupt operational redeployments and supply movements.

Thus experience of organization and conduct of air defense of lines of communication on the Kursk Salient under conditions of highly-active hostile air operations confirmed the advisability of zone-installation arrangement of air defense in the Great Patriotic War according to a unified concept and plan of employment of all air defense personnel and

weapons, their centralized control and close operational and tactical coordination with the air defense forces and facilities of the Soviet Army fronts. The objectives of the air defense forces were opposite to those of the enemy's air operation. Advance dispositioning of the air defense system was subordinated to these objectives. Establishment of an advantageous ratio of air defense forces in the course of combat operations was ensured by maneuvering fighters, with maneuver specified in structuring the defense. Antiaircraft weapons would also execute maneuver in intervals between combat actions. The air operations of friendly air forces to weaken the enemy's air forces also helped thwart the enemy's air operation and were conducted in coordination with the plan of action for the air defense forces.

The success of operations of the National Air Defense Forces was in large measure predetermined due to skilled elucidation by the Soviet command of the objectives, missions, time and nature of actions of the enemy's air forces against our defended installations and prompt performance of requisite countermeasures. Unfortunately we did not succeed in accomplishing this in sufficiently full measure to thwart the enemy's air operation undertaken by him for the purpose of destroying industrial installations in Yaroslavl', Gor'kiy and Saratov.

Three air defense combined units took part in frustrating this air operation, which was directed against our industrial installations in the heartland -- the Gor'kiy Corps Air Defense Region, the Saratov-Balashov, and the Rybinsk-Yaroslavl' Division Air Defense regions. They contained the 142d, 144th, and 147th Air Defense Fighter divisions. Each air defense combined unit operated according to its own concept and plan. The forces of other air defense combined units, air defense forces and air forces of the Soviet Army fronts through the zones of which the enemy's bomber corridors passed, were not engaged. Only the Moscow Air Defense Front engaged some of its fighters. But they downed only two bombers when operating beyond searchlight coverage zones. In other words not everything was done to counter the adversary's highly-organized actions with organized actions by large National Air Defense forces and Soviet Army fronts, following a unified concept and plan and with centralized control.

The experience of organization and conduct of the air defense of Yaroslavl', Gor'kiy and Saratov during the war years attested to how important it is to establish in advance an air defense system unified by a single operational concept and plan in order to thwart a hostile air operation and ensure coordinated conduct of engagements and battles by all manpower and weapons of an air defense forces operational grouping. The availability even of large air defense forces to defend an important target did not guarantee its safety if the combat operations of air defense combined units and units were conducted separately and uncoordinated.

Hq SHC and National Air Defense Forces Central Headquarters, taking this unsuccessful operation into account, took decisive measures to organize close coordination between the field air defense system and the National Air

Defense system, to provide timely warning of hostile aircraft to air defense combined units and formations, and to utilize all their manpower and weapons to hit enemy aircraft along their entire route of flight to and from the target. Air defense fronts were established for this purpose; they were closely coordinated with the air defense forces of front ground forces and air force formations according to a unified concept, with centralized control.

Losing more than 3,500 aircraft in the summer of 1943, the enemy lost his strategic air supremacy. The German command's capability to mount air operations against targets deep in the Soviet heartland diminished sharply.

In the second and third periods of the war, in conformity with instructions by Hq SHC and the plans of offensive operations, the National Air Defense Forces began to be more extensively employed to cover lines of communication of the Soviet Army fronts.

The features of operational employment of National Air Defense Forces were defined even more precisely in these periods: planning of combat employment of air defense fronts and armies according to a unified concept; assignment of operational-strategic missions and determination of areas of responsibility for air defense formations and combined units; decisiveness of combat actions (defeat and annihilation of penetrating hostile air forces); active character of air defense forces combat actions (especially air defense fighter aviation); large spatial scale; extensive operational maneuver of air defense units and combined units within the boundaries of an air defense front and between fronts; shift to extensive maneuver utilization of air defense fighter aviation for covering installations, areas and axes; high degree of intensity and swiftness of battles and engagements, due primarily to the great mobility and maneuverability of the main engaging forces — hostile aircraft and air defense fighters; organization and implementation of operational and tactical coordination between air defense fronts and Soviet Army fronts, fleets and flotillas in matters of air defense in the front zone and coastal areas.

Following the Great Patriotic War there was a need for further improvement and development of the combat might of the National Air Defense Forces and the principles of their employment, which was caused by the aggressive foreign policy of the imperialist nations, headed by the United States.

Theory of the air defense operation is a synthesis of the experience of the Great Patriotic War in combination with new weaponry. The experience of highly organized combat actions by large air defense forces aimed at thwarting the air operations of the enemy's air forces became a practical foundation for this theory.

The air defense operation was viewed as the highest form of organization and conduct of combat actions by the National Air Defense Forces. It was believed that by its content it comprises an aggregate of battles and engagements conducted according to a unified plan and concept, with centralized control, in coordination with fighter aviation and antiaircraft

artillery of fronts and fleets, with the objective of thwarting an air operation undertaken by the enemy against important targets or regions, by defeating, destroying and neutralizing the enemy's forces and weapons. The substance of preparation for and conduct of an air defense operation was also theoretically substantiated.

Theory of operational employment of National Air Defense Forces is continuously evolving. But the experience of combat actions of National Air Defense Forces on an operational-strategic scale obtained during the Great Patriotic War continues to be of great significance for it.

At the present time, thanks to tireless concern by the Communist Party, the National Air Defense Forces have become qualitatively renovated. They are greatly superior in combat capabilities to the National Air Defense Forces of the period of the Great Patriotic War. They are armed with antiaircraft guided missiles, missile-carrying supersonic fighter-interceptors, more sophisticated detection and guidance radars, automated control systems, and new communications equipment. The National Air Defense Forces, just as other branches of the Armed Forces, are today in a state of continuous combat readiness to repel attack by any aggressor. Constant combat readiness brought to the very highest degree has been and remains the objective and purpose of the daily life and activity of each and every serviceman.

FOOTNOTES

1. Central Archives of the USSR Ministry of Defense, Fund 72, List 56103, File 2, sheets 23, 24; Fund 741, List 708648, File 1, Sheet 19.
2. Ibid., Fund 214, List 2970, File 16, Sheet 95.
3. Ibid., Fund 2 gv. iad PVO, List 123865, File 1, sheets 24-26.
4. For more detail see VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL, No 11, 1974, pp 18-26.
5. Central Archives of the Ministry of Defense, Fund 7 k PVO, List 708619, File 1, Sheet 52.
6. "Voyska protivovozdushnoy oborony strany. Istoricheskiy ocherk" [National Air Defense Forces. A Historical Sketch], Voyenizdat, 1968, page 239.
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SUBMARINE ACTIVITIES IN PETSAMO-KIRKENES OPERATION DESCRIBED

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 10, 1979 signed to press
21 Sep 79 pp 26-27

[Article, published under the heading "Skill and Heroism," by Capt 1st Rank M. Khametov: "An Attack on the Sea Lines of Communication" (Combat operations of Northern Fleet submarines in the Petsamo-Kirkenes Operation)]

[Text] Thirty-five years ago, in October 1944, the troops of the 14th Army of the Karelian Front, acting in coordination with the forces of the Northern Fleet, successfully mounted the Petsamo-Kirkenes Operation, which ended with the rout of Germany's XIX Mountain Rifle Corps and liberation of the Pechenga area and a portion of Norwegian territory.

Submarines were operating in a sector running from Vardö to North Cape. Positions were taken up in these areas by the S-104, M-171, S-102, S-14, V-4, L-20, S-101, as well as the S-51 and V-2, which had put to sea on combat patrol before the operation began.¹ Several more submarines were to be sent to Norway's North Coast.

The submariners performed exceptionally vigorously, boldly and resolutely. The first kill in this operation was registered by the submarine S-51 (Capt 3d Rank K. M. Kolosov, commanding). On 10 October the S-51, crossing through a minefield, set course for the Norwegian coast. At this time sonar operator T. Anan'yev heard the sound of propellers, from the ships of an enemy convoy. Kolosov headed his submarine toward the adversary. Raising his periscope, he sighted two transports being convoyed by a destroyer, an escort ship, and a minesweeper. The commander sounded the torpedo attack signal. The submarine began its torpedo run. Kolosov decided to destroy two targets at the same time with a single salvo. His plan proved effective — one torpedo sent the destroyer to the bottom and the other hit a transport, which burst into flames and lost steerageway.

On the night of 12 October an enemy convoy was spotted in Varanger Fjord, consisting of two transports in the company of 12 escorts. The next morning it was met in Pers Fjord by Guards Red-Banner Submarine M-171. Attacking the enemy off Cape Harbaken, it sank an escort ship.²

Receiving from the commander of the submarine M-171 the report on the sinking of an escort ship and the convoy's position, the brigade command reported the convoy's coordinates to all submarines participating in the operation.

At noon the convoy was attacked off Cape Tanahorn by the submarine S-104 (Capt 2d Rank V. A. Turayev, commanding). It fired a four-torpedo salvo at a transport and escort ship. The sonar operator heard two explosions.³ A few minutes later Turayev raised the periscope and saw wooden fragments of a vessel, overturned lifeboats and drowning enemy soldiers. The 7,000 gross register ton transport, which was carrying a considerable number of enemy troops, had been sunk.

Turayev's submariners scored their next kill on 15 October. After midnight the submarine attacked a convoy steaming eastward and sent to the bottom with a torpedo a German cargo ship loaded with ammunition.⁴

On 16 October a report on a kill scored by the S-14 (Capt 3d Rank V. P. Kalanin, commanding) was received at the operations command post. On this, its seventh combat patrol, the submarine encountered by Porsanger Fjord three enemy minesweepers proceeding in echelon formation. Kalanin decided to attack the entire group. The submarine fired a four-torpedo salvo from a range of six cables. Two torpedoes hit their target. Both ships broke up and began to go down.

On that same day the M-171 added another kill to the score of the Arctic submariners. On this occasion it spotted a convoy while surfaced. It put two torpedoes into a German transport, sending it to the bottom.⁵

The men of the other submarines participating in the operation also displayed a high degree of skill, staunchness and heroism.

Of the submarines received from England on lend-lease, the V-4 performed particularly successfully in this operation. Its commanding officer, Hero of the Soviet Union Capt 3d Rank Ya. K. Iosseliani, displayed a high degree of tactical skill, and his men performed with exceptional coordination and skill.

Ya. K. Iosseliani noted that off North Cape enemy convoys, fearing Soviet submarine attack, were hugging the coast, keeping in shallow waters, and the convoy escorts were covering the transports and cargo ships on the sea side. This gave the officer the idea of setting up an "ambush." The submarine lay to surfaced between shore and channel. Blending in against the dark coastline, it lay in wait for enemy convoys, which stood out clearly against the background of the sea horizon.

The first kill came on 18 October. That night the sonar operator, PO 1st Class N. Bordok, heard propeller noise from an enemy ship at a bearing of 70°. General quarters was sounded. The submarine proceeded to close with the adversary. Soon Iosseliani spotted on the horizon the silhouette of a heavily-laden tanker proceeding westward. It was later learned that this

ship had been in a convoy which had been attacked and scattered by other submarines. It was attempting, under cover of darkness, to slip along the coast and into the nearest port.

The V-4 began to maneuver into an advantageous attack position. The captain of the enemy tanker, spotting the submarine, proceeded to vary course and speed. Twice the tanker succeeded in escaping a hit, since on both occasions not all the torpedoes were ejected from the tube. It seemed that the enemy would succeed after all in escaping. The persistence and skill of the Soviet navymen, however, brought success. Making a third attack run, the V-4 fired a two-torpedo salvo. Again only one torpedo actually fired, but it hit the tanker. The ship exploded and sank rapidly.

The combat operations of Northern Fleet submariners in the Petsamo-Kirkenes Operation ended with skillful attacks by the S-101 (Capt-Lt N. T. Zinov'yev, commanding). On the morning of 31 October it spotted a group of three enemy ships and sank a destroyer. At about 1500 hours on that same day the submarine encountered two German minesweepers and destroyed one of them. But the submarine did not succeed in leaving the area unnoticed. Escort ships spotted it and pursued it for approximately 24 hours. The enemy dropped 147 depth charges on the S-101. Their bursts caused considerable damage to the submarine, but Zinov'yev succeeded in escaping from his pursuers and bringing his submarine into base without mishap.⁶

This ended combat operations by Northern Fleet submariners on the enemy's sea lines of communication during the Petsamo-Kirkenes offensive operation. In the period from 7 through 31 October they sank 15 enemy transports, cargo ships, and warships. Upon returning to base the submariners would announce their kills by firing 15 shots with their deck gun. The submarine brigade sustained no losses.

Thwarting of enemy sea transport operations by the men of the Northern Fleet, including submarine crews, and their blockading of enemy ports and naval bases constituted an important contribution toward defeat of the German-Fascist forces in the Arctic.

FOOTNOTES

1. Central Naval Archives, Fund 11, File 35713, sheets 31-32.
2. Ibid., Fund 112, File 17685, Sheet 18; Fund 11, File 35713, Sheet 31.
3. Ibid., Fund 112, File 17685, Sheet 26.
4. Ibid., Fund 11, File 35713, Sheet 32.
5. Ibid., Fund 11, File 35713, Sheet 32.

6. Ibid., Fund 11, File 35713, Sheet 32; Fund 112, File 33075, sheets 9-11.

7. Ibid., Fund 11, File 35713, Sheet 35.
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SOVIET EFFORTS IN LIBERATION OF NORWAY IN WORLD WAR II RECALLED

Petsamo-Kirkenes Operation

Moscow VOVENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 10, Oct 79 signed to press 21 Sept 79 pp 28-31

[Article, published under the heading "Documents and Materials," by Lt Col A. Sidorov: "The Victory in the Arctic" (On the 35th anniversary of the Petsamo-Kirkenes Operation in the liberation of Northern Norway)]

[Text] On the gray, overcast morning of 7 October 1944, precisely at 0800 hours, hundreds of guns roared into action, and an intense concentration of fire hit the enemy's foxholes, covered trenches and emplacements. Two hours and 35 minutes later Soviet infantry attacked, advancing close behind a moving barrage.... Thus the Petsamo-Kirkenes offensive operation began -- the final operation of the Soviet Armed Forces in the 1944 summer-fall campaign.

The operation objective was stated by Headquarters, Supreme High Command (Hq SHC) to the Karelian Front in a directive dated 26 September 1944. According to this directive the 14th Army (Lt Gen V. I. Shcherbakov, commanding; Maj Gen A. Ya. Sergeyev, member of military council; Maj Gen I. P. Gerasev, chief of staff), reinforced by the XXXI Rifle Corps, and acting in coordination with the Northern Fleet (Adm A. G. Golovko, commanding), was to crush the main forces of the XIX German Mountain Rifle Corps, capture the Nikel'-Salmiyarvi area and, advancing to the Norwegian border, entirely clear the Petsamo area of enemy troops.

The German command attached much importance to the Norwegian operational sector. The Arctic nickel mines by the Norwegian border provided Germany with 70% of its annual requirements in this strategic raw material. Situated in the Kirkenes area were the main ammunition dumps, equipment and food supply depots for Hitler's troops in the North. In addition, German warships rebased to the ice-free ports of Norway in the Barents Sea following loss of their naval bases in France.

Therefore German defense on the Murmansk axis comprised a system of strong fortified positions dispositioned in depth, a system which was being constructed and improved over a period of 3 years. This sector was being

defended by the German XIX Mountain Rifle Corps, totaling more 53,000 officers and men, more than 750 guns and mortars. The corps was supported by approximately 160 warplanes. German naval forces in this region were operating approximately 200 ships of various types.

Pursuant to the Hq SHC directive of 26 September 1944, Army Gen K. A. Meretskov, commanding general of the front's troops, assigned the 14th Army the mission of attacking from the Chapr Lake area in the direction of Luostari and Petsamo, with the objective of destroying the opposing German force to the southeast of Petsamo, followed by the total liberation of the Soviet Arctic.

The warships of the Northern Fleet were to blockade the ports of Petsamo and Kirkenes and prevent the enemy from evacuating his troops by sea along the section of coast between Kirkenes and Hammerfest. Naval infantry combined units (two reinforced brigades) were assigned the mission of penetrating the defense on the isthmus of the Sredniyy Peninsula and, linking up with the forces of the 14th Army, advancing on Petsamo. Soviet forces were air-supported by the 7th Air Army (Col Gen Avn I. M. Sokolov, commanding) and Northern Fleet aviation. The I Air Defense Corps (Col I. F. Korolenko, commanding) and the 12d Air Defense Fighter Division (Col F. A. Pogreshayev, commanding) were also enlisted to participation in the operation.

By the beginning of the offensive, the 14th Army contained 97,000 men, 2,000 guns and mortars, and 126 tanks and self-propelled guns.¹

The Soviet fighting men had a clear picture of the difficult conditions under which they would be operating: mountainous tundra, numerous swamps, lakes and rivers, and harsh climatic conditions. All this in combination with a strong enemy defense placed the attacking troops in a very difficult position. But the commanders and men burned with the desire to overcome all these difficulties in order to destroy the hated foe. This was fostered by extensive, purposeful party-political work, vigorously conducted by political agencies, Communists and Komsomol members. It was based on party and government guideline documents, in particular the 1 May 1944 order from the Supreme Commander, in which Soviet troops were assigned the mission to clear all German-fascist invaders from Soviet soil and to reestablish the border of the USSR.

As a result of purposeful party-political work, full-fledged party organizations were established in all companies and batteries without exception. As Lt Gen (Ret) K. F. Kalashnikov, former chief of the political directorate of the Karelian Front recalls, company party organizations in the 10th Guards Rifle Division contained from 25 to 45 party members and probationary members, while the figure was 30-35 Communists in the 31st and 72d Rifle brigades. A similar situation prevailed in other units and combined units.

Party members cemented the ranks of fighting men, boosted their morale, and served as an example in performance of military duty.

...Overcoming stubborn enemy resistance, the Soviet troops penetrated the enemy's defense and, after 8 days of savage fighting, had accomplished the assigned mission of routing the Petsamo force. The troops of the 14th Army, in coordination with the Northern Fleet and air forces, killed more than 18,000 enemy officers and men and captured a large quantity of combat equipment and supply depots containing military equipment and supplies.

Soviet troops had to enter Norwegian territory in order to achieve total defeat of Hitler's forces in the Arctic and to lend fraternal assistance to the Norwegian people in their liberation from fascism. An agreement to enter Norwegian territory was concluded on 16 May 1944 between the governments of the Soviet Union, United States and Great Britain on the one hand and the Norwegian Government on the other. The Norwegian Government expressed the desire to have Norwegian subunits stationed in England take part in the liberation of Norway together with Soviet and Allied troops. British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, however, opposed this,² and Norwegian subunits were unable to reach Northern Norway from England in time. The Soviet Army was compelled to operate independently.

Pursuant to the 16 October 1944 Hq SHC directive, the commander of the Karelian Front assigned the 14th Army a new mission: the army's troops, with the support of the Northern Fleet, were to continue the advance toward the northwest and southwest, complete liberation of the Petsamo area, capture the towns and ports of Kirkenes and Neiden, and advance toward Nautsi. The depth of the army's mission was 45-65 km.

On 18 October the Soviet offensive took off with renewed force. The army's support echelon was engaged (the XXXI Rifle and CXXVII Light Rifle Corps). On that same day our fighting men entered Norwegian territory, bringing freedom to the Norwegian people from fascist enslavement.

Tarnet, Kirkenes, Elvenes, Neiden and other Norwegian towns and villages were liberated in savage engagements with the enemy. Soviet military personnel displayed models of courage, bravery and valor, honorably carrying out their internationalist duty. Battalion commanders Maj K. M. Gontar' and Capt V. P. Strygin, submachine-gun company commander Capt V. A. Lynnik, foot reconnaissance platoon leader Lt P. P. Primakov, platoon leader Jr Lt V. M. Ivanov, squad leader Sr Sgt F. G. Kopaniyets, and others were awarded the lofty title of Hero of the Soviet Union for combat on Norwegian soil. Navy men and fliers covered themselves with unfading glory. The title Hero of the Soviet Union was awarded to 27 submariners, patrol boat crewmen, naval infantrymen, and pilots.³

By order of the Supreme Commander dated 25 October 1944, combined units and units of the Karelian Front which had distinguished themselves in the Petsamo-Kirkenes Operation were given official thanks and awarded the honored designations Pechenga and Kirkenes. Thousands of Soviet military personnel were awarded a specially instituted "For Defense of the Soviet Arctic" medal.

Norwegian workers joyously greeted the Soviet soldiers as they entered Northern Norway. The newspaper of the Norwegian Communist Party, FRIHETEN, wrote: "The appearance of Soviet troops has evoked unprecedented enthusiasm on the part of the Norwegian people, who realized that the hated occupation, victory and freedom will soon come to pass."⁴

Employing "scorched earth" tactics in Norway, the German-fascist occupation troops burned and demolished buildings, bridges and other structures as they retreated. At the same time the Germans and Quisling supporters (betrayers of the Norwegian people) unleashed violent anti-Soviet propaganda, attempting to frighten the population with fabrications about "cruelties" perpetrated by the Soviet Army and to sow seeds of distrust among the people toward their liberators. However, as was emphasized by CPSU Central Committee General Secretary Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, "peoples learn through their own experience what a malicious and implacable foe fascism is...."⁵

The fascists, sensing the hopelessness of their position, barbarously destroyed Kirkenes, which literally drowned in flames. Only 28 of 1,000 buildings remained standing. In order to save their own lives, more than 3,500 townspeople hid in a mine at Björnevattn Station, located near the town. The German command decided to dynamite the mine entrance and bury all the townspeople alive. Having learned of this plan, the Norwegians sent a messenger, Hugo Ensen, to inform forward units of the Soviet Army about their predicament. A reconnaissance platoon of the 65th Rifle Division, under the command of Lt A. Kh. Bakhteyev, was ordered to move with all due speed to the mine. At dawn on 25 October the Soviet reconnaissance platoon mounted a surprise attack on the Germans and captured the station. The Norwegians, including many women and children, tearfully embraced and kissed their liberators.⁶

Many peoples, including the Norwegians liberated from German occupation, experienced in full measure the humanitarianism of Soviet fighting men and their dedication to the great, immortal ideals of proletarian internationalism. The underground newspaper SISTE NJUTT, published in Southern Norway, stated: "Life has once again commenced in Kirkenes.... The liberators were greeted with enormous joy. Excellent relations were established between Russians and Norwegians."⁷

The population of the liberated areas of Norway was in a difficult situation. In the middle of a cold Arctic winter, many were without shelter, food, or fuel. The Soviet military came to the aid of local residents during these harsh times. Emergency measures were taken to provide them with food and medicine. According to the figures of the Norwegian military mission, each Norwegian began receiving a weekly ration of 1,600 grams of bread and 200 grams each of fats and sugar. And in the little town of Svanvik, to which hauling of supplies was extremely difficult in winter, our soldiers shared their own rations with the local populace.

The Soviet military also offered vigorous assistance to the residents of liberated areas in solving the problem of shelter, in combatting epidemics,

and did everything possible to restore normal life. "The Soviet Army," wrote prominent Norwegian Communist Party leader Just Lippe, "graphically demonstrated that it had come to Norway not only as a military force but also as a true friend of the Norwegian people."⁸

And even the Norwegian bourgeois paper *AFTENPOSTEN* could not refuse an objective appraisal of the liberation mission of the Soviet Armed Forces in Northern Norway. It stated in September 1945: "The Russians were the first to come, and they are the first to leave. They have done their job. The Norwegians will never forget what the Russians have done for us as well as for the common cause of victory over the enemy."⁹

Not everybody, however, remembers with gratitude the Soviet soldiers who brought liberation from fascism. They are first and foremost those who drew the country into the militarist harness of NATO, who advocate an escalation of the arms race, who oppose international détente, and who see in the clear, peace-seeking foreign policy of the Soviet Union a "Soviet military threat." They are doing everything they can to extinguish in the hearts of the Norwegian people the picture of the Soviet soldier-liberator and are attempting to distort the persuasive facts of history, making every effort to minimize the role of the Soviet Armed Forces. For example, former head of the Norwegian military mission in Northern Norway Col A. Dal, one of the authors of a three-volume work entitled "History of the War in Norway," devotes only between one and a half and two pages out of a total of 2,500 to combat by the Soviet Army in the Arctic, and not a word is said about assistance to the Norwegian population.

But the truth of history cannot be covered by lies, regardless of the form in which the truth is falsified. The heroism and courage of the Soviet fighting men who brought victory from fascist enslavement will remain forever as a warm memory to the Norwegian working people. It is for good reason that the wording on monuments to fallen Soviet fighting men in Oslo, Kirkenes, (Budyø), Elvenes, and (Fyouske) reads: "Norway thanks you!"

The Petsamo-Kirkenes Operation, the objective of which was liberation of the Soviet Arctic and the northern areas of Norway from the German-fascist invaders, was conducted from 7 through 31 October 1944 and was completed successfully. The victory of the Soviet forces in the Arctic was of great military-political and economic significance. As a result the enemy was driven from occupied territory, having lost approximately 30,000 men in killed alone. The Germans also sustained substantial losses at sea. The ships and aircraft of the Northern Fleet sunk 156 enemy ships and vessels. Ice-free ports and large naval bases on the Barents Sea were liberated, as well as an extremely rich nickel mining area.

The operation was conducted on a coastal axis, under Arctic conditions, by the combined efforts of ground forces, air and naval forces. This was the first time all arms of the military, including tanks, as well as combined units of the various branches of the Armed Forces, had been employed on a large scale in this region, which provided valuable experience and know-how which enriched Soviet art of warfare.

FOOTNOTES

1. "Istoriya vtoroy mirovoy voyny 1939-1945" [History of World War II, 1939-1945], Vol 9, Voenizdat, 1978, page 149.
2. A. S. Kan, "Vneshnyaya politika skandinavskikh stran v gody vtoroy mirovoy voyny" [Foreign Policy of the Scandinavian Countries During World War II], Moscow, Nauka, 1967, pp 33', 380.
3. VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL, No 10, 1974, pp 15-16, 27.
4. A. M. Noskov, "Skandinavskiy platsdam vo vtoroy mirovoy voynye" [Scandinavian Bridgehead in World War II], Moscow, Nauka, 1977, page 220.
5. L. I. Brezhnev, "Na strazhe mira i sotsializma" [Guarding Peace and Socialism], Moscow, Politizdat, 1979, page 20.
6. "Osvoboditel'naya missiya Sovetskikh Vooruzhennykh Sil vo vtoroy mirovoy voynye" [Liberation Mission of the Soviet Armed Forces in World War II], Moscow, Politizdat, 1971, page 265.
7. Ibid., page 266.
8. ZA RUBEZHOM, No 44, 1964, page 11.
9. KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 10 October 1945.

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Soviet Aid to Norwegians Described

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 10, Oct 79 signed to press 21 Sept 79 pp 31-33

[Article, published under the heading "Documents and Materials," by Candidate of Historical Sciences I. Shinkarev: "Soviet Aid to the Norwegian People" (1944-1945)]

[Text] In the spring of 1944 the Soviet Army, continuing to liberate Soviet soil from the Hitler invaders, was preparing to advance combat operations onto the territory of fascist-occupied neighboring countries, including the northern part of Norway.

In view of the situation, on 16 May 1944 the Norwegian Government concluded an agreement with the governments of the USSR, United States and Great Britain on civil administration on Norwegian territory.¹ This agreement stated that Allied commanders were to be invested with full authority during the conduct of combat operations on Norwegian territory. To co-ordinate actions with them, the Norwegian Government appointed special military missions and placed a small number of troops at their disposal.

The Norwegian military mission in the USSR was headed by Col A. D. Dal.

On 18 October 1944 Soviet troops reached the Soviet-Norwegian border, and on 25 October they captured Kirkenes and continued to liberate the remainder of Northern Norway from the fascists. In connection with this, conditions were created for the Norwegian military mission to operate; it arrived in Murmansk on 9 November and in Kirkenes on the following day, where it remained until the end of the war.

At this same time a 234-man detachment of Norwegian troops arrived on liberated territory in Northern Norway from England, and two companies of police from Sweden (307 men).² Prior to the arrival of these troops, two companies were formed of local inhabitants on liberated territory of Northern Norway; these companies were armed with Soviet submachine guns.³

The Norwegian troops were operationally subordinate to the 14th Army of the Karelian Front. On 8 November the chief of staff of the Karelian Front ordered that the newly-arrived detachment of Norwegian officers and men be utilized for organizing operational reconnaissance on Norwegian territory, and that it be transferred to corps or division operational subordination. The detachment was to receive all rations and allowances on an even basis with other military personnel.⁴

On 11 November the Norwegian Government requested permission from the Soviet Government to dispatch Norwegian warships to the port of Kirkenes in order to conduct combat operations jointly with Soviet Forces for liberation of Northern Norway from the German-fascist occupation forces. The Soviet Government approved this request.⁵ By 10 December 20 Norwegian combatant and auxiliary ships were concentrated in the port of Kirkenes,⁶ including the corvette "Eglangins" and the minesweepers "Karmeii," "Jelei," and "Trumei."

Matters connected with billeting, supply and combat employment of Norwegian troops were settled at joint meetings of the military missions and 14th Army command. These meetings took place not less than once a month.

Norwegian troop strength increased month by month, totaling 1,350 men by the end of January 1945.⁷

In February-April 1945 new subunits arrived from England and Sweden. The total numerical strength of the Norwegian armed forces increased substantially and totaled 2,735 men by the end of the Great Patriotic War.⁸ They consisted of two battalions, warships and vessels, an independent mountain company, two companies of police, and a hospital. The Soviet Union armed them with 685 submachine guns, 40 machineguns and ammunition for these weapons. In addition, they were supplied with trucks, fuel and lubricants, horse transport, food, feed, clothing and medicines. The Soviet Government donated 25 tons of flour and 200 tons of potatoes gratis for the civilian population of Northern Norway. Total expenditures by the Soviet Union for maintenance of Norwegian troops in 1944-1945 exceeded 27.5 million rubles.⁹

The fact that Soviet troops were on Norwegian territory and their friendly relations with the civilian population and Norwegian troops evoked the displeasure of reactionary circles. They spread various provocative rumors. In March 1945, for example, (Ioanas Li), traitor to the Norwegian people, published an appeal to the Norwegian police, in which he stated that Norway was allegedly threatened by "a flood of Bolshevik hordes."

The head of the military mission to the USSR, Colonel Dal, wrote the following in response to this appeal: "I worked for 5 months together with our Soviet allies. Therefore I am better qualified than anybody else to comment on this scare campaign. Soviet troops have been on Norwegian territory for 5 months; during these 5 months we have learned to respect their discipline, their enormous military strength, and their will to win. We have become personally acquainted with them on an individual basis, and we like them.

"...We should be grateful to the Red Army and to it alone for the fact that today a portion of our country is liberated and that there exist at all conditions suitable for life in Finnmark.

"If the Germans had sufficient time for the devastation they had conceived jointly with the traitor (Ioanas Li) and others, Finnmark today would be empty of life, and its rebuilding would require decades."¹⁰

The Soviet Union extended a hand of fraternal assistance to the Norwegian people during the years of World War II. The northern part of Norway, with Kirkenes, an important port on the Barents Sea, was liberated from the German-fascist invaders by the efforts of the Soviet Armed Forces. The period when Norwegian troops were under Soviet command during the Great Patriotic War was a bright page in the chronicle of fighting comradeship and mutual assistance between the Soviet and Norwegian peoples.

FOOTNOTES

1. "Vneshnyaya politika Sovetskogo Soyuza v period Otechestvennoy voyny" [Foreign Policy of the Soviet Union in the Period of the Patriotic War], Vol II, Gospolitizdat, 1946, page 135.
2. Central Archives of the USSR Ministry of Defense, Fund 40, List 11549, File 229, Sheet 19.
3. Ibid., Fund 363, List 6249, File 32, Sheet 18.
4. Ibid., Fund 214, List 1443, File 190, Sheet 483.
5. Ibid., Fund 40, List 11549, File 229, sheets 286-287.
6. Ibid., File 173, Sheet 223.
7. Ibid., Fund 363, List 6230, File 40, Sheet 37.

8. Ibid., List 6249, File 34, Sheet 195.
9. Ibid., Fund 40, List 11549, File 224, sheets 16-17.
10. Ibid., Fund 40, List 11549, File 219, Sheet 273.

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Documents Reflecting International Solidarity

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 10, Oct 79 signed to press 21 Sept 79 pp 33-35

[Four documents "On International Solidarity," published under the heading "Documents and Materials"]

[Text] Document 1. From the newspaper CHASOVAY SEVERA: Road to Kirkenes

Before us lay a narrow, rapids-filled stream. It was the border; beyond the stream lay Norway. Pursuing the Germans, our units have crossed the border and are continuing to hit the fascists on Norwegian soil.

Even under the difficult conditions of the Arctic, our troops are swiftly advancing, across the roadless mountains and forests, rivers and lakes of Norway, forcing the enemy out of his strong points, from commanding heights, and sweeping him from one village after another.

There was heavy fighting for the Norwegian village of Tarnet, which was the German's first strong point on the far approaches to the port of Kirkenes. Dug in on two commanding heights, the Germans held under their guns a large stretch of the road leading to Tarnet. The subunits of officers Lytnev and Selivon, in spite of a number of attempts, were unable to force the enemy from these heights. Then Lieutenant Colonel Kotsyl decided to call in tanks to assist.

Several hours later, in spite of enemy artillery fire, the tank crews of officer Ustinnikov's subunit succeeded in negotiating stretches of road which had been demolished by the Germans and, approaching close to the heights on which the Germans had dug in, opened direct fire. The enemy gun positions were neutralized. And infantrymen, working in coordination with tanks, swept down the cleared road toward Tarnet.

At approximately 1300 hours, following 24 hours of savage fighting, our units entered the first Norwegian village, Tarnet. Before us lay the horrifying scene of the destruction wrought by the Germans. Seized by impotent rage, the fascists had set the entire village to the torch, a village in which peaceful civilians resided. Only a few houses were spared from the flames. In one of them we found four men and a woman. The squalid interior of this house and the oppressed visage of the emaciated Norwegians clearly testified to the hard life of the residents of Tarnet under the Germans.

...Not halting for even a minute, our soldiers advanced through the burning village of Tarnet and along the road toward Kirkenes, eager to continue the fighting. It is characteristic that at Tarnet and in subsequent fighting on the road to Kirkenes our fighting men encountered soldiers from a German airborne regiment which had been hastily brought up to the combat zone from deep in the rear, where it had been resting. But these reserves failed to save the day. Smashing the German resistance, on 25 October our troops captured the town of Kirkenes, an important port on the Barents Sea.

Norway, 22-25 October 1944

Capt Z. Il'yevskiy

Document 2.

From a political report by the Chief of the Political Directorate of the Karelian Front to the Chief of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army

29 October 1944

...The civilian population is friendly toward the Red Army and gives our units whatever assistance it can. A group of local residents helped the troops when crossing the fjord by the village of Tarnet; they carried men and equipment in their boats and launches. Medical aid teams were spontaneously formed in this village and a number of others as well as in the town of Kirkenes; these teams assisted the wounded. Many civilians pointed out to our combat engineers those locations where the Germans had planted landmines.

One of the members of the Kirkenes town councils, (Treyte), handed our representative a list of members of the area fascist organization, which he had pilfered. Local residents believe that there were as many as 60 members of the fascist party in the town of Kirkenes. Most of them left with the Germans.

Local residents reported that Soviet aircraft had sunk many ships at Kirkenes at various times, had destroyed a large fuel dump and demolished police headquarters.... According to local residents, there were many Soviet prisoners in Kirkenes, who were exceptionally cruelly treated by the Germans, particularly in 1941 and 1942. Many of the prisoners died. SS and Luftwaffe units treated prisoners particularly harshly. The civilian population did what it could to assist the prisoners. One person told me that the Germans meted out severe punishment for possession of various articles exchanged by prisoners for food. In one instance Norwegians buried with full honors a Soviet pilot whose body the Germans refused to bury. The local residents promised to bring to headquarters a photograph of the dead pilot and a diagram of the aircraft's identification marks. Norwegian policemen Harald Rimm helped a Soviet prisoner escape who had been sentenced by the Germans to be executed by a firing squad; the two of them escaped to the Russian side....

Chief of the Political Directorate of
the Karelian Front Maj Gen K. Kalashnikov

Central Archives of the USSR Ministry of Defense, Fund 214, List 1510,
File 159, sheets 271-272. Original document

Document 3.

From a political report by the Chief of the Political Section of the 14th Army

7 November 1944

...On 25 October units of the 14th Army entered the town of Kirkenes, having liberated in the course of the operation a number of Norwegian villages on the Varanger Peninsula -- Svanvik, Sandnes, and others.

The civilian population of these localities warmly greeted the arriving Red Army units.

German propaganda spread false rumors that Norway was being invaded by Mongols, who would rob and kill the civilian population.

There immediately arose the necessity to begin explaining to the Norwegian civilian population the objectives and missions of the Red Army.

Senior instructors comrades Napalkov and Klepikov, whose combined units were the first to enter Norwegian territory, succeeded in coping with the situation in spite of lack of knowledge of the Norwegian language; finding among the Norwegians persons who knew German, they conducted extensive explanatory work with the Norwegian population. They held lectures at which they exposed the falsity of the German propaganda against the Red Army. Major Rybalkin, agitation and propaganda department senior instructor, and Major Volkov, agitator of the 10th Guards Rifle Division, took part in this first stage of the work.

Later the village of Tarnet was visited by Major Raytsin, who held eight talks with the inhabitants on the objectives of the Red Army on Norwegian territory.

The Norwegians welcomed the arrival of the Red Army, have been very friendly toward our officers and men, and are returning from the hills to their homes.

There have been many instances where Norwegians have assisted Red Army units in setting up crossing operations across bodies of water and assisting wounded....

Chief of the Political Division of the
14th Army Colonel (Grigorovich)

Central Archives of the USSR Ministry of Defense, Fund 214, List 1510,
File 468, sheets 281-282. Original document

Document 4.

One of numerous documents recording transfer of foodstuffs by the Soviet command to Norwegian subunits

1944

DOCUMENT

15 November

We the undersigned, for the one party Captain Belyayev, representative of military unit Infantry Regiment 17762, and for the other party Lieutenant

Lindstrom, representative of the Norwegian detachment, do hereby state that the former has turned over and the latter accepted the foodstuffs listed below:

Designation	Unit of Measure	Quantity	Remarks
1. Mixed-flour bread	kg	1128	One thousand one hundred twenty-eight
2. Flour	"	28.2	Twenty-eight 200 g
3. Peeled barley	"	70	Seventy
4. Rice	"	170	One hundred seventy
5. Salted fish	"	141	One hundred forty-one
6. Soybean meal	"	21.2	Twenty-one 200 g
7. Animal fat	"	60	Sixty
8. Sugar	"	49.4	Forty-nine 400 g
9. Tea	"	1.5	One five hundred g.
10. Salt	"	42	Forty-two
11. Fresh potatoes	"	1439	One thousand four hundred thirty-nine
12. Pepper	"	0.5	Five hundred g
13. Mustard	"	0.5	Five hundred g
14. Bay leaves	"	0.4	Four hundred g
15. Tomatoes	"	8.5	Eight five hundred g
16. Tinned meat	"	127	One hundred twenty-seven
17. Tinned bacon	"	35.2	Thirty-five 200 g
18. Tinned fish 1/340	cans	52	Fifty-two
19. Cigarettes, Grade I	packs	260	Two hundred sixty
20. Matches	boxes	156	One hundred fifty-six

Issued by Captain (Belyayev)
Received by Lieutenant (Lindstrom)

Central Archives of the Ministry of Defense, Fund 363, List 6262, File 48,
Sheet 26.

Prepared by V. Sutulov

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Division Commander Reminiscences

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 10, Oct 79 signed to press 21 Sept 79 pp 36-39

[Article, published under the heading "Memoirs," by Lt Gen (Ret) Kh. Khudalov, commander of the 10th Guards Rifle Division during the described period: "On Norwegian Soil"]

[Text] On 22 October 1944 units of the 10th Guards Rifle Division, together with other Soviet troops, were in pursuit of the enemy in the Arctic. On that day we crossed the Norwegian border and fought our way

* At this time Kh. A. Khudalov was commander of the 10th Guards Rifle Division.

deeper into Norwegian territory. The German-fascist command was endeavoring to hold the town and port of Kirkenes -- the main supply base for the German 20th Army. As our units advanced, the force of the enemy's resistance and savagery of the fighting increased. The jaegers were utilizing for defense the rocky, comparatively low mountains, numerous lakes, forest and roadless terrain. We were seeking extensively to employ maneuver, flanking and envelopment of the enemy's dispositions, but under conditions where we lacked pack transport and the requisite gear for such terrain, it was necessary to carry ammunition and food to the troops on the shoulders of personnel. It was impossible to execute planned maneuvers when there were no roads or even trails.

After capturing the tiny village of Bratli, situated south of Kirkenes, we conceived the idea of executing a deep enveloping maneuver with the forces of the 28th Guards Rifle Regiment under the command of Lt Col A. V. Pas'ko in the direction of Munkelven. It would enable us to cut off the enemy's avenue of withdrawal from Kirkenes toward the southwest. A thorough study of the map, however, to find even the slightest semblance of a trail was quite dejecting: the terrain was extremely difficult; the regiment could not get through. Particularly since it would be necessary to cross the mountains.

An elderly, very untalkative local resident came to our assistance. We explained our difficulties to him. The Norwegian ran his finger across the map, asked for a sheet of paper and pencil, and then drew a crude but understandable route diagram and pointed to his own chest, volunteering himself as a guide.

Puffing clouds of smoke with his pipe, he told us he would accompany us to the pass and when there would show us how to proceed from that point.

We were pleased to utilize the services of this Norwegian patriot. The regiment accomplished an incredible march under the conditions and successfully accomplished the difficult and critical mission. Unfortunately I do not recall the name of this most remarkable Norwegian, but he was a native of the village of Langfjurbotn.

At 0300 hours on 25 October reports came in from the 24th and 35th Rifle regiments: they had penetrated to the southern edge of Kirkenes and were fighting in the vicinity of the metallurgical plant. This was confirmed by the artillerymen. I went out to the observation post of one of the regimental commanders. While I was still en route I could see that it would be extremely difficult to dislodge the enemy from his positions. It was night; the terrain, broken up by hills, natural pits and fissures was barely visible in the darkness. In addition, around the plant there were numerous tunnels in which ore had once been mined, while now there was a rail spur. The regimental commander informed me that the enemy was tenaciously holding both tunnels and rail spur.

Our reconnaissance had obtained extremely meager intelligence on what we could expect within the town and in these tunnels. Here too, however, we were helped by local inhabitants. Suddenly two excited Norwegians appeared out of nowhere at the command post, accompanied by our scouts. The interpreter at first did not understand what these people were talking about. It finally was elucidated that several hundred local inhabitants were confined in the tunnels, having been forcibly driven there by the Germans. These were mostly young people designated to be taken to Germany for forced labor. They then gave us an extremely full briefing on the enemy and on the tunnels and structures which had been adapted for defense. Now we could fight without groping in the dark.

Soon we also began receiving intelligence from our scouts. They confirmed what we had been told by the Norwegians, but in addition they had discovered that all the tunnels were mined and ready for demolition. Now the task of preventing the brutal murder of the Norwegian prisoners and their rescue from the hands of these butchers had assumed particular importance for us. We kept thinking about their fate. We therefore assigned additional missions to the units, took steps to increase pressure on the enemy, and reported to neighboring units on the situation.

This piece of news mobilized the men of the neighboring combined units. Moving out to rescue the Norwegian patriots, they succeeded in reaching the enemy's demolition charges and disarming them.

In the meantime the division, overcoming the enemy's resistance, had advanced right up to the tunnels and rail spur. I moved forward. A column of smoke was slowly rising skyward in the damp air along the rail spur. A slight breeze from the sea carried the smell of burning grain. There was no doubt about it: the Germans had removed from railroad cars the wheat which had been procured for a defense of several months, had poured gasoline on it and ignited it. A Norwegian approached me, a railroader, judging from his clothes. He silently, tears in his eyes, pointed to the conflagration and shook his fist in that direction.

By noon the rail spur was in our hands. Suddenly an unforeseen event occurred. People began converging on our observation post, which was located at an unobtrusive site in a local ramshackle, broken-down hut. Nobody had summoned them, but they kept coming, appearing from clefts in the rocks and from the still-smoking ruins. Evidently they were being drawn toward their liberators by a burning sense of gratitude. They were moving without any command, loudly shouting, singing and even dancing. They were waving Norwegian flags, which they had kept during the occupation at great risk and peril.

The Norwegians thanked our soldiers and attempted to touch them. Women, wiping away tears, were picking brilliantly flaming autumn leaves, forming them into bouquets and presenting them to the soldiers, were embracing their liberators, and gesturing toward their demolished homes. The men endeavored to be more restrained.

By evening the enemy had been driven out of the town and port. Although fighting was continuing in the area of Eebugten airfield, a big rally was held on the Kirkenes town square, to honor the raising of the Norwegian flag. The local people gathered there warmly greeted the Soviet troops.

Political section chief Col V. V. Dragunov spoke on behalf of our division. I remember his speech well.

"Dear Ladies and Gentlemen, our good neighbors -- Norwegians! The Soviet Army congratulates you and, through you, the entire Norwegian people on liberation of the town of Kirkenes and the entire northern province of Finnmark! From here the German-fascist military launched attacks on Red Army troops, Soviet ships, and Murmansk. Now an end has been put to this, and the people of Kirkenes henceforth and forever will breathe free, will be able to live without hiding from the Germans, without having to escape into the mountains. Thousands of Norwegians have been liberated from bondage, from the threat of death...."

When the interpreter translated this, many women ran forward and loudly cried: "We are those who lives you saved!"

This prompted thunderous applause and shouts of gratitude from all over the square. Now the town mayor, an antifascist, had to give a response speech. It was evidently difficult for him. He was quite emotional from the events. With his left hand he held the cord from the Norwegian flag which he was supposed raise over the square following many years of Nazi occupation, and he was unable immediately to control the rush of emotions. Finally the mayor thanked the Soviet Army for everything it had done for the town, for the liberation of Norway, and for selfless assistance to the people of his homeland. "We Norwegians will never forget you fighting men of the Soviet Army-liberator!" he concluded. The Norwegian flag slowly ascended the flagpole to the triumphant shouts of the assembled townspeople. Our band struck up the Norwegian National Anthem, and the townspeople burst into song. A triple artillery salvo roared a salute....

Kirkenes was in ruins. It appeared as if the enemy had attempted to burn even the very ground on which the town stood. There were booby traps everywhere, and street intersections had been mined.

The Norwegians quickly organized assistance to help us clear mines from the town. I remember how they, even old women, volunteered to show the Soviet combat engineers the locations of the minefields, lanes through them, mined buildings and other structures. Our combat engineers, led by Sr Lt A. A. Mikhaylov, who is today editor in chief of the journal LITERATURNAYA UCHEBA, worked selflessly and tirelessly to make the town once more safe for the townspeople.

The local inhabitants continued to offer friendly assistance where the fighting was continuing. A small Soviet reconnaissance team, which had

the mission of circling around under cover of darkness into the enemy's flank, lost their way. As they were trying to find their way back to the correct route, the soldiers encountered a group of Norwegians who had been hiding in the mountains from the Germans. Sergeant Inkuyev, in charge of the scouts, knew Finnish and was able to get across that they were lost. The Norwegians assigned them a guide who led the Soviet soldiers to the designated location, which ensured the subsequent success of the main forces of one of our regiments.

The division remained in Norway only from 10 to 12 days, as it was shifted to the western sector. During this time we worked in close contact with the local population, receiving whatever assistance the people could give us. First of all it was necessary to work together to save grain stocks which were urgently needed by the Norwegians. These stocks, which the occupation forces had set aside for themselves as a 9-12 month supply, had been barbarously destroyed. Everywhere the same scene was repeated: the Germans would pour fuel on the grain and mercilessly set it on fire.

Gen K. S. Grushevoy, member of the military council of the Karelian Front, helped us put together a plan for supplying the local population. We did not allow the grain to be completely burned up. The men of the division hastily removed the smoldering top layer of grain and distributed to the civilians that grain which had not been consumed by fire. Housewives could not believe their eyes. Hitler's propaganda had painted them a frightful picture of the Soviet soldier. This propaganda picture was now dissolving. The Norwegians expressed their gratitude to the generous Soviets.

In addition, other food supplies captured from the enemy were made available to the local population. Substantial quantities were supplied, but nevertheless the population's food requirements were not met. Then enough food supplies to make up the deficit were released from our army supply depots. It seemed to us that this food was particularly tasty to the Norwegians. We also gave the local population medicines, of which they had practically none, communications and transport equipment.

In the meantime our doctors and nurses were giving assistance to Norwegian children, whose health had been adversely affected by the extended time spent in caves. Division units released to the townspeople of Kirkenes the ramshackle dwellings seized from the enemy during the fighting. The troops themselves bivouacked outside the town. Within a few days following liberation, the Kirkenes power generating plant and public baths were back in operation, and the demolished roads began to be repaired.

Nor were the Norwegians marking time. They were establishing armed detachments, which were formed in a tunnel at the iron mines by the village of Bjornevand.

At that time even the foreign press was speaking of the noble mission of the Soviet troops which had entered Northern Norway. The following commentary on these events, for example, appeared in the 6 December 1944 issue of the Swedish newspaper GÖTEBORGS-POSTEN: "A Norwegian who is prominent in the Resistance Movement and who recently arrived in Sweden relates that the Russians are being very kind to the people of Northern Norway. During the first days, when supply had not yet been organized, the Russian troops gave the civilian population food from their own supplies and in general were very helpful. A large percentage of the buildings in Kirkenes were destroyed by the Germans. The Russians have placed at the disposal of the townspeople those houses which remain standing. Cooperation between the Russians and Norwegians is very cordial. The Russians came as genuine liberators, and they are being received with great enthusiasm..."*

I visited Norway many years later. At a friendship rally in Drammen that familiar scene from the war was repeated: as I was recounting past experiences, several men and women approached me. They proceeded to embrace me emotionally, saying that they had been among those who in that memorable year 1944 had been rescued from inevitable death by Russian troops in the fascist-mined tunnels of Kirkenes. The rally gave an additional boost toward strengthening friendship between the peoples of Norway and the Soviet Union.

After the rally we paused to take enjoyment from the quiet reigning over the Norwegian land, a poor and harsh land, but so glorious and beautiful. The turquoise waters of the fjords, the fantastic cliffs and precipitous shores seemed a wonder of nature. This was indeed so thanks to the friendship and peace achieved in the joint struggle against Hitler's fascism. Good seeds produce good shoots.

[8144/0279-3024]

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3024

CSO: 8144 /279

* Central Archives of the USSR Ministry of Defense, Fund 1068, List 2, File 306, Sheet 133.

SOURCES OF SOVIET-CZECHOSLOVAK COMBAT COOPERATION TRACED

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 10, Oct 79 signed to press 21 Sep. 79 pp 42-44

[Article, published under the heading "In the Fraternal Armies," by Docent and Candidate of Military Sciences Col (Res) P. Matronov: "Combat Cooperation of the Soviet and Czechoslovak Armies -- Internationalism in Action"]

[Text] The fighting alliance between the armies of the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia, as well as the other armies of the Warsaw Pact nations, possesses deep historical roots and traditions. It was born in a joint struggle for victory of the Great October Socialist Revolution and was strengthened in battles for the triumph of socialism and communism.

During the years of intervention and civil war in the USSR, more than 6000 Czechoslovak patriots fought in the ranks of the Red Army. When a military threat from Hitler's Germany hung over the Czechoslovak Republic, the Soviet Government offered unselfish assistance. Czechoslovakia's bourgeois government, however, rejected this offer, giving its people over to the tender mercies of the Nazis, while the Western powers, as we know, gave the aggressor a free hand by consenting to the Munich agreement.

The Soviet-Czechoslovak brotherhood in arms became particularly strengthened in the battles of the Great Patriotic War, in the course of which were laid the foundations of the indestructible friendship of the armies of the nations of the socialist community.

On 18 July 1941, at the initiative of the Soviet Government, a Soviet-Czechoslovak agreement of alliance in the war against fascist Germany was concluded.¹ Pursuant to this agreement, at the end of 1941 Czechoslovak units and subunits began to be formed on Soviet territory, in the city of Buzuluk. The Soviet command supplied them with needed weapons and military equipment.

On 8 March 1943 the 1st Czechoslovak Battalion received its baptism of fire in combat near the Ukrainian village of Sokolovo. Its men fought bravely and displayed a high degree of skill; 87 of the most outstanding soldiers were awarded Soviet decorations. Company commander Lt Otakar Jaros was awarded the title Hero of the Soviet Union, and battalion commander Ludvik Svoboda was awarded the Order of Lenin.

In the fall of 1943 the 1st Czechoslovak Brigade was formed on the basis of this battalion and furnished with Soviet weapons and combat equipment. Operating as an element of the LI Rifle Corps of the 38th Army, on 5 November it was among the first units to enter Kiev, the Ukrainian capital, and distinguished itself in subsequent engagements at Belaya Tserkov' and Zhashkov. By ukase of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, the brigade was awarded the Order of Suvorov and the Order of Bogdan Khmel'ni茨kiy. Soviet decorations were awarded to 138 officers and men of this brigade. Lt Antonin Sochar and Jr Lt Richard Tesarik were named Hero of the Soviet Union. Czechs and Slovaks fought valiantly in the ranks of the Belorussian and Ukrainian partisans. Capt Jan Nalepka was awarded the lofty title Hero of the Soviet Union for a heroic feat performed in this struggle.

Signing on 12 December 1943 of a Soviet-Czechoslovak treaty of friendship, mutual assistance and postwar cooperation was of great importance for strengthening the fighting alliance. Pursuant to this treaty, the Soviet Union increased the magnitude of comprehensive assistance to the Czechoslovak Republic, especially in arming military units on the territory of the USSR and partisans operating behind enemy lines.

Formation of the I Czechoslovak Army Corps began in the vicinity of Chernovtsy in the spring of 1944. By September it totaled 16,170 men and was armed with 8,050 rifles and carbines, 4,897 submachine guns, 496 light and heavy machineguns, 283 guns and mortars, 31 tanks, and 766 trucks.²

The Slovak national uprising erupted on 29 August 1944. The Soviet Union offered considerable assistance to the insurgents. In September and October they were delivered more than 10,000 rifles and carbines, hundreds of antitank rifles, approximately 1,000 machineguns and mortars, as well as several million rounds of ammunition and medical supplies. Soviet aircraft transported to Slovakia the Czechoslovak 2d Airborne Brigade and 1st Fighter Regiment. To assist the Slovak uprising, the troops of the First and Fourth Ukrainian fronts mounted the Eastern Carpathian Operation, which also involved participation by the men of the Czechoslovak I Army Corps. Soviet partisans were also dispatched to Slovakia.

On 6 October 1944, following heavy, bloody fighting for possession of the Dukla Pass, Soviet and Czechoslovak soldiers entered Czechoslovakia. This day is celebrated as Czechoslovak People's Army Day.

An armed uprising erupted in Prague on 5 May 1945. The insurgents were greatly assisted by the troops of the First, Second and Fourth Ukrainian fronts. These included the Czechoslovak I Army Corps. The Polish 2d Army and units of the Romanian First and Fourth armies fought side by side with them. The Czechoslovak capital was liberated on 9 May.

Today the Czechoslovak People's Army, under the guidance of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, has been transformed into a highly-disciplined regular army, possessing modern organization, weapons and combat equipment.

Since establishment of the Warsaw Pact organization (1955) the Czechoslovak People's Army has been a strong link in the socialist defensive alliance, the political foundation of which is the common social system, the economic -- a socialist mode of production, and ideological -- the teachings of Marxism-Leninism and loyalty to the ideals of socialism and communism and the principles of proletarian internationalism.

A graphic example of embodiment of the Leninist principle of international defense of the achievements of socialism was the assistance rendered to Czechoslovakia by the Soviet Army and the other armies of the nations of the socialist community to prevent a counterrevolutionary coup in 1968. Troops of five brother countries were dispatched to Czechoslovakia. The plans of domestic counterrevolutionaries and international imperialism were thwarted.

In the great family of nations of the socialist community, the Czechoslovak people, under the guidance of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, are successfully building a developed socialist society and are expanding comprehensive cooperation with the Soviet Union and the other brother countries.

Soviet-Czechoslovak friendship and cooperation received another significant boost as a result of last year's visit to the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic by a party-government delegation headed by General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Comrade Leonid Il'ich Brezhnev, Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet.

Convincing confirmation of this is the fraternal cooperation between the USSR and the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic in the conquest of space.

"...All facets of our cooperation — production, scientific-technical, and political," stated L. I. Brezhnev, "were reflected in the recent space flight by the first international socialist spacecraft crew, one member of which was Comrade Vladimir Remek, the first pilot-cosmonaut in the history of Czechoslovakia."³

All joint measures by the armies of the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia are permeated by a spirit of socialist internationalism.

Regular mutual visits by military delegations are of enormous importance for deepening cooperation between the brother armies.

Expansion of ties and strengthening of personal contacts were promoted by last year's visit to Czechoslovakia by a military delegation of the Soviet Union headed by USSR Minister of Defense Mar SU D. F. Ustinov, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo, and a visit to the USSR by a Czechoslovak military delegation headed by Minister of National Defense Army Gen M. Dzur, member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia. Having now become a solid tradition, they reveal the complete unity of views on root questions of military affairs and make it possible to exchange advanced know-how amassed by the allied armies.

Soviet and Czechoslovak troops, together with combined units and units of the other armies of the nations of socialist community, take active part in joint measures conducted according to the plans of the joint command of the Joint Forces of the Warsaw Pact member nations and the national military commands.

An important role in strengthening military cooperation is played by relationships of friendship and brotherhood established between the men of the Central Group of Soviet Forces temporarily stationed in Czechoslovakia and Czechoslovakia's military and civilians. A wealth of experience has been amassed in the area of training and internationalist indoctrination of military personnel and strengthening class and military solidarity. The successes of the Soviet people in implementing the resolutions of the 25th CPSU Congress constitute an inexhaustible source of revolutionary enthusiasm and achievements by the Czechoslovak people in implementing the resolutions of the 15th Congress of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia and in building developed socialism.

Noting the 34th anniversary of liberation of Czechoslovakia by the Soviet Army, Czechoslovak president Gustav Husak stated: "The Czechoslovak people will never forget the fraternal assistance of the Soviet Union and the enormous sacrifices of the glorious Soviet Army which liberated Czechoslovakia. Our people cherish and nurture the indissoluble friendship and alliance of our brother countries and armies, bonded by the blood shed in joint battle against fascism."⁴

A friendly meeting was held in the Crimea in July of this year between CPSU Central Committee General Secretary L. I. Brezhnev, Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, and General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia G. Husak, President of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, at which it was remarked that Soviet-Czechoslovak cooperation is continuing to grow stronger in all areas, with great benefit for both countries and for the entire socialist community.⁵ The fighting men of the nations of the socialist community, indoctrinated in a spirit of proletarian internationalism, are deeply cognizant of their noble mission. They are vigilantly guarding peace and socialism.

FOOTNOTES

1. "Sovetsko-chekhoslovatskiye otnosheniya vo vremya Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyny, 1941-1945 gg. Dokumenty i materialy" [Soviet-Czechoslovak Relations During the Great Patriotic War, 1941-1945. Documents and Materials], Moscow, Politizdat, 1960, page 14.
2. VOPROSY Istorii. No 12, 1969, page 52.
3. PRAVDA, 1 June 1978.

4. RUDE PRAVO, 7-9 May 1979.

5. PRAVDA, 19 July 1979.
(8144/0279-3024)

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MILITARY INITIATIVE AND CREATIVITY OF FRUNZE DESCRIBED

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 10, Oct 79 signed to press 21 Sept 79 pp 49-52

[Article, published under the heading "Scientific Information," by Candidate of Historical Sciences, Col (Res) I. Korotkov, and Capt 1st Rank (Res) M. Filimoshin: "The Initiative and Creativity in Military Activities of M. V. Frunze"]

[Text] M. V. Frunze ranks among the most eminent figures in the Communist Party and the world's first worker-peasant state who took active part, under the direction of V. I. Lenin, in establishing the Soviet Armed Forces. Linked with his name are many outstanding victories of the young Red Army over the White Guards and interventionists as well as the first major steps taken in military organizational development and elaboration of the root problems of Soviet military science following the civil war.

A convinced Marxist-Leninist and worthy person to express the ideology and interests of the worker class, Mikhail Vasil'yevich not only inherited the remarkable revolutionary qualities of the proletariat but also deeply perceived their enormous importance in military affairs. "...Entry into the Red Army of proletarian elements and Red commanders was reflected in the character of conduct of our operations..." he stated. "Red command personnel brought to the army boldness, initiative and resoluteness."¹ These words also apply in full measure to M. V. Frunze himself, who embodied the finest traits of the military leader advanced by the revolution from the masses. His bold actions of initiative and innovative approach toward solving complex problems were carried out in the spirit of Marxist-Leninist teaching on the role of the initiative and creativity of the revolutionary masses and individuals in all forms of class struggle, including warfare. During the civil war years, for example, V. I. Lenin viewed the initiative of the toilers and Red Armymen as a source of "additional strength," which plays an immense role in armed combat, especially in critical situations. In his outline plan for the article "Example of the Petrograd Workers," V. I. Lenin stated concretely following the thesis "Provide additional forces": "Proletarian initiative."² Volunteer units, examples of mass heroism, resolute actions by military commanders, etc, can also become "additional forces." N. V. Frunze noted: "...An adversary with initiative, even if much weaker, frustrates all the enemy's calculations, disrupts his plans, and achieves victory."³

At the end of 1918 the party Central Committee dispatched M. V. Frunze to the front to direct the combat operations of Soviet troops. He was designated commander of the 4th Army, which was deployed on the southern end of the Eastern Front. His military command activities began at this time, and can be conditionally divided into three periods: December 1918-August 1919 (Eastern Front); August 1919-September 1920 (Turkestan Front); September-November 1920 (Southern Front).

There still remained traces of "disorderly guerrilla warfare" in the 4th Army, which had been established primarily of partisan detachments: slackness held sway in the regiments, discipline was poor, and there occurred cases of insubordination, failure to carry out orders, and even a mutiny by kulak elements. In order to strengthen army ranks, a special detachment of worker volunteers was quickly formed at Mikhail Vasil'yevich's initiative in the Ivanovo-Voznesensk area. This detachment followed him to the 4th Army. In mid-February 1919 it was expanded into the 220th Ivanovo-Voznesensk Rifle Regiment, which became the "worker guard" of the 25th Rifle (Chapayev) Division and a reliable support for the army commander.

Having consolidated the army's proletarian nucleus, its party ranks and command-commissar personnel, M. V. Frunze rapidly transformed the semi-partisan detachments, units and combined units comprising the 4th Army into highly-disciplined regular troops capable of defeating the White Guardists and interventionists. The army commander called upon the soldiers, commanders and commissars honorably to justify the hopes of the Soviet people and to fight the enemy until complete victory was won, holding back neither energy nor their very life. In an order to his army he expressed confidence that "the aggregate efforts of all members of this army will prevent the occurrence within its ranks of manifestations of cowardice, laziness, self-interest or treason," and he warned that "if such things occur, the stern arm of authority will come down mercilessly upon the heads of those who in this... decisive battle between labor and capital betray the interests of the worker-peasant cause."⁴

Soon the 4th Army shifted from the defense to the attack and liberated a large part of the Urals. During this time M. V. Frunze displayed the ability quickly and correctly to estimate the situation and to reach appropriate decisions. By personal example of courage in combat he rapidly gained respect and enormous authority from this men. His deputy, F. F. Novitskiy, former general in the Tsarist army, characterized M. V. Frunze's generalship abilities as follows: "From the very first days of his military service, having taken at the very outset a high position... which in the old days came at the end of one's military career, Mikhail Vasil'yevich immediately began performing his military job brilliantly in the full meaning of the word, and according to all the rules and laws of military science."⁵

In April 1919 an exceptionally grave situation had developed in the eastern part of our country. As a result of an offensive by Kolchak, who had succeeded in attaining, with the aid of the imperialists of the

Entente, an overwhelming superiority in forces, the Eastern Front was breached. The enemy was approaching the Volga, threatening Kazan', Simbirsk, and Samara. The Soviet Republic was in the gravest danger. In connection with this the Central Committee of the RCP(B) [Russian Communist Party (of Bolsheviks)] stated in its theses written by V. I. Lenin: "Kolchak's victories on the Eastern Front present an extraordinarily great danger to the Soviet Republic...."

"The Central Committee appeals to all party organizations and to all trade unions to set to work in a revolutionary manner, without being bound by the old stereotyped patterns....

"All resources must be harnessed, setting revolutionary energy into play, and Kolchak will be swiftly defeated. The Volga, Urals, and Siberia can and must be defended and regained."⁶

The innovative abilities and generalship talents of M. V. Frunze were most fully revealed precisely in this most grave situation. He was appointed to the position of commander of the Southern Army Group of the Eastern Front. Thoroughly analyzing the course of military operations, he elaborated and proposed a vigorous plan for crushing the enemy with the forces of the Southern Group, which contained the 4th, 1st, 5th, and Turkestan armies. In spite of Trotsky's opposition, this plan was adopted. The Central Committee of the RCP(B) and V. I. Lenin personally ordered organization of a counterstroke without delay, under the supervision of M. V. Frunze, giving him complete operational independence.

Having determined the main axis of advance (Buzuluk-Buguruslan-Belebey), M. V. Frunze succeeded in a short period of time, under muddy conditions caused by the spring thaw and a transportation system collapse, in redeploying his troops and making preparations for a counteroffensive by the armies, consisting of three sequential offensive operations (Buguruslan, Belebey, and Ufa). Their successful execution enabled the troops of the Southern Group to crush Kolchak's main forces in that sector, to cross the Belaya River and liberate Ufa. The White Guard armies, pursued by our troops, were pushed back to the crest of the Urals. This victory radically altered the strategic situation at the front in favor of the Soviet forces and created favorable conditions for crushing the eastern counterrevolution.

At all stages of the offensive by the Southern Group under the leadership of M. V. Frunze (from April to mid-June 1919), it firmly held the combat initiative. Our troops, giving the enemy no respite, inflicted one defeat after another. All this was a result of the commander's foresight, who had clearly seen the potential variants of development of events, and his ability to execute maneuver of forces and thus to influence the combat situation.

This counteroffensive is a classic example of how the creative activity of a military commander and his actions of initiative become a factor ensuring

a rapid shift from a threatened position to total victory over the adversary with unfavorable relative strengths.

M. V. Frunze's innovative activities encompassed not only elaboration and execution of plans of operations but also solving of many other problems connected with organization of combat operations. They include placement of personnel, utilization of equipment, provision of ammunition and other supplies, moral-political preparation of troops, political work among the local population and enemy soldiers, etc.

For example, conducting an operation to defeat General Belov's large White Guard army (Turkestan Front), M. V. Frunze skillfully utilized weapons which were new for that time -- armored trains, armored cars, and airplanes, which were incorporated into the flank battle groups. This promoted successful development of the offensive. At the same time Communists sent behind enemy lines sought to convince the enemy soldiers to stop fighting. A particularly important role in demoralizing the White Guard troops was played by appeals by M. V. Frunze to the Urals and Orenburg Cossacks to cease the fratricidal war. As a result great numbers of enemy soldiers, who had been deceived by the enemy's propaganda, surrendered, while entire units went over to the side of the Reds. By 10 September 55,000 men had laid down their arms.

Thus M. V. Frunze skillfully combined operational leadership with political work, to which he always attached enormous importance, considering it to be "a new, additional branch of arms, terrifying to all our enemies."⁷

A most important aspect of the generalship talents of M. V. Frunze, as already noted, was the fact that in the course of conduct of numerous operations he would seize the military initiative, regardless of the relative strengths of the opposing forces, and even in the most unfavorable situation. He would hold the initiative until total victory over the enemy had been gained. This was the case on all fronts, including the Southern Front, when the troops of the Red Army under his command succeeded in rapidly preparing for and shifting to a counteroffensive against Wrangel'.

The appeal of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Southern Front to the troops stated: "The enemy, having suffered a number of severe setbacks in recent battles, is exhausted and is once again ready to withdraw to the Crimea, sensing impending collapse.... With a coordinated, swift attack by all the armies of this front, we must crush his forces and drive into the Crimea on the shoulders of the fleeing White Guardists. The campaign can be ended with a single blow, and it is our duty to the entire country and to ourselves to deliver this blow. Under no circumstances can we allow things to drag on to a winter campaign."⁸

The assigned mission was successfully accomplished. In spite of fierce resistance by the enemy troops which had taken refuge behind the impregnable fortifications of the Perekop Isthmus, Red Army units took this

tough objective by storm and totally crushed Wrangel's army. On 16 November the Southern Front ceased to exist.

Following the victorious conclusion of the Civil War the Communist Party was faced with a new and very important task -- to convert the Armed Forces of the Soviet Republic to a peacetime status and to determine their numerical strength and organization under conditions of economic devastation and threat of imperialist attack. Enormous credit for accomplishment of this difficult task must go to M. V. Frunze, who was now recognized as a prominent statesman and eminent military theorist.

In January 1921 M. V. Frunze and S. I. Gusev presented their proposals on reorganization of the Red Army in the form of 22 points.⁹ The points authored by Frunze (17 through 22) express basic theses on the necessity of elaborating a unity of views on the character of military tasks facing the worker-peasant state, and establishment of a Soviet military doctrine. That same year M. V. Frunze published a well-reasoned article entitled "A Unified Military Doctrine and the Red Army," in which military questions were examined from the position of Marxism-Leninism. It advanced for the first time theses revealing two aspects of military doctrine -- political and military-technical.

Discussion of the theoretical principles of Soviet military doctrine assumed an acute character from the very outset, since the Trotskyites denied its importance and necessity for the Soviet Republic. At the initiative of M. V. Frunze and K. Ye. Voroshilov, this question was examined at a conference of military delegates to the 11th Congress of the RCP(B) (April 1922), at which Mikhail Vasil'yevich precisely substantiated the necessity of creating a Soviet military doctrine based on the practical needs of the Armed Forces.¹⁰

While serving as commander of all armed forces of the Ukraine and the Crimea, M. V. Frunze was the first of the Soviet military commanders to organize synthesis of the experience of the wars which had recently ended (World War I and the Civil War). He enlisted in this important work many specialists from his staff, as well as several senior commanders and political workers. The first results of this work were summarized at a conference of command and commissar personnel in March 1922.¹¹

On the basis of the scope of problems addressed in the 11 principal reports, various supporting reports and addresses in the sections, this conference has every reason to be called a scientific conference, at which M. V. Frunze expressed a number of interesting theses, including on the character of projected future military clashes and possible actions by the Red Army. Proceeding from the fact of change in enlisted and command personnel, expressed "in the highest degree of activeness, initiative, in ability for organization, unification and actions by large organized masses...,"¹² he stated that "the principal, predominant character of our future operations will be maneuver."¹⁴ At the same time he warned against

becoming wed to any specific scheme or method. Mobility, he stated, will require extensive and full familiarity with static forms of warfare.¹⁵

Thus the entire military activities of M. V. Frunze serve as a vivid example of an innovative approach with initiative to solving the problems of art of warfare and further development of the Soviet Armed Forces. Many of his theses in this area remain valid up to the present day.

FOOTNOTES

1. M. V. Frunze, "Izbrannyye proizvedeniya" [Selected Writings], Voyenizdat, 1965, page 92.
2. "Leninskiy sbornik" [Lenin Collection], XXIV, page 16.
3. Frunze, op. cit., Vol II, 1957, pp 47-48.
4. "M. V. Frunze na frontakh grazhdanskoy voyny. Sbornik dokumentov" [M. V. Frunze on the Fronts of the Civil War. Collected Documents], Voyenizdat, 1941, page 51.
5. "Trudy akademii" [Works of the Academy], Vol 40, Moscow, Izd. Voennoy akademii imeni M. V. Frunze, 1955, page 19.
6. V. I. Lenin, "Poln. Sobr. Soch." [Complete Works], Vol 38, pp 271-274.
7. Frunze, op. cit., page 148.
8. "M. V. Frunze na frontakh...," op. cit., pp 412-413.
9. See "Desyatyy s"yezd RKP(b). Mart 1921 goda. Stenograficheskiy otchet" [Tenth Congress of the RCP(B), March 1921. Stenographic Record], Moscow, Politizdat, 1963, pp 710-714.
10. Frunze, op. cit., Vol 2, pp 92-105.
11. See "Stenograficheskiy otchet soveshchaniya komandnogo i komissarskogo sostava voysk Ukrainskogo i Krymskogo fronta, proiskhodivshego s 1 po 7 marta 1922 g. v g. Khar'kove" [Stenographic Record of the Conference of Command and Commissar Personnel of the Forces of the Ukraine and the Crimea, Held on 1 - 7 March 1922 in the city of Khar'kov], Khar'kov, Izd. Shtaba voysk Ukrainskogo i Krymskogo fronta, 1922, 271 pages.
13. Frunze, op. cit., Vol II, pp 43, 47.
14. Ibid., page 46.
15. Ibid., page 47.
(8144/0279-3024)

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ARMY-LEVEL COMBAT INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS DESCRIBED

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 10, Oct 79 signed to press 21 Sep 79 pp 53-58

[Article, published under the heading "Scientific Information," by Candidate of Military Sciences Col (Res) V. Chikin: "Combat Intelligence in Operations of the 61st Army"]

[Text] An analysis of preparations for and conduct of operations by combined-arms armies indicates that combat intelligence in all types of combat operations during the Great Patriotic War was organized on the whole according to a unified scheme. But since every specific operation is unique both in objective and content, the specific features of that operation were taken into consideration. This was done in order promptly to provide the commanding general and his staff with the required intelligence on the enemy and terrain, on the basis of which they could come up with the most expedient modes of combat action. In this article we shall briefly examine resolution of this problem by the 61st Army, which was sequentially commanded by Col Gen F. I. Kuznetsov (10 November-18 December 1941), Lt Gen M. M. Popov (18 December 1941-28 June 1942), and Lt Gen (Col Gen effective 26 July 1944) P. A. Belov (from 28 June 1942 to war's end). Experience of organization of combat intelligence in this army is of definite interest today as well.

As a result of accumulation and synthesis of combat experience, the army headquarters staff was continuously improving the forms and modes of organization and conduct of reconnaissance. By mid-1942 the firm conviction had been formed that the input data for organizing the gathering of combat intelligence are the army's mission, the operation decision of the army commanding general, instructions (combat order or field instructions) of front headquarters, available information on the enemy, status of personnel and equipment and their combat capabilities. To be fair we should note that some staff officers, with an incorrect grasp of the principle of employment of reconnaissance subunits, demanded under the pretext of continuous reconnaissance that they be employed as combat subunits, that is, not according to their direct designation. The result of this was that in the initial period of the war reconnaissance subunits sustained heavy losses and were unable to perform the tasks for which they were intended.

As a rule the army commander would determine the combat intelligence objective and would specify the target of principal intelligence-gathering efforts, what information was to be obtained and by what time. It frequently happened that he personally would assign missions to the commander of the intelligence-gathering entity.

His chief of staff would usually detail the intelligence missions assigned by the army commander and front headquarters, would establish the sequence of their execution, would detail the sectors (areas) in which the main efforts were to be concentrated, would specify the manpower and equipment to reconnoiter the most important installations, and would designate the makeup of the reserve and subunits which were to engage in reconnaissance in force.

The intelligence chief and headquarters intelligence section officers would be the principal executors of all measures. The intelligence section would draw up army draft combat intelligence plans and combat intelligence orders for combined unit headquarters and headquarters of arms and special services, would verify execution of assigned missions and communicate additional tasks, would collect, process and synthesize intelligence, would prepare intelligence reports and summaries, would prepare reports on obtained intelligence for the army chief of staff and commander and for front headquarters, and would also inform neighboring large strategic formations. Interrogation of prisoners, questioning of local civilians, study and translation of captured documents, periodicals and letters would be performed by translators and intelligence section officers.

The combat intelligence plan for individual operations would be drawn up personally by the intelligence officer. In the initial period of the war it would be approved by the chief of staff, and in the subsequent period by the army commander.

In defensive operations combat intelligence would be planned for 10-15 days, and in offensive operations — for the entire operation. The plan would be put together by stages, and in the greatest detail for the preparatory stage and for execution of the immediate mission for each day of the operation. Subsequently planning was performed in less detail and consisted in determining the most important axes of concentration of the main efforts of army intelligence personnel and facilities and partisan detachments, as well as the principal axes of conduct of reconnaissance by rifle corps.

The plan would usually specify the following: objective, intelligence missions and areas of concentration of principal intelligence efforts, distribution of tasks among designated personnel and equipment, timetable of execution of measures, sequence and time of presentation of intelligence. A map on a scale of 1:100,000 or 1:200,000 with graphic representation of measures to be performed would be appended to the written plan.

Combat intelligence orders would be drawn up on the basis of the plan, for rifle corps and independently operating divisions, chiefs of arms and services, requests to front headquarters for air reconnaissance, and reconnaissance instructions to partisan detachments. Conduct of reconnaissance in force would be planned jointly with army headquarters operations section officers, and draft field instructions to the troops would be drawn up for this purpose.

Combat intelligence orders to rifle corps would normally contain a brief description of the opposing enemy force, would specify combat intelligence missions, a timetable for their execution, and sequence of presentation of intelligence reports and summaries. Combat intelligence missions for arms and services would usually be given verbally.

An air reconnaissance request would specify areas and axes of conduct of reconnaissance by visual observation, aerial photography zones, scale and timetable for aerial photography, quantity and time when delivery of photomosaics was desired. In the third, final period of the war it would state what was to be spotted where, and when the intelligence was to be reported. The manner of performance of assigned reconnaissance missions was not specified. Requests would be transmitted to front headquarters by telegraph or code.

Organic intelligence personnel and facilities and combat subunits would be enlisted to conduct reconnaissance. Each rifle division contained a reconnaissance battalion. In December 1942 they were reorganized into reconnaissance companies. Rifle regiments had two reconnaissance platoons (foot and mounted reconnaissance).

There were no organic intelligence gathering personnel or facilities directly in the army and its rifle corps. Therefore the command sought various possibilities of training and establishing nonorganic intelligence gathering entities. In particular, in November 1942 army intelligence training courses were established in the 215th Army Reserve Regiment, courses which operated up to war's end. They were directed by Capt P. A. Likhodey.


Course graduates would be sent as replacements to the divisions' reconnaissance subunits and to form special nonorganic reconnaissance teams to be sent behind enemy lines. Final training exercises would most frequently be held directly on the front line, where reconnaissance teams would be assigned an intelligence target, and they would mount a raid or set up an ambush in the enemy's dispositions with the objective of taking prisoners, capturing documents or weapons.

Beginning in May 1943, on an order issued by the army commander, nonorganic reconnaissance teams of 7-8 men were established in each rifle battalion. By June 1943 495 battalion intelligence personnel had been trained in the army.¹

The capabilities of partisan detachments behind enemy lines were extensively utilized for gathering operational intelligence.

Beginning in 1943 army chief of intelligence Col A. K. Kononenko had continuously at his disposal a nonorganic intelligence team led by Sr Lt V. M. Moskalev, which would set up an army observation post on the main axis. The team was provided with a motor vehicle and requisite communications gear.

Intelligence-gathering entities employed various intelligence techniques: observation, night and day raids, ambushes, radio and telephone eavesdropping, as well as reconnaissance in force. The depth of army reconnaissance (see Diagram 1) would be determined in each concrete case by the mission and capabilities of intelligence gathering entities.



Key:

1. Regimental observation post	5. Separate reconnaissance patrol
2. Separate mounted patrol	6. Sound ranging battery
3. Intelligence-reconnaissance detachments	7. Communications equipment close reconnaissance team
4. Separate reconnaissance group	8. Troop concentration

Observation was one of the principal combat intelligence techniques. It was organized by commanders and staffs of all echelons and in all types of combat activities. It was conducted by specially selected intelligence personnel possessing good eyesight, familiar with the telltale indications of weapons, equipment and defensive works, and equipped with binoculars, stereoscopic telescopes, and periscopes.

An elaborate network of observation posts (OP) would be set up in the forward-echelon units and combined units. During the defensive operation on the Bolkhov axis in November 1942, for example, the forward-echelon regiments of the 12th Guards and 342d Rifle divisions (Maj Gen K. M. Erastov and Col G. I. Kanachadze, commanding) had three OP apiece, while the battalions had two, and the companies one.³ Combined unit headquarters would set up from two to three OP.

Beginning in the winter of 1942/43 and up to the end of the war, reconnaissance in force would be conducted prior to beginning an offensive. As a rule it would be performed on a wide front 24 hours prior to the offensive by reinforced rifle companies (battalions) of the attack-echelon divisions, with artillery and air support. The mission was to determine the actual configuration of the enemy's main line of resistance and his fire plan, since frequently by the time we would initiate an offensive the enemy would withdraw his troops to depth in order to avoid losses during the preliminary artillery and air bombardment. Such was the case in the zone of the 61st Army on the eve of the offensive on the Bolkhov axis in July 1942. Intelligence had failed to discover that "the enemy withdrew his main forces from the forward position to depth, and therefore preliminary artillery bombardment failed to produce results. The army's attack-echelon divisions overran the enemy's first position without encountering any particular resistance. As they approached the second position, however, they encountered stubborn resistance and sustained heavy losses. The army's advance stalled on the first day of the operation."⁴ Nor was combat intelligence performed ideally on the following days. This was one of the reasons why "the army's offensive operation was not successful."⁵ In August of that same year the enemy mounted a powerful attack on that same axis at the juncture between the 16th and 61st armies, as a result of which the 350th and 346th Rifle divisions and several other of the army's units found themselves encircled. During escape from encirclement they sustained considerable losses. Unsatisfactory combat intelligence was again the reason for this.

Sometimes reconnaissance in force would be conducted at an earlier time in order to delude the enemy. On 5 January 1945, for example, that is, 10 days prior to the start of the Vistula-Oder offensive operation, the 1st Rifle Battalion of the 240th Guards Rifle Division, with an antitank battalion 76 mm battery, and a combat engineer company, supported by two artillery regiments and a mortar battalion, conducted reconnaissance in force with the objective of reconnoitering the forward edge of the enemy's main defensive position, to take prisoners for identification purposes and to demolish antipersonnel obstacles in a sector 500 meters north of Grabow-Zalesny (south of Warsaw).⁶ The mission was accomplished. Raids, ambush and sending of reconnaissance parties and detachments behind enemy lines were for the purpose of capturing prisoners, documents, specimens of weapons and combat equipment, and inflicting losses on the enemy. The raid and ambush were the most effective and widely-used techniques. In January 1943 alone (during the period of defense) the army mounted 50 and 23

respectively. These actions killed 70 officers and men and took 5 prisoners. Reconnaissance party losses totaled 4 killed and 45 wounded.⁷

During the fighting to enlarge bridgeheads in the fall of 1943 on the west bank of the Dnieper, the XXIX Rifle Corps (Maj Gen A. N. Slyshkin, commanding; Maj V. F. Palenov, chief of intelligence) mounted 40 night raids and set up 18 ambushes. In addition, three teams were operating behind enemy lines. The prisoner take was as follows: 27 during the conduct of night raids; 17 taken in ambushes.⁸ During this period the army mounted 136 night raids and 40 ambushes, capturing 273 prisoners. Fifteen reconnaissance teams were operating behind enemy lines.⁹

Teams of 5-8 men would be formed in the divisions for mounting raids and ambushes, and 3-5 man teams for operating deep in the enemy's defenses. They could penetrate behind enemy lines undetected and operate noiselessly and maintaining concealment.

Large intelligence-reconnaissance detachments (RO), formed from army combined units, were employed for reconnaissance at operational depth. On the night of 21 October 1943, for example, a 64-man army RO under the command of Capt M. K. Yudin was parachuted behind enemy lines. Its mission was to reconnoiter and frustrate enemy troop movements on lines of communication. At the same time the army commander ordered the detachment to organize co-ordinated action with partisan detachments in support of the offensive operation to widen the bridgeheads on the west bank of the Dnieper. The reconnaissance detachment personnel were armed with submachine guns, hand grenades, and explosives. The detachment was equipped with a Sever radio set with seven sets of radio batteries and was issued 7 days rations. In a period of 20 days they spotted an enemy force, the location of four unit headquarters, a large tank and truck maintenance shop, a military hospital and defensive line along the west bank of the Braginka River; they also determined the strength of the XLVI Tank Corps. While behind enemy lines (from 21 October to 30 November) the detachment killed 255 officers and men, destroyed 14 trucks, 2 large headquarters radio communications facilities, killing their crews, and took 8 prisoners.¹⁰ The detachment was flown behind enemy lines employing 110 sorties of PO-2 aircraft from the 440th Independent Army Aviation Squadron.¹¹

Personnel and equipment were detailed to eavesdrop on radio and telephone traffic. In July 1944, for example, during the Belorussian offensive operation, a communications equipment close reconnaissance team (GBRSS) was formed in the 106th Independent Signal Regiment by order of the army commander (Engr-Lt Col N. Ya. Pozdnyakov, regimental commander; Sr Lt N. P. Yenakhonov, group commander). It contained two radio monitoring squads, covering the VHF and HF bands (four men each) and two line communications monitoring squads (10 men). In addition, it contained a radio technician, 6 military German translators, and 2 drivers.¹² The intelligence personnel of the GBRSS obtained valuable intelligence on the composition and strength of the enemy's forces, numerical strength of subunits and units, time and place of delivery of hostile artillery attacks. This made it possible to determine the enemy's intentions in a timely manner.

Artillery reconnaissance was conducted by artillery reconnaissance and fire subunits with the aid of optical, sound ranging and other devices. Its mission was promptly to spot and precisely to determine the coordinates of important targets. The SCh2M-36 sound ranging unit was the most sophisticated. From July 1943 through April 1945 sound ranging took part in the major operations of the Great Patriotic War in determining coordinates on the average of up to 90% of the total number of reconnoitered targets by all artillery weapons.¹³ Personnel of artillery, engineer and chemical reconnaissance subunits were included in combined-arms reconnaissance manpower.


The volume of combat intelligence missions constantly broadened as the war progressed. In the third period of the war, as a consequence of increased depth of the enemy's defense, a high degree of weapons saturation of the defense and decreased time of preparation for combat actions, it became increasingly necessary to obtain reliable intelligence on the enemy's force, planning and installations extremely rapidly. In this connection gathering of combat intelligence proceeded in the direction of the most purposeful organization and close coordination of all types of reconnaissance, fuller utilization of the capabilities of intelligence manpower and facilities, combat subunits and units, and employment of the most efficient technical devices and methods.

Collection and processing of intelligence and reporting of intelligence to the commander, front headquarters and communication to subordinate staffs and neighboring units constituted the major function of the army headquarters intelligence section. This entire combat intelligence cycle is generally designated by the generalized term "information." The results of combat activities of intelligence and reconnaissance personnel and facilities were concentrated here, in information.

Following were the principal sources of intelligence for the army, such as in the Battle of the Dnieper: corps headquarters, air force, partisan detachments, army intelligence and reconnaissance entities, army sections and directorates, prisoners, captured documents, etc (see Diagram 2). It is evident from the diagram that continuity of collection and reliability of intelligence were achieved by combined utilization of all reconnaissance and intelligence manpower and facilities, types and modes of intelligence gathering.

Reports, including summary reports (usually covering 10 days), reports on the enemy and other documents would be prepared on the basis of obtained and synthesized intelligence.

All obtained information was thoroughly considered, and would be used as a basis for preparing maps of troop dispositions and location of headquarters, artificial obstacles, and military airfields. In addition a report map would be prepared, containing summary information covering 24 hours of combat activities.



Key:

1. Front headquarters RO	16. Army observation post
2. Commander and military council member, 61st Army	17. Prisoners
3. Chief of staff, 61st Army	18. Captured documents
4. 61st Army headquarters RO	19. Local civilian populace
5. Partisan	20. Intelligence reports
6. Brigades	21. Mutual information
7. Detachments	22. Headquarters of neighboring armies
8. Imeni Suvorov	23. Air force headquarters
9. Imeni Dzerzhinsky	24. Operations section, 61st army
10. Imeni Chapayev	25. Artillery headquarters
11. Imeni Kotovskiy	26. Armored headquarters
12. Sinyakov Brigade	27. Engineer troops headquarters
13. Baranov Brigade	28. Commander of CW troops
14. Army reconnaissance detachment	29. Army political section
15. GBRSS	СН -- rifle corps
	ГВ -- guards
	КК -- cavalry corps

There was a blank form for each enemy division, on which the following would be entered on the basis of prisoner statements and captured documents: line of march, numerical and fighting strength, list of commanders and their characteristics, numbering of units and their field post offices.

Prior to initiation of an offensive, intelligence diagrams would usually be sent to the line units, to the battalion inclusive, on 1:25,000 or 1:50,000 scale maps, carrying information on the enemy. Thus commanders of all echelons would receive a common briefing on the enemy's force and defensive

system, which to a substantial degree promoted thorough organization of coordinated action, distribution of targets and determination of the most expedient modes of action.

In the majority of operations the combat activities of combat intelligence personnel and facilities produced substantial results. For example, by the start of the Bolkhov offensive operation (July 1943) the opposing force in the army's zone of advance and character of field fortifications to the depth of the enemy's first defensive zone had been fully determined.¹⁴

In the course of an offensive capability to determine the fighting strength of an enemy force would increase considerably due to the conduct of reconnaissance by all troops participating in the operation and a large number of prisoners. Some information, however, would sometimes become obsolete due to rapid advance, disruption of communications, as well as for other reasons.

As the war progressed there occurred continuous improvement in the forms and methods of planning combat intelligence gathering of all types, as well as the modes of operation of intelligence and reconnaissance entities. There was an improvement in the level of direction of the intelligence gathering effort on the part of commanders and chiefs of staff at all echelons. The skill of intelligence officers improved to a high level, and all reconnaissance and intelligence personnel became conditioned and toughened in combat. All this substantially increased the effectiveness of reconnaissance and intelligence and enabled the army commander and commanders of combined units to make decisions promptly and expediently, promoting the successful conduct of combat operations.

Under present-day conditions thorough study of experience in organization and conduct of combat intelligence activities in the operations of the last war retains its importance, in order innovatively to utilize this experience in theoretical studies, in practical operational training of staffs and officer personnel, as well as in troop combat training.

FOOTNOTES

1. Central Archives of the USSR Ministry of Defense, Fund 418, List 10679, File 23, Sheet 142.
2. Footnote omitted.
3. Ibid., Fund 418, List 10679, File 8, sheets 189, 190.
4. "Obshchevoyskovaya armiya v nastuplenii" [The Combined-Arms Army in the Offensive], under the overall editorship of Prof Army Gen P. A. Kurochkin, Voenizdat, 1966, pp 88-89.
5. D. K. Mal'kov, "Skvoz' dym i plamya" [Through Smoke and Flame], Voenizdat, 1970, page 49.

6. Central Archives of the Ministry of Defense, Fund 418, List 10679, File 73, sheets 27-30.
7. Ibid., File 23, Sheet 10.
8. Ibid., File 33, Sheet 289.
9. Ibid., Sheet 303.
10. Ibid., Fund 418, List 10695, File 198, Sheet 43.
11. Ibid., List 10679, File 33, sheets 301, 306.
12. Ibid., List 10679, File 37, Sheet 230.
13. Gordon, Yu. A., and Khirenkov, A. V., "Artilleriyskaya razvedka" [Artillery Reconnaissance and Observation], Voyenizdat, 1971, page 54.
14. Central Archives of the Ministry of Defense, Fund 418, List 10679, File 25, sheets 56-63.
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3024

CSO: 8144 /279

WARTIME OPERATIONS OF ARTILLERY REPAIR UNITS DESCRIBED

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 10, Oct 79 signed to press 21 Sep 79 pp 58-63

[Article, published under the heading "Scientific Information," by Lt Col (Ret) A. Kiselev: "The Struggle to Service and Maintain Weapons and Equipment in a Combat Situation"]

[Text] Among the many factors which guaranteed our people's victory over fascist Germany, a prominent place is occupied by the qualitative superiority of Soviet weapons and military equipment over those of the enemy.

USSR Minister of Defense Mar SU D. F. Ustinov, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo, stated: "A comparison of the numerous specimens of our systems and types of automatic weapons with those of the enemy shows that they not only are not inferior but in many cases are superior in combat qualities to the enemy's weapons."¹ As regards artillery, he noted such outstanding qualities as mobility, versatility, and capability to utilize various types of artillery systems to engage that type of enemy weapon which presented the greatest danger at a given moment.²

The actions of the antiaircraft gunners of the Moscow Air Defense Zone during the fighting at Moscow in the fall of 1941, for example, constitute confirmation of versatility. Reliably defending the capital against enemy air attacks, they operated in close coordination with the combined units and units of the Western Front, delivering effective fire from their antiaircraft guns against the enemy's tanks and personnel.

Fascist antiaircraft artillery, in contrast to the Soviet equipment, could deliver fire primarily only at air targets.

The enemy himself acknowledged the excellent qualities of our artillery. In a highly personal military diary, which however became quite widely known after the war, Col Gen F. Halder, Chief of the General Staff of Ground Forces in Hitler's Germany, wrote the following entry in August 1941: "Colonel Metz (liaison officer of the 11th Army)... has been telling us about the excellent Russian weapons and excellent artillery." He also gave an evaluation of the T-34 tank on the 83d day of the war. "The Russian D-34 tank (25 tons)," he wrote, "is a high-quality, fast piece of equipment. Unfortunately we have not captured a single usable specimen of this tank."³

Other weapons and equipment designed by Soviet inventors and designers also possessed such excellent combat qualities as reliability, simplicity and ease of operation and maintenance, capability of rapid repair of combat damage, etc.

But no matter how simple, reliable and well designed these weapons and equipment were, their reliability, serviceability, and combat readiness were ensured only with skillful handling, proper operation and maintenance in a combat situation and during extended and difficult marches, rapid and high-quality servicing and maintenance, and conscientious care.

The effort to service and maintain weapons and equipment in a combat situation and during a march, and mobilization of all army personnel for this effort played an important role in successful accomplishment of combat missions.

The extensive aggregate of various measures carried out toward this end includes first and foremost planned, scheduled propaganda and indoctrination work at the front, with the objective of instilling in the men affection for their weapons and equipment, faith in them, a strong feeling of responsibility for keeping them in good working order, and a strong endeavor to master them. Commanders and engineer-technician personnel of all echelons and propaganda means were designated for this work, and the party-political edifice and military press were mobilized. Speeches by party and government leaders, military commanders, and many orders and directives made appeals to achieve this. For example, a 1 May 1942 order of the USSR People's Commissar of Defense, No 130, assigned to the Soviet Army and its personnel the task of "studying military affairs, studying persistently, mastering one's weapon, becoming an expert at one's job, and thus learning to hit the enemy surely."⁴

Propaganda and indoctrination work was closely combined with skillfully and comprehensively organized technical training of military personnel. Study of weapons and military equipment, their specifications and performance characteristics, rules of operation and maintenance was conducted not only in military educational institutions and in reserve regiments but also in the front-line units and combined units. They studied in detail, persistently, utilizing for this purpose free days and hours between engagements; in a short period of time they totally mastered new equipment and generously shared their experience amassed in combat. The most diversified forms and methods of study were employed: scheduled training classes, assemblies, technical conferences, study of exchange of know-how bulletins and leaflets, articles on technical topics in front and army newspapers, etc.

In March 1943, for example, two-day training sessions for command, engineer and technician personnel of tank and mechanized units and combined units were scheduled on the Northern Caucasus Front. Their purpose was to examine in detail and discuss problems of readying equipment for spring-summer operation. Special attention was to be focused on preparation of devices increasing the roadability of equipment during the spring thaw,

conduct of thorough equipment inspection, specific features of care of engine cooling and lubrication systems under summer operation conditions, care of air cleaners and storage batteries, as well as tanks during brief halts on a march and after completion of combat missions, specific features of driving tanks during the spring bad-road season, on sandy ground, and on rugged terrain.⁵

The specific subject matter to be covered at the training classes was included in the technical training calendar schedule. In July-August 1944 training classes on the following topics were held for artillery supply officers of the regiments and divisions of the 17th Guards Rifle Corps: types of repairs; procedure of preparing repair lists; new repair methods; utilization of repair personnel bulletin recommendations in practical work; new types of ammunition; facts affecting bore wear; Soviet and German artillery -- comparison of performance characteristics, etc. Artillery-technical service engineers and technicians would share the knowledge they acquired and refreshed at training classes with line unit commanders, artillery crews and the personnel of their service.⁶

Technical conferences held at numerous locations under combat-zone conditions played an important role in mastering equipment and acquiring know-how in servicing equipment. They were particularly beneficial to repair personnel. For example, at a conference for automotive maintenance personnel of the Northern Caucasus Front in September 1943, discussion covered such items as organization of and improvement in quality of automotive repair, economizing in fuel and lubricants, experience in mastering advanced repair techniques for the motor group, clutch, transmission, rear axle, brake system, manufacture of pistons for all types of cars and trucks (including casting), wrist pins, bushings, and other parts.⁷

Technical exhibits were an effective means of exchange of experience and know-how, nicely supplementing the system of technical training classes. The newspaper of the First Ukrainian Front, ZA CHEST' RODINY, reported in the 26 February 1945 issue on one such exhibit -- a mobile work shop-exhibit set up by the Main Automotive Directorate of the Soviet Army. This exhibit consisted of two sections: a demonstration section, which included drawings, photographs and examples of parts rebuilt by the most efficient methods under field conditions, containing a considerable quantity of materials on truck servicing and maintenance, and a production-regulation section, where experienced experts demonstrated their skill on operating equipment and helped improve the skills of unit and subunit maintenance personnel.

Thanks to efficient utilization of diversified forms of technical training and continuous attention devoted to this matter, in the fronts there was a steady increase in the number of highly-skilled specialists, experts at their job. Their military labor and skilled handling of equipment were honored by government decorations. For example, a team of drivers of the First Belorussian Front was awarded decorations and medals in January 1945 for exemplary performance of combat missions, excellent maintenance and prompt servicing of tanks and self-propelled guns, proper maintenance and

skillful operation on the battlefield, as a result of which they achieved much better than the warranty-guaranteed mileage without a single problem or breakdown.⁸

A most important element in the complex of measures directed at efforts to service and maintain weapons and equipment was their careful preparation for combat, detailed planning, and precise organization of logistical support and servicing of units and subunits both on the march and in combat. Characteristic in this regard is the experience of combat operations of units of the 4th Tank Army in the summer of 1943. It is presented below, based on the technical report materials.⁹

The combined units and units were to enter their first engagement following the army's formation. In the course of formation it was determined that the crews were not adequately trained technically and lacked solid driving skills. Therefore special attention was focused on individual training of crew members in their occupational specialty, and in addition training classes were held on rules and procedures of loading and unloading tanks from flatcars, procedure and extent of vehicle servicing during halts, readying tanks for march and combat, tank technical inspection en route, rules of operating vehicles in a column, and crew procedures when tanks break down. Ten to 12 days of intensive training was given, in the course of which drivers also acquired fairly solid practical driving skills.

In conformity with the plan of operations, army combined units and units, having executed a 60 kilometer march, reached the assembly area, and subsequently, advancing 25 km, took up the attack position. The march involved dirt roads in an advanced state of neglect, with a large number of crossings over creeks and streams with marshy banks and collapsed bridges. In spite of the adverse conditions, however, all tanks, with few exceptions, accomplished the march on schedule. An important role in this as well was played by the fact that all army repair and recovery equipment was distributed in such a manner that it service-covered the entire route of movement of the columns and would promptly appear wherever needed. Technical observation in the columns was performed personally by the subunit deputy commanders for technical affairs and specially designated, well-instructed officers.

In the assembly area, in a limited period of time, preventive maintenance work was performed: cleaning air filters, checking and adjusting steering clutches, etc.

The army was heavily engaged for a period of several days. Combat success was promoted to a substantial degree by intelligently organized servicing and support. Engineer-technician personnel did an excellent job of performing their assigned tasks, although conditions were exceptionally unfavorable: rain, lack of requisite equipment, tools, spare parts, etc. Sometimes repair personnel were compelled to perform jobs for which they were not trained and work not covered in the manual. The battalion

technical servicing platoons, for example, in addition to their principal duties, were assigned an additional task -- to perform minor repairs on damaged tanks. The regiment and brigade maintenance companies, which should have been performing minor repairs, were instructed to perform medium repairs on disabled tanks.

Repair schedules were drawn up for short periods of time (3-5 days), which proved fully warranted, since these schedules usually included repair of specific vehicles with indication of their identifying number, location, condition and timetable for restoration to service.

After the army's combined units and units were disengaged from action (the army was assigned a new combat mission), they executed an additional 50 kilometer march and reached the attack position. In the course of preparation for new combat operations, field maintenance shops, elements of the battalion technical maintenance echelon, were designated. Maintenance platoons moved behind the brigades. Technical service officers conducted observation by inspecting the columns by motorcycle. Some army maintenance equipment and corps mobile repair battalions were left in the previous area to complete repairs on damaged vehicles left there. On the whole, during the period covered by these engagements, army units received the equivalent of full replacement of tanks through repairs.

As is evident from the above example, much credit went to maintenance personnel for maintaining weapons and equipment at the front in a continuous state of combat readiness. Statistics from the war years show that in the course of the war they rehabilitated approximately 1,641,000 guns and mortars, performed 622,000 tank and self-propelled gun repairs, 82,300 major overhauls on tank engines, approximately 1,500,097 repairs on all types of aircraft, 382,600 aircraft engine repairs, approximately 2 million medium and major overhauls on trucks, and more than 8,800 ship repairs. Almost all of these types of weapons and equipment averaged repairs on 3-4 occasions in the course of the war.¹⁰

Archives of the war years abound in materials attesting to the selfless and productive actions of maintenance units and subunits. Unfortunately they are rarely mentioned today, although their experience is needed in the present day as well.

We shall present here several examples characterizing the significance of the military labor of maintenance personnel.

At the beginning of 1945 the equipment of the 5th Guards Tank Army, which had arrived in a new disposition area, was in need of repairs, with few exceptions. The army command was assigned the task of rehabilitating the vehicles as quickly as possible. Several repair subunits (3d Repair Battalion and a plant repair brigade) were attached to the army to assist maintenance personnel. The schedule called for performing under field conditions (at disabled vehicle collection points) 156 repairs, for the most part major overhauls. In addition to these, 20 other vehicles were

repaired by the specified deadline. The army entered battle completely up to strength with equipment in good working order. Maintenance personnel also worked selflessly on restoring to service tanks and self-propelled guns which had been damaged in combat. During combat operations the army's equipment was twice restored to service (equipment beyond repair was not counted).¹¹

Interesting figures are contained in the report of that same army's artillery supply service. The report states that between 1 January 1944 and 30 March 1945 army repair entities (two army artillery maintenance shops and 18 shops of combined units and units) with medium repairs alone restored to service enough weapons to arm six motorized rifle brigades, 14 light artillery, 7 antitank, 3 mortar and 8 antiaircraft regiments with light guns.¹²

An enormous job of restoring to service small arms, artillery and mortars was performed in the 3d and 5th Assault armies, 8th Guards Army and others during preparation for the assault on Berlin. We must state that it coincided with spring scheduled-preventive maintenance. The condition of weapons following the fierce battles fought by the troops from the Vistula to the Oder left much to be desired. A large quantity of weapons in need of repair had accumulated in the units and at the depots. In the 8th Guards Army, for example, approximately 40% of small arms and mortars needed repairs, as well as 53% of artillery equipment. Instruments (13%) were also in need of repair. In addition to repairs, all weapons in the units needed to be completely taken down and thoroughly inspected.¹³

In response to an order issued by the army commander dated 8 March 1945, the unit and combined unit commanders scheduled weapons inspection and maintenance timetables in conformity with the combat situation and arranged for maintenance teams from army artillery maintenance shops to go out to the units.¹⁴

The artillery maintenance people performed their job well: all weapons were rehabilitated and readied for combat ahead of schedule.

The author of this article remembers well a great many instances of skilled work by artillery repair personnel of the 3d Assault Army. Here is one of them. Antiaircraft gunners delivered to the army artillery maintenance shop an antiaircraft director (PUAZO-3) mechanism damaged by a bomb fragment. A pinion, which can be made only on a special machine tool, had been totally ruined; naturally the machine tool could not be found in any maintenance entity, not only of the army but of the front as well. Nor were there any spare pinions in the kit of spare parts, tools and accessories. In short the mechanism was not suited for repair in the field. It was hard to say how long the antiaircraft gunners would have to wait for a repaired or new instrument, if the mechanism had not fallen into the hands of technician Lt V. P. Amanshin. Overnight he made a pinion by hand and repaired all other damage. This finely-detailed work could be performed only by an outstanding master technician, and Viktor Petrovich proved to be just such a person.

After the war this skilled craftsman went to work at a plant in Kaluga. He was awarded the title Hero of Socialist Labor and elected delegate to the 24th CPSU Congress.

Combat-zone inventors and efficiency innovators made a great contribution toward the cause of keeping weapons and equipment maintained and serviceable. During three years of the war -- from 1942 through 1944 -- on the basis of far from complete figures, the army in the field received more than 90,000 suggestions, and more than 76,000 of these were adopted. The technical innovativeness of military personnel of the most varied occupational specialties frequently exerted considerable influence on the successful outcome of combat operations. Deputy People's Commissar of Defense Mar Arty N. N. Voronov issued a directive on 2 March 1943, praising the role of inventors and efficiency innovators: enlisted men, commanders, and political workers, frequently lacking the requisite conditions and adequate time, and often in a combat situation, are inventing new means and techniques of combat, are improving existing weapons, and are improving the efficiency of processes of maintenance, storage and utilization of equipment and combat training processes, creating conditions for a faster victory over the enemy.¹⁵

As a result of fabrication and rehabilitation of tools and devices, spare parts, parts and even entire pieces of combat equipment based on inventor proposals, as well as adoption of new repair techniques and methods, it became possible to repair equipment -- aircraft, tanks, guns, weapons, transport vehicles, etc in the field, which previously could not be done without withdrawing equipment far to the rear.

Front orders made mention of this. For example, an order to the troops of the Fourth Ukrainian Front dated 28 December 1943 noted that as a result of vigorous work by inventors and efficiency innovators, suggestions pertaining to repair and rehabilitation of equipment and weapons and suggestions on combat training had been exceptionally effective. Just in a period of 8 months our front produced more than 1,000 suggestions and inventions, many of which were not only of significance to the front but to the entire army.¹⁶

Adoption of many of them significantly sped up laborious processes of servicing and maintaining equipment, made it possible more rapidly to restore to service battle-damaged weapons and equipment, and expanded repair capabilities.

For example, thanks to extensive technical innovation, the number of overhauled trucks and engines increased sharply in the motor transport companies of the First Belorussian Front. Time required for engine overhaul was cut by more than half due to making individual operations more efficient. Adoption of valuable suggestions made it possible to fabricate in motor transport units parts which formerly had been manufactured only by large, well-equipped plants.¹⁷

In mobile artillery repair shops of that same front, implementation of efficiency suggestions in 1944 made it possible to save a quantity of man-hours equivalent to above-target repair of more than 35,000 rifles or 540 divisional artillery pieces.¹⁸

Conditions of care and storage of weapons and equipment were continuously monitored by commanders of subunits, units and combined units and inspectors from higher headquarters. The experience obtained in this area as well as revealed shortcomings would be communicated to the appropriate commanders and crews, who would thoroughly study, analyze and respond to them.

It is evident from the above that the problem of servicing and maintaining weapons and equipment in a combat situation is quite diversified. Its successful resolution exerted considerable influence on the outcome of operations. The wealth of experience amassed in this area during the war years is of great practical interest today as well.

FOOTNOTES

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2. Ibid., page 52.
3. F. Gal'der, "Voyenny dnevnik" [Military Diary], Vol 3, Book 1, Voenizdat, 1971, pp 287, 341.
4. I. Stalin, "O Velikoy Otechestvennoy voynе Sovetskogo Soyuza" [On the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union], Gospolitizdat, 1951, page 57.
5. Central Archives of the USSR Ministry of Defense, Fund 371, List 6340, File 32, Sheet 119.
6. Ibid., List 6388, File 338, Sheet 209.
7. Ibid., List 6406, File 2, Sheet 44.
8. Ibid., Fund 333, List 4846, File 26, Sheet 64.
9. Ibid., Fund 323, List 4770, File 2, sheets 6-63.
10. "Velikaya pobeda sovetskogo naroda 1941-1945" [Great Victory of the Soviet People, 1941-1945], Moscow, Nauka, 1976, page 368.
11. Central Archives of the Ministry of Defense, Fund 332, List 4948, File 315, sheets 16-21.
12. Ibid., File 32, Sheet 32.

13. Ibid., Fund 345, List 5510, File 668, sheets 54-62.
14. Ibid., Sheet 175.
15. L. Karnezov, and A. Kiselev, "Azbuka izobretatel'stva" [Inventor's Primer], Voyenizdat, 1978, page 29.
16. Central Archives of the Ministry of Defense, Fund 233, List 2378, File 2, Sheet 6.
17. Ibid., Fund 233, List 2378, File 2, sheets 134-153.
18. Ibid., File 24, sheets 15-20.
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BIBLIOGRAPHY ON RESISTANCE MOVEMENT IN WORLD WAR II DESCRIBED

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 10, Oct 79 signed to press 21 Sept 79 pp 70-71

[Article by M. Popenov, Bibliographer: "A New Bibliography"]

[Text] The most complete bibliography on a very important but as yet insufficiently investigated problem, a problem which has been deliberately obfuscated by bourgeois historians -- the Resistance Movement in the Countries of Western Europe, including Germany, has been published in the German Democratic Republic. In recent years much literature has been published in German dealing with the antifascist movement in Germany. The scholars of the German Democratic Republic have achieved particularly great success in this area.

The lack of a basic bibliography on this subject had been felt increasingly more acutely with each passing year, due to its importance and steadily growing interest in it. Now this gap has been filled. An interesting new bibliography has been published through the efforts of GDR bibliographers under the direction of Rudi Goguel.*

The bibliography contains literature (4,704 titles) published in the German language between 1945 and 1973 in the GDR, FRG, Switzerland, Austria, Hungary, Poland, Czechoslovakia, England, France, and elsewhere. It contains both monographic works and articles from scholarly journals and

* Goguel, R. "Antifaschistischer Widerstand und Klassenkampf. Die faschistische Diktatur 1933 bis 1945 und ihre Gegner. Bibliographie deutschsprachiger Literatur aus den Jahren 1945 bis 1973" [The Antifascist Resistance and Class Struggle. The Fascist Dictatorship, 1933-1945, and Its Opponents. Bibliography of Literature Published in the German Language, 1945-1973], collaborating bibliographers -- Jutta Grimann, Manfred Pueschner, Ingrid Volz. Berlin, Militaerverlag, 1978, 568 pages, first edition -- 1,500 copies.

collected volumes, dealing with problems of the Resistance Movement and the class struggle in Germany during the period of fascist dictatorship (1933-1945).

Of literature published other than at central publishing houses, it includes only that which contains factual material of importance to the scholar. It contains a great many works dealing with the political, ideological and military struggle of German and foreign antifascists against the Nazi dictatorship, which advocated the seizure of foreign soil, the annihilation and enslavement of the peoples inhabiting these areas, and was planning world conquest.

The bibliography lists biographies of eminent German leaders of the anti-fascist struggle. It also lists works dealing with the fascist governmental system, which was directed not only against the peoples of other countries but also against the German people. Literature on military operations in World War II is represented only in connection with armed actions by Resistance fighters.

It also lists materials of the International Tribunal in Nuremberg and the postwar trials of fascist criminals, which contain an enormous quantity of facts dealing with their crimes.

In his explanatory note to the reader Rudi Goguel states that fascist literature published by biased West German publishers is not included in the bibliography.

Memoirs and biographies are categorized as autobiographic articles listed alphabetically by author. Collective-authorship publications are listed under the name of each of the authors. If the number of authors is not precisely specified or they are unknown, biographies are listed in the biographic section (collected volumes).

An appendix contains the following: a chronological list of major conferences pertaining to the subject of the bibliography; an auxiliary subject index containing geographic and name as well as thematic and regional subheadings.

At the end of the volume there is a list of abbreviations, permitting avoidance of repetitions in bibliographic description and in the auxiliary lists, as well as to reduce word volume.

The volume is annotated.

The printing job is of excellent quality.

Unfortunately this fine publication does have its deficiencies. The sections are heavily overloaded, containing several hundred and even thousands of description units which, although listed in alphabetical order, deal with various aspects of the problem, which naturally makes it difficult to

look up literature on a specific topic even with an auxiliary index. The volume does not list articles from daily and weekly newspapers, "in view of the extensive nature of this literature." Inclusion of newspaper materials would have made the bibliography more complete and more useful to specialists.

On the whole the bibliography has been prepared on a high scholarly level and represents a substantial contribution to the bibliography of the Resistance Movement.

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BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION ON MARSHAL SUDETS

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 10, Oct 79 signed to press 21 Sep 79 pp 78-79

[Article, published in the section "News Items, Facts, Findings," by Col P. Dunayev (Moscow)]

[Text] Vladimir Aleksandrovich Sudets was born on 23 October 1904 in Nizhne-Dneprovsk (later renamed Dnepropetrovsk). In his youth he worked at an industrial plant as a toolmaker. He joined the party in 1924, and the following year, on the recommendation of the plant party organization, was sent to the military technical school of the Red Army Air Force. His service in the Air Force began at this time.

By dint of hard study V. A. Sudets mastered the complex aviation equipment. He always reinforced his knowledge of theory with practical activities. Subsequently, when commanding fighter subunits, he improved his flying skills. In November 1933 V. A. Sudets, commander and military commissar of the 73d Independent Fighter Detachment, was sent on a duty assignment to the Mongolian People's Republic, where he devoted much attention to problems of training and indoctrination of flight and ground crew personnel, organization of new aviation units of the Mongolian People's Army, and took active part in the fighting against the Japanese invaders in various parts of the Mongolian People's Republic and China. By decree of the USSR Central Executive Committee dated 28 January 1938, V. A. Sudets was awarded the Order of the Red Banner for successful performance of a responsible government assignment and for personal bravery. The Presidium of the Great People's Hural of the Mongolian People's Republic twice awarded him the Order of the Combat Red Banner.

In February 1939 Col V. A. Sudets was named deputy commander of the 27th Heavy Bomber Brigade, with which he took part in the fighting against the White Finns. Vladimir Aleksandrovich personally flew 14 combat missions. He was awarded the Order of Lenin for courage and valor. The knowledge and combat experience acquired in combat against the Japanese militarists and White Finns stood him in good stead in the Great Patriotic War. When the war broke out he was serving as commander of the IV Long-Range Bomber Corps of the Supreme High Command Reserve, the pilots of which delivered devastating attacks on the enemy.

At the end of March 1943 V. A. Sudets was named commander of the 17th Air Army. Vladimir Aleksandrovich commanded this army up to the end of the Great Patriotic War.

During the battle on the Kursk Salient, well-organized strikes by the 17th Air Army frequently predetermined the success of the ground forces. In the course of the battle Vladimir Aleksandrovich responded flexibly to all situation changes and skillfully guided the combat actions of the air combined units and units.

Working in close coordination with the troops of the combined-arms and tank armies of the Third Ukrainian Front, the airmen of the 17th Air Army battered Hitler's invaders in the Donbass, at Zaporozh'ye, Dnepropetrovsk, Krivoy Rog, Nikopol', and Odessa. In the operations to liberate the Ukraine, Gen V. A. Sudets skillfully organized air combat actions.

The airmen of the 17th Air Army and its commander performed decisively, boldly, vigorously, and displayed a high degree of skill in the Iasi-Kishinev Operation and in the liberation of Yugoslavia, Hungary, Austria, and Czechoslovakia.

On 30 April 1945 V. A. Sudets was awarded the title Hero of the Soviet Union. He was awarded many Soviet and foreign decorations and medals. Vladimir Aleksandrovich is a People's Hero of Yugoslavia and Hero of the Mongolian People's Republic. The combined units under his command received commendations on 32 separate occasions in orders of the Supreme High Command for distinction in combat.

After the war V. A. Sudets was named Chief of Staff and Deputy Commander in Chief of the Air Force. In 1955 he was promoted to the rank of Marshal Aviation. In March 1962 he was named Commander in Chief of National Air Defense Forces, USSR Deputy Minister of Defense, and Deputy Commander in Chief of Warsaw Pact Forces. Marshal Aviation Sudets served in this important post through July 1966. At the present time Vladimir Aleksandrovich is serving as inspector-advisor in the Ministry of Defense Inspector General Group. He is also serving as deputy board chairman of the Soviet-Bulgarian Friendship Society. He has been awarded the title of Honored Pilot of the Yugoslavian and Mongolian People's Republic Air Force. For a number of years now Mar Avn V. A. Sudets has been a member of the editorial board of VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL. He does a good deal of military-patriotic work, participating in indoctrination of our youth in revolutionary, fighting and labor traditions.

[8144/02''s-3024]

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ANNIVERSARY OF SOVIET VICTORY IN MANCHURIA MARKED

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 10, Oct 79 signed to press 21 Sep 79 pp 82-84

[Article, published under the heading "Military Historical Dates," by Candidate of Historical Sciences, Engr-Col M. Novikov: "On Defense of the Far Eastern Borders (On the 50th Anniversary of the Rout of the Chinese Militarists 1929)"]

[Text] In the spring of 1929, as a result of stepped-up intrigues on the part of international imperialism, the situation on the Soviet-Chinese border deteriorated sharply. The troops of Manchuria's military dictator, General Zhang Xueliang, began regularly shooting at border outposts and villages on Soviet territory. These activities were encouraged by China's Central Government, headed by Chiang Kai-shek, who was acting on the instructions of and in agreement with British, U.S. and Japanese imperialist circles.

In violation of Soviet-Chinese agreements on joint administration and use of the Chinese Eastern Railroad (CERR), built by Russia at the beginning of the 20th century, on 10-11 July 1929 the Chinese military seized yards and stations, as well as the railroad's general offices in Kharbin. All Soviet employees were fired, trade union and cooperative organizations were broken up, and more than 2,000 Soviet citizens who were employees of the CERR were put into concentration camps. Many of those arrested were subjected to torture, humiliation, and physical annihilation. All Soviet delegations and establishments in Manchuria were shut down. At the same time the number of armed provocations on the border increased.

The Soviet Government could not ignore hostile actions against the USSR on the part of the Chinese authorities. A note from the USSR People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs dated 13 July 1929 requested that the situation on the CERR be restored to normal within 3 days, taking into consideration the legitimate interests of the Soviet Union, and that border provocations be stopped. True to its peace-seeking policy, aimed at strengthening and development of good-neighbor relations between countries, the Soviet Government declared its willingness to hold talks on settling the conflict by peaceful means.¹ The Chinese militarists, however, ignored

the peaceful Soviet proposals. They continued to commit arbitrary and lawless acts on the CERR, continued incursions by armed bands onto Soviet soil, and continued moving troops toward the borders of the Soviet Maritime Region and Trans-Baikal.²

Under these conditions on 20 August 1929 the USSR Central Executive Committee and Council of People's Commissars issued a decree entitled "On Breaking Soviet Relations With China" and recalled Soviet diplomatic representatives.³ At the same time measures were taken to strengthen our Far-Eastern borders. Pursuant to a USSR Revolutionary Military Council order dated 6 August 1929, the Special Far-Eastern Army (SFEA) was formed, with V. K. Blyukher designated commander, N. Ye. Donenko, military council member, and A. Ya. Lapin, chief of staff. The SFEA consisted of the XVIII Rifle Corps, stationed in the Trans-Baikal (S. S. Vostretsov, commanding), the XIX Rifle Corps, stationed in the Maritime Region (G. D. Khakhan'yan, commanding), and the Amur River flotilla (Ya. I. Ozolin, commanding).

On 10 September the army newspaper TREVOGA published a statement by V. K. Blyukher. "All these hostile actions by the other side cannot be interpreted to be other than deliberate provocation," stated the commander of the SFEA. "Evidently they are planning on somewhat more than what they have done on the CERR and the border raids. In making this known to the troops of this army, I call upon all to display the greatest vigilance. I reiterate that in this conflict as well our government adheres to an inalterable policy of peace and is taking all steps it can to resolve the conflict by peaceful means."⁴



Defeat of the Forces of the Chinese Militarists in 1929

Key to map on preceding page:

1. CERR, jointly owned by the USSR and China and seized by the Chinese militarists on 10 July 1929
2. Systematic violations of the Soviet border by Chinese militarists in July-1929
3. Concentration of Chinese militarist troops
4. Deployment of Soviet troops (SFEA)
5. Soviet troop advance
6. Amur Flotilla area of operations
7. Signing of the Khabarovsk Protocol on 22 December 1929
8. XVIII Rifle Corps, SFEA
9. XIX Rifle Corps, SFEA
10. 2d Rifle Division
11. Army of Zhang Xueliang
12. Manchuria
13. Vladivostok
14. Khabarovsk
15. Blagoveshchensk
16. Amur
17. Kharbin
18. Chinese Eastern Railroad
19. Mongolian People's Republic
20. USSR
21. Ussuri River

In spite of the peace-seeking steps taken by the Soviet Government, however, the situation on the border remained tense. Chinese troops brazenly invaded Soviet territory and virtually paralyzed ship traffic on the Amur, Argun' and the Ussuri. The number of hostile actions was increasing, and they were increasing in scale. A real threat of military attack hung over the Soviet Far East.

By the beginning of October 1929 the Chinese militarists had concentrated their forces in four sectors: Man'chzhuro-Khaylar (approximately 20,000 men), Blagoveshchensk (up to 5,000 men), Sungari (more than 5,500 men), and Maritime (approximately 63,000 men).

The Soviet command, having estimated the situation, was forced to undertake response actions directed at ensuring the security of the Far-Eastern borders of the USSR. Between 12 October and 20 November the troops of the SFEA mounted three offensive operations (the Sungari, Mishan'fu, and Man'chzhuro-Chhalaynor). As a result large Chinese forces concentrated along the Soviet border were fully routed.

The devastating blow dealt by the Red Army against the Chinese militarists had a sobering effect on the Mukden Government, which on 26 October sent an urgent telegram to Moscow stating their agreement to talks with the Soviet Government.

On 3 December Soviet and Chinese representatives signed in Nikol'sk-Ussuriysk a preliminary agreement on settlement of the conflict on the CERR, and on 22 December a protocol was signed in Khabarovsk, which called for restoring the situation to normal on the CERR in conformity with the Treaty of Peking (1924).

In signing this document the Soviet Union did not impose a single humiliating condition, nor did it attempt to include a single point pertaining to China's sovereignty. The victory won by the SFEA served to strengthen peace and tranquility on the Far Eastern borders.

Pursuant to the agreement, on 23 December troops of the SFEA began withdrawing from Manchuria. They were given a warm sendoff by the local citizenry, who had suffered from outrages and plunder perpetrated by the troops of the White Chinese generals. The Soviet command handed out free of charge to the poorest segment of the population flour, sugar, salt, and other captured provisions.

The homeland highly praised the valiant actions and mass heroism of the defenders of our Far-Eastern borders. The Special Far-Eastern Army and the Amur Flotilla, as well as more than 500 officers and enlisted men, were awarded the Order of the Red Banner. They included the commander of the 5th Independent Kuban' Cavalry Brigade, future Mar SU K. K. Rokossovskiy; future army general A. P. Beloborodov and I. I. Fedyuninskiy, military council member N. Ye. Donenko, chief of staff of the SFEA A. Ya. Lapin, commander of the Amur Flotilla Ya. M. Ozolin, and many others. A commemorative presentation revolutionary weapon was presented to S. S. Vostretsov, commander of the Trans-Baikal Group of Forces. V. K. Blyukher, commander of the SFEA, was awarded Order of the Red Star No 1.

PRAVDA stated at that time that if our peace policy had triumphed and we had succeeded in averting a conflagration in the Far East, it was "in large measure due to the fact that our peace policy was supported by the military power and revolutionary enthusiasm of the Red Army.... Our army did not cease for a single minute to be an international army -- an army of the world proletariat.... The proletariat of the entire world will note with pride and delight the fact that before, during and after the military clashes the Chinese toilers have always viewed every Red Arayman as their friend and defender."⁵

Combat operations against the Chinese invaders gave the Soviet troops valuable combat experience and demonstrated the correctness of the fundamental points of the Red Army's field manuals and field service regulations. Such characteristic features of Soviet art of warfare as concentration of forces on the main axis and the element of surprise in attacks aimed at splitting, encircling and totally routing the enemy were vividly manifested in the course of combat. Coordinated action by infantry, cavalry, artillery, tanks and aircraft was carried out with precision on the Man'chzhuro-Chzhalaynor axis during penetration of fortified positions. For the first time in the history of Soviet art of warfare there was co-ordinated action between infantry units, ships and aircraft during landing of assault forces. The Red-Banner Special Far-Eastern Army demonstrated to the entire world the impregnability of the Far-Eastern borders of our socialist homeland. When on Chinese soil Soviet military personnel always displayed friendly, genuinely fraternal feelings toward the civilian population and displayed an example of a humane attitude toward prisoners of war.

The victory of the Soviet forces and a return to a normal situation on the CERR were of great political significance and promoted further strengthening of the international position of the USSR.

FOOTNOTES

1. "Sovetsko-kitayskiy konflikt 1929 g. Sbornik dokumentov" [The 1929 Soviet-Chinese Conflict. Collected Documents], Moscow, 1930, pp 23-24.
2. "Mezhdunarodnaya politika noveyshey vremeni" [Modern International Politics], Part III, Issue 1, Moscow, 1945, page 375.
3. Central State Archives of the Soviet Army, Fund 33879, List 66, File 2, sheets 590-600.
4. V. Dushen'kin, "Ot soldata do marshala" [From Private to Field Marshal], third edition, enlarged and revised, Moscow, Politizdat, page 180.
5. PRAVDA, 2 January 1930.
[8144/0279-3024]

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ANNIVERSARY OF THE 'GOLD STAR' MEDAL MARKED

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 10, Oct 79 signed to press 21 Sep 79 pp 84-87

[Article, published under the heading "Military Historical Dates," by Col V. Lebedev: "A Decoration of Special Distinction (On the 40th anniversary of the establishment of the "Gold Star" medal)"]

[Text] Giving due credit to and profound respect for the heroic deeds of Soviet citizens, their courage and self-sacrifice displayed during defense of the socialist homeland and performance of their patriotic and internationalist duty, the Communist Party and Soviet Government award government decorations to those who have distinguished themselves. The General Statute on USSR Decorations, Medals and Honorary Titles, ratified by ukase of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet dated 3 July 1979, emphasizes that award of USSR government decorations is one of the most important moral incentives in development of labor and sociopolitical activeness on the part of Soviet citizens, in the campaign to carry out the tasks of building communism, and in indoctrinating workers in a spirit of constant readiness to defend the socialist homeland.

Developing and improving the Soviet Government awards and decorations system, the USSR Central Executive Committee issued a decree dated 16 April 1934 establishing the highest degree of distinction — the title Hero of the Soviet Union.¹

Later, by an ukase of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet dated 1 August 1939, in order to provide special distinction for citizens who already bear the title Hero of the Soviet Union and who accomplish new heroic deeds, the Hero of the Soviet Union medal was established, a medal which, pursuant to an ukase of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet dated 16 October 1939, was redesignated the "Gold Star." This same ukase specified the design and described the medal.³

The "Gold Star" medal was first awarded to participants in the world-famous epic rescue of members of the Arctic expedition trapped on a drifting ice floe and the crew of the sunken vessel "Chelyuskin," famed

Soviet pilots M. V. Vodop'yanov, I. V. Doronin, N. P. Kamanin, S. A. Levanevskiy, A. V. Lyapidevskiy, V. S. Molokov, and M. T. Slepnev, who were awarded for this deed the title of Hero of the Soviet Union by ukase of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet dated 20 April 1934.

"Gold Star" medal No 1 was awarded to A. V. Lyapidevskiy, who was the first to deliver to terra firma the women and ~~children~~ members of the expedition.

Soon other Soviet patriots who had been awarded the title Hero of the Soviet Union prior to the ukase establishing the medal were awarded a badge of special distinction — the "Gold Star" medal. They included pilots M. M. Gromov, V. P. Chkalov, G. F. Baydukov, and A. V. Belyakov, who had successfully accomplished extremely long-distance flights; polar explorers O. Yu. Shmidt, M. I. Shevelev, I. D. Papanin, E. T. Krenkel', P. P. Shirshov, and Ye. K. Fedorov; and the first female Heroes of the Soviet Union -- Pilots Valentina Grizodubova, Polina Osipenko, and Marina Raskova.

In 1939-1940 the "Gold Star" medal was awarded to many Soviet military personnel who had fought on the side of the Republican forces in Spain, who had taken part in the rout of the Japanese militarists at Lake Khasan and the Khalkhin-Gol River, and who had distinguished themselves in combat on the Karelian Isthmus during the Soviet-Finnish conflict and who had been named Hero of the Soviet Union for this.

Up to 1941 a total of more than 600 persons had been awarded the "Gold Star" medal; five of these — military pilots S. I. Gritsevets, S. P. Denisov, G. P. Kravchenko, Ya. V. Smushkevich, and outstanding polar scientist I. D. Papanin were awarded this medal twice.⁴

During the Great Patriotic War the list of Gold Star heroes grew by thousands of additional names, which was a graphic indication of the mass heroism of Soviet citizens in the struggle against the German-fascist invaders.

On 8 July 1941 fighter pilots M. P. Zhukov, S. I. Zdorovtsev, and P. T. Kharitonov were honored with the title Hero of the Soviet Union and awarded a "Gold Star" medal for excellence in combat against enemy aircraft.

On 22 July 1941 a second "Gold Star" medal was awarded for the first time in the Great Patriotic War, to Hero of the Soviet Union Lt Col S. P. Suprun.⁵

During the war years more than 11,500 persons were honored with the title Hero of the Soviet Union and awarded a "Gold Star" medal. Feats accomplished by men of the army and navy, border guards and partisans, representatives of various of our country's peoples and nationalities were awarded the Gold Star of the Hero of the Soviet Union. Four out of every five persons honored with this highest award of the homeland were members

of the Communist Party and Komsomol. All 104 Heroes of the Soviet Union who received a second "Gold Star" medal during the Great Patriotic War were representatives of the Leninist party.

In the postwar period the family of Heroes of the Soviet Union who have been awarded the "Gold Star" medal has continued growing steadily. Soviet citizens, indoctrinated by the Communist Party, are boldly adding to the deeds of the heroes of the war, supporting and further developing the glorious revolutionary, combat and labor traditions of the past. Many members of the Soviet Army and Navy, border guards, testers of new, modern combat equipment, and bold space explorers have joined the honored ranks of Heroes of the Soviet Union.

In 1961 L. I. Brezhnev awarded the Order of Lenin and "Gold Star" medal to Yu. A. Gagarin, the world's first cosmonaut. Today more than 40 Soviet space explorers have been awarded this coveted decoration, and many of them twice.

There are approximately 30 citizens of other nations among the Heroes of the Soviet Union. They include Czechoslovak citizen O. Jaros, who distinguished himself in combat against the German-fascist invaders, and international space experiment participant V. Remek; Polish citizens -- sub-machine gunner A. Krzywon and cosmonaut-explorer of the PPR M. Giermaszewski; German antifascist F. Schmenkel and citizen of the GDR S. Jähn; glorious sons of the Bulgarian people Z. Zakhariev and G. Ivanov; French pilots of the Normandy-Neman Regiment; eminent leaders of the international Communist movement F. Castro, W. Ulbricht, and many others.

The "Gold Star" medal has been awarded to more than 12,500 persons in the four decades since its establishment.

Heroes of the Soviet Union who have repeated outstanding heroic feats enjoy the special respect and gratitude of the Soviet people. The deeds of 136 Heroes of the Soviet Union have been twice rewarded with decorations of special distinction.⁶

Five Heroes of the Soviet Union have gone beyond even this honored summit of popular recognition, having been awarded the "Gold Star" medal more than twice.⁷ On 19 August 1944 the heroic deeds of famed Soviet pilot, now Marshal Aviation, A. I. Pokryshkin were honored by a third "Gold Star" medal, and on 18 August 1945 another outstanding Soviet ace, now Col Gen Avn I. N. Kozhedub, was awarded such an honor. The deeds of famed hero of the Civil War and Great Patriotic War Mar SU S. M. Budenny were honored by three "Gold Star" medals. Outstanding Soviet military commander Mar SU G. K. Zhukov was awarded four "Gold Star" medals.

By ukase of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet dated 19 December 1978, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Mar SU Comrade Leonid Il'ich Brezhnev, Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, was awarded the Order of Lenin and a

third "Gold Star" medal for outstanding service to the Communist Party and Soviet state in strengthening the economic and defense might of the Soviet Union during the years of the Great Patriotic War and the postwar period, for tireless labor in the campaign for peace, and in connection with his birthday.

The "Gold Star" medal is awarded not only to individuals who have accomplished a heroic feat and who have been awarded the title Hero of the Soviet Union. In conformity with the law, this award is given, together with the Order of Lenin and a Certificate of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, to a city which has been awarded the highest distinction -- the title "City-Hero," and a fortress which has been awarded the highest mark of distinction -- the title "Fortress-Hero."

At various times the "Gold Star" medal has been awarded to the hero-cities Moscow, Leningrad, Kiev, Volgograd, Minsk, Odessa, Sevastopol', Novorossiysk, Kerch', Tula, and the Brest Fortress (Hero-Fortress), the population and military garrisons of which displayed mass heroism and courage in defending the socialist homeland.

"Decorations to cities are of course decorations to people," stated Leonid Il'ich Brezhnev at an official gathering dedicated to award of the Order of Lenin and the "Gold Star" medal to the Hero-City of Minsk. "People build cities. People defend them. People rebuild them from ashes. People provide cities with amenities and transform them."⁸

An obelisk bearing a facsimile of the Order of Lenin, the "Gold Star" medal and the text of the ukase of the presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet designating award of this honored title is being erected in the city awarded the title "Hero-City" and at the fortress awarded the title "Fortress-Hero."

In the 40 years since establishment of the "Gold Star" medal, this special mark of distinction has earned the honored right to be the most vivid symbol of the courage and heroism of the Soviet people, their total dedication to the socialist homeland, the Communist Party and people.

FOOTNOTES

1. The highest mark of distinction, the title Hero of the Soviet Union, is awarded for personal or collective service to the Soviet state and society connected with performance of a heroic deed (for more detail on the title "Hero of Soviet Union" see VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL, No 4, 1964; No 5, 1975).
2. Footnote omitted.

3. According to the description of the "Gold Star" medal, it is fashioned of gold and is in the shape of a five-pointed star with the inscription "Hero of the USSR" on the reverse. The medal is attached to a form mounting a red silk moire ribbon. The previously established "Hero of the Soviet Union" medal was not employed for physical presentation, and its design and description were not ratified.
4. In conformity with Soviet law, Heroes of the Soviet Union may be awarded an additional "Gold Star" medal for another heroic deed. In addition to the "Gold Star" medal, Heroes of the Soviet Union are awarded the highest Soviet honor — the Order of Lenin and Certificate of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet.
5. S. P. Suprun was awarded the title Hero of the Soviet Union by ukase of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet dated 20 May 1940.
6. A bronze bust with appropriate inscription on the pedestal is erected in the home town of a Hero of the Soviet Union who has been awarded a second "Gold Star" medal (or at another site by decision of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet).
7. Figures on the total number of Heroes of the Soviet Union who have been awarded an additional "Gold Star" medal were correct as of 1 August 1979.

8. PRAVDA, 26 June 1978.
[8144/0279-3024]

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MARSHAL BELOV ON ANNIVERSARY OF THE SIGNAL TROOPS

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 10, Oct 79 signed to press 21 Sep- 79 pp 87-89

[Article, published under the heading "Military Historical Dates," by Marshal Signal Troops A. Belov: "The 60th Year of the Signal Troops"]

[Text] On 20 October 1979 the Signal Troops of the Soviet Armed Forces celebrated their 60th anniversary. Their establishment and development are inseparably linked with the name of the great Lenin. During preparations for and in the course of the Great October Socialist Revolution, he emphasized time and again the special role and significance of communications in coordinating the efforts of the armed detachments of the proletariat for achieving victory.

In the difficult years of civil war and foreign military intervention, the Communist Party established a regular army and took decisive steps to organize an effective system of troop control and the material foundation of this system -- military communications.

On 10 October 1919 the Workers and Peasants Defense Council discussed the state of communications in the army and passed a resolution instructing the Republic Revolutionary Military Council (RRMC) to examine a draft statute on establishment of a central military communications directorate under the Field Headquarters of the RRMC. On the basis of this resolution RRMC Order No 1736/362 was issued on 20 October 1919, stating that "in order to unify all modes of communication in the Red Army, a communications directorate shall be established at Field Headquarters, headed by a chief of signal service."¹

Directorates were established in the fronts,² signal departments in the armies and divisions, and signal sections in the brigades. The positions of front and army chiefs of signal service were also established. The establishment of a central entity to direct Red Army communications and corresponding entities in the fronts, armies and divisions was of great significance in eliminating parallelism in operations and ensuring centralized troop control and military communications.

The first chief of signal service and commissar of the Red Army Signal Directorate was A. M. Lyubovich, a professional revolutionary, who prior to this had served as deputy people's commissar of postal and telegraph service.

Established under the direct supervision of V. I. Lenin, the Red Army Signal Troops honorably withstood the severe tests, fighting against the enemies of the young Soviet Republic. During the years of civil war and foreign intervention the signal troops wrote a glorious page in the chronicle of the history of our valiant army. Approximately 250 military communications personnel were awarded the Order of the Red Banner for unprecedented heroism and courage displayed during this period.

After the Civil War the Red Army was shifted to a peacetime status. In 1924 a military reform was carried out, which defined the structure and missions of the army under peacetime conditions. An important event for the signal troops during that period was the congress of top-echelon Workers' and Peasants' Red Army Signal Troops personnel, held in November 1924. M. V. Frunze spoke at this congress. The congress detailed the general provisions of organization of communications and examined the organizational structure of signal units and subunits, organization of combat and special training, and support of signal troops with more sophisticated equipment.

The party's policy course of national industrialization made it possible during the years of the first five-year plans to establish a domestic industry to manufacture various communications equipment. An enormous role in this was played by the Central Radio Laboratory and Scientific Research Communications Institute of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army.

New radio sets had been developed and were beginning to be delivered to the signal troops by 1941 -- the RAT, RAF, RSB, RSI-4, 9R, 10R, and others. In their specifications and performance they not only were not inferior to counterpart enemy equipment but superior in many respects. The situation was the same as regards development of telephone and telegraph equipment.

The first months of the last war confirmed with particular persuasiveness the importance of the role and the significance of military communications as the principal means of troop control. By decision of the State Defense Committee the position of Deputy People's Commissar of Defense for Communications was established, to be in charge of supervising domestic government and military communications, which substantially increased the reliability of communications for defense needs. Communications control entities of the Red Army, the fronts and armies adopted a new organizational-staff structure.

In August 1941 deployment of front and army signal units was substantially completed. Signal troops of the Supreme High Command Reserve and government communications were subsequently established.

The Communist Party and Soviet Government devoted constant attention toward increasing production and supply to the troops of more sophisticated communications equipment. By 1942 the signal troops had received approximately 500 sets of vehicle-mounted radio sets for front nets and General Staff nets, approximately 3000 radio sets for corps and army nets, and more than 25,000 portable radio sets. The troops began receiving VHF sets. Approximately 9,000 radio sets of various types were employed by our troops in the Battle of Stalingrad, while the number had increased to more than 27,000 by the 1944 Belorussian Operation. In the final operations of the war the signal troops for all practical purposes had a sufficiency of radio equipment. In the period 1941-1945 Soviet industry supplied the front with more than 325,000 radio sets.³

A characteristic feature of development of military communications during the Great Patriotic War was an increase in the percentage share of signal troops in the overall structure of the Soviet Armed Forces. At the beginning of the Great Patriotic War signal troops comprised approximately 5% of the army's total numerical strength, while by the end of the war one out of every ten servicemen was in military communications.⁴

Methods of organization of communications were steadily improved as the war progressed, officers and general officers improved their professional skills, and signal unit and subunit tactics were developed.

There developed in the course of the war gifted military communications leaders, including Mars Sig Trps I. T. Peresypkin and A. I. Leonov, Gens N. D. Psurtsev, I. T. Bulychev, I. I. Burov, A. T. Grigor'yev, D. N. Dobykin, I. N. Kovalev, T. P. Kargapolov, M. A. Naydenov, P. K. Panin, B. T. Soldatenkov, and many others.

The homeland highly regarded the heroic labor and combat deeds of signal troops personnel. Hundreds of thousands of signal personnel were awarded Soviet Government decorations and medals. A total of 303 signal personnel were awarded the title Hero of the Soviet Union. The Order of Glory was awarded to 106 persons. Approximately 600 signal units received government decorations, more than 200 were twice decorated, 58 independent signal units were given the guards appellation, and 172 front and army signal units were honorarily named after the cities in the liberation of which they had assisted with their skilled and selfless actions. In 1945 alone signal troops received more than 150 commendations in Supreme Commander orders.

The wealth of experience amassed by signal troops during the Great Patriotic War was extensively employed in development and improvement of military communications in the postwar period.

Thanks to the constant concern of party and government, today the troops are being equipped with the latest communications gear. Automated control systems substantially increase the capabilities and efficiency of troop

control. Organization of combat training of signal units is being improved and brought into conformity with the new demands of control, and new principles of training and indoctrination of military signal personnel are being incorporated.

The level of training of signal troops specialists is continuously rising. More than 50% of signal troops officers now possess higher military and engineering training. A number of signal units have been awarded the Minister of Defense Pennant for courage and military valor, the Jubilee Badge of Honor of the CPSU Central Committee, Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet and USSR Council of Ministers.

The signal troops, marching shoulder to shoulder with the other arms and branches of the military, are making a worthy contribution and are doing everything "to ensure that the glorious Armed Forces of the Soviet Union continue in the future possessing all requisite means to carry out their responsible mission -- to guard the peaceful labor of the Soviet people and to serve as a bulwark of world peace."⁶

FOOTNOTES

1. Central State Archives of the Soviet Army, Fund 25, List 10, File 2, Sheet 7.
2. Ibid., Sheet 41.
3. Ibid., Fund 71, List 12173, File 191, sheets 4-7; List 12178, File 141, sheets 10-11.
4. "Voyennyye svyazisty v dni voyny i mira" [Military Signal Personnel in War and Peace], Voenizdat, 1968, page 290.
5. Footnote omitted.
6. "Materialy XXV s"yezda KPSS" [Proceedings of the 25th CPSU Congress], Moscow, Politizdat, 1976, page 83.
[8144/0279-3024]

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3024

CSO: 8144/279

BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION ON ARMY GENERAL BELIK

Moscow VOVENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 10, Oct 79 signed to press 21 Sep 79 pp 93-95

[Article, published under the heading "Military Historical Dates," by HSU Army Gen P. Kurochkin: "Army General P. A. Belik (On his 70th birthday)"]

[Text] Petr Alekseyevich Belik's childhood was not easy.¹ He began at a tender age hiring out to local wealthy peasants — tending stock and working in the fields. Unable to stand the abuse of one of his bosses, the 14-year-old boy joined the "army" of homeless waifs.

In spite of the difficult years, the Soviet authorities made a man out of this runaway. In 1925 Petr Belik was sent to a children's labor colony. There he learned to read and write and, having learned the bench mechanic's trade, went to work at a factory.

On 27 September 1927 P. A. Belik voluntarily enrolled in the Kiev Infantry School, at which he was accepted to membership in the All-Union Communist Party (of Bolsheviks) in 1929. This was a joyous and important event in his life.

Beginning in 1930 the young Red commander in turn commanded a platoon, a tank company, a battalion, and in 1940 was named commander of the 8th Motorcycle Regiment.

The subunits, and subsequently the regiment, commanded by P. A. Belik were always boosted by him to the level of outstanding performers in combat and political training and discipline. Successful leadership of his subordinates and their training were promoted by the excellent overall and political development of the young commander, his fine methodological skills, his demandingness on his men and his concern for them. He always possessed thorough knowledge of his unit's equipment and weapons, was an excellent marksman, and displayed in this respect a worthy example to all regiment personnel.

An excellent company, excellent battalion, and excellent regiment — how much labor is expended, how much intellect, how many concerns, large and small! And every day the commander is faced with the question: "How will

my men perform in combat? Will they perform at the moment of severe test that to which one's entire life has been devoted?"

Even today Petr Alekseyevich remembers well the day when, at the beginning of summer in 1941, his regiment was moving westward. Commanders were saying goodbye to their wives and children, assuring them that within a month or two their families would receive notice to move and would replace the harsh Trans-Baikal for the Ukraine. In actual fact the commanders were going to war. The regiment fought its first engagement at Shepetovka as an element of the V Mechanized Corps of the 16th Army. Heavy fighting and the bitterness of retreat did not weaken the fighting spirit of the men of the regiment.

In July 1941 I entered 20th Army Headquarters near Smolensk. By order of Headquarters, Supreme High Command, Maj Gen Tank Trps I. P. Alekseyenko's V Mechanized Corps was now an element of this army. I remember how, describing the commander of the 8th Motorcycle Regiment, he commented that during combat Major Belik had shown himself to be a fine organizer and leader -- he had directed the combat of the regiment's subunits firmly and skillfully, and did not lose his bearings in a difficult tactical situation.

P. A. Belik's regiment fought bravely and skillfully at Orsha, Smolensk, and subsequently took part in the Battle of Moscow, where Petr Alekseyevich's military skills were honored with a high government decoration -- the Order of the Red Banner. On 24 January 1942 Lieutenant Colonel Belik was seriously wounded. But upon release from the military hospital, he returned to his regiment.

On 1 November 1942 the 8th Motorcycle Regiment joined the 5th Tank Army of the Southwestern Front. P. A. Belik's brave fighting men distinguished themselves once again in the fighting at Stalingrad. For example, on 19 November the regiment broke through to operational depth and by the following morning had reached the enemy's lines of communication in the area of Perelazovskiy, helping establish an outer perimeter of encirclement. Bypassing strong points, the motorcyclists swiftly advanced, hitting headquarters and communications centers. They acted bravely, resolutely, and boldly. In 8 days the regiment destroyed three field headquarters, disabled 14 tanks, 16 self-propelled guns, 15 antitank guns, 247 trucks and 470 horse-drawn ammunition wagons, blew up 7 supply dumps, railbed and communications line poles between Stalingrad and Likhaya. The motorcyclists burned 9 JU-88 aircraft at a fascist airfield near Solevskaya. During these days the regiment killed 2,800 and captured 11,000 enemy officers and enlisted men.

Stories about the bravery of the men of this regiment and their commander made the rounds of the troops, as the word of their combat actions spread. The newspaper NA RAZGROM VRAGA wrote: "Belik's motorcyclist-heroes have killed 6,000 of Hitler's soldiers in combat.... Glorious infantrymen, tankers, and artillerymen! Drive the Germans out of their fortified areas, fight for the guards banner, for our victory like the hero-motorcyclists are fighting for it!"²

On 18 December 1942 the 8th Motorcycle Regiment was redesignated the 3d Independent Guards Motorcycle Regiment for outstanding combat performance behind enemy lines, for the courage and valor of its personnel. On 14 February 1943 Col P. A. Belik was awarded the title Hero of the Soviet Union. Subsequently the regiment's guards motorcyclists fought at Khar'kov, Izyum, and took part in the Battle of the Dnieper.

As 1944 began Col P. A. Belik was in Moscow enrolled in the Higher Academic Curriculum at the Armored Troops Academy. In March 1945 he was named commander of the 2d Independent Red-Banner, Order of Suvorov and Kutuzov Guards Tank Brigade of the Third Belorussian Front, which under his leadership successfully fought actions to penetrate the enemy's defense, which was dispositioned in depth, and to exploit the successful advance in the East Prussian Operation.

Following the Great Patriotic War Petr Alekseyevich commanded combined units for an extended period of time. In 1953 he successfully completed the Higher Academic Curriculum at the General Staff Academy. In 1960 Lt Gen (Col Gen effective April 1962) P. A. Belik was named deputy and subsequently first deputy commander of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany. From August 1966 through January 1979 Army Gen³ P. A. Belik commanded the troops of the Trans-Baikal Military District. He skillfully directed the work of the district's military council, headquarters staff and party organization aimed at increasing troop combat readiness, improvement of the training process, establishment of facilities, and provision of adequate housing and living conditions for his men and their families. In January 1979 P. A. Belik was named military inspector-advisor of the USSR Ministry of Defense Inspector General Group.

Petr Alekseyevich takes active part in party and civic affairs. He was elected deputy to the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR and to the USSR Supreme Soviet, 8th and 9th Convocations, and served as a delegate to the 24th and 25th CPSU Congresses, at which he was elected to the CPSU Central Audit Commission. At the present time Petr Alekseyevich is continuing to work productively for the good of our country to the extent health permits; he is performing considerable military-patriotic work among the population, especially among young people and military personnel.

Army Gen P. A. Belik has been twice awarded the Order of Lenin, holds the Order of the October Revolution, has been four times awarded the Order of the Red Banner, holds the Order of Suvorov, 3d Class, the Order of the Red Star, "For Service to the Homeland in the USSR Armed Forces," 3d Class, medals, as well as foreign decorations.

The character of this amazingly brave, gifted fighting man, a true son of our socialist homeland, was formed and conditioned in battles and campaigns. On the occasion of his 70th birthday we wish deeply-respected Petr Alekseyevich Belik good health and continued success for the benefit of our homeland and strengthening of the defense capability of its Armed Forces.

FOOTNOTES

1. Army Gen P. A. Belik was born on 6 October 1909 in the village of Zhukovtsy (today's Obukhovskiy Rayon, Kiyevskaya Oblast), in a poor peasant family. His father, Aleksey Grigor'yevich Belik, moved to Kiev in 1909 and worked as a laborer at a cement plant prior to conscription into the Tsarist army. His mother, Anna Mikhaylovna, worked as a laundress and charwoman. In 1917 his father joined a Red Guard detachment and beginning in 1918, while serving as a sailor in the Dnieper Naval Flotilla, defended Soviet rule. He died in 1923.
2. NA RAZGROM VRAGA, 4 December 1942.
3. P. A. Belik was promoted to the rank of Army General on 21 February 1969.
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